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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to explain the development of national identity in Jordan in the 
post-disengagement period since 1988. National identity in Jordan has come full circle 
with the announcement of the ‘Jordan First’ policy. The Jordan First policy was 
enunciated to put the interest of the country first over other influences that were 
perceived to be inimical to the development of a strong national identity. After the 
Second World War, Jordan was still unsure of its national identity and its place in the 
Middle East state system. The rise of nationalism as one of the chief ideological 
instruments in many cases in the region soon found traction in Jordan as well, and led 
the country’s authorities to apply nationalism to the development of the national 
identity. Nationalism has become one of the primary dynamics for the development of 
national identity in Jordan. Within the context provided, this thesis, thus, explains the 
evolution of nationalism in Jordan and its impact on identity politics in the post-
disengagement period since 1988. 
 
 
 
4 
 
Acknowledgements: 
 
 
I offer my sincerest gratitude and thanks to Professor Ehteshami and Professor Emma 
Murphy for their patience, hard work and unstinting support.  I want to thank Professor 
Clive Jones for his help and guidance during the review panel stages, Dr Christian 
Schweiger for his help in the early stages of the review.  I want to thank Mr mamtimyn 
sunudoula for his help in finding resources in the library and helping me with general 
literature enquires. 
 
I want to thank my parents for their continuous  support and them believing in me and 
my project. My Family members including my brothers who always supported me in 
difficult and challenging times. I must signal out my uncle who was always happy to 
give me his precious time and listen to the progress of my research work whenever I 
travel to Jordan.  
 
 
In the  spring/summer 2013 a number of people helped me in my fieldwork research in 
Amman. These people are: Dr Hasan Momani Head of Politics Department University 
of Jordan, Dr Jawad Al Anani, former deputy Jordanian Prime Minister and foreign 
minister, His excellency Dr Marouf Al Bakheit Former Prime minister from November 
2005 until  November 2007 and from  February 2011 to 17 October 2011. His 
Excellency Abdulsalam Al Majali former Prime Minister in the period 1993-1995 and 
also signed the peace Accord between Jordan and Israel in 1994. 
5 
 
 
Table of Contents	  
 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ 3	  
Thesis Structure .............................................................................................................. 9	  
Introduction: Modern History of Jordan from the 1950s to the Disengagement of 
1988 ................................................................................................................................ 11	  
I. The early years of King Hussein’s rule and the 1950s ........................................... 14	  
II Jordanian nationalism in the 1960s and the Six Day War, 1967. ........................... 30	  
(i) The Samu raid 1966 .......................................................................................... 31	  
(ii). The unification of the West Bank ................................................................... 33	  
(iii) The West Bank ............................................................................................... 39	  
(iv) Jerusalem ........................................................................................................ 42	  
(v) Jerusalem’s role in the 1967 war ..................................................................... 44	  
III Black September 1970 .......................................................................................... 46	  
(i) Events prior to September 1970 ....................................................................... 46	  
(ii) ‘Black September’ 1970 .................................................................................. 48	  
IV. Jordan in the 1980s (pre disengagement) ............................................................ 54	  
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 58	  
Chapter One: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Jordan ................................................. 60	  
I. Early theories of nationalism .................................................................................. 61	  
II. Modernist approaches to nationalism .................................................................... 68	  
III. Gellner’s structuralist theory ................................................................................ 71	  
IV. The Kohn Dichotomy .......................................................................................... 75	  
V. Gellner and nationalism ........................................................................................ 80	  
VI. Definition of Arab Nationalism ........................................................................... 85	  
VII. Prominent thinkers on Arab nationalism ............................................................ 86	  
VIII. A conceptual discussion of nationalism in Jordan ............................................ 88	  
IX. The ethnic factor in Middle Eastern politics ........................................................ 92	  
XI. Politics of ethnicity and the Middle Eastern state ................................................ 95	  
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 99	  
Literature review ...................................................................................................... 102	  
 
6 
 
(i) From colonialism to Arab nationalism ........................................................... 102	  
(ii) Tribes and Bedouin ........................................................................................ 108	  
(iii) The military ..................................................................................................... 112	  
(iv) From Palestinians to Jordanians ......................................................................... 114	  
Methodological section ............................................................................................ 121	  
Chapter Two: Hashemite and Jordanian National Discourse since 1988 ............. 124	  
I. Hashemite discourse and tribes ............................................................................ 124	  
Introduction ......................................................................................................... 124	  
(i) Tribes and state formation in the Middle East ................................................ 126	  
(ii) Sub-societal divisions in the Middle East: tribal, ethnic or sectarian ............ 128	  
(iii) Tribes and the state in the Middle East ........................................................ 129	  
(iv) Who are the tribes of Jordan? ....................................................................... 130	  
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 136	  
2. The Army and the Hashemite discourse .............................................................. 138	  
Introduction ......................................................................................................... 138	  
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 146	  
3. The Palestinians and the Hashemite discourse .................................................... 147	  
Introduction ......................................................................................................... 147	  
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 154	  
4. Jordan First and the Hashemite discourse. ........................................................... 155	  
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 160	  
Chapter Three: Jordanian-Palestinian relations and their impact on identity 
formation in Jordan .................................................................................................... 163	  
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 163	  
I. Jordan’s involvement and struggle for Palestine .................................................. 164	  
II. Jordanian-Palestinian relations after the Nakba and until the Six-Day War ....... 171	  
III. Jordanian-Palestinian relations from the Six Day War until the 1985 Agreement
 .................................................................................................................................. 178	  
IV.The Agreement between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat ................................ 184	  
V. Dismantling legal and administrative links with the West Bank ........................ 188	  
VI. Jordanian-Palestinian relations after the disengagement of 1988 ...................... 195	  
VII. Jordanian-Palestinian relations in the peace process ........................................ 198	  
VIII. Confederation: theory versus practice ............................................................. 201	  
(i) Definition of the Confederation and its importance ....................................... 201	  
7 
 
(ii) Jordanian confederation with Palestine ......................................................... 202	  
(iii) The confederation’s most important goals, benefits and motivations .......... 205	  
(iv) The confederation option in the official Jordanian vision: Attitudes and 
concept ................................................................................................................. 206	  
(v) The confederation option in the official Palestinian vision: Attitudes and 
concept ................................................................................................................. 208	  
(vi) Scenarios for the future Jordanian-Palestinian relationship ......................... 211	  
IX. Agreement between Jordan and Palestine over custodianship of Jerusalem’s holy 
places ........................................................................................................................ 214	  
(i) Introduction .................................................................................................... 214	  
(ii) Jordanian identity linked to defending Jerusalem ......................................... 215	  
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 217	  
Chapter Four: Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty and its effects on Jordanian 
identity ......................................................................................................................... 221	  
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 221	  
I. Terms of agreement .............................................................................................. 230	  
II. Identity in Jordan and the peace process ............................................................. 231	  
III. Debates in Jordan over the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty ............................... 234	  
IV. National identity and the peace process after the death of King Hussein .......... 238	  
V. Peace with Israel and the future of Jordanian identity ........................................ 241	  
VI. The evolution of identity in Jordan and relations with Israel ............................ 244	  
VII. The future prospects for Jordanian-Israel relations and identity formation ..... 247	  
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 249	  
Chapter Five: The Arab Spring and National Identity in Jordan ......................... 251	  
Introduction to the Arab Spring protest ................................................................... 251	  
Section A: The Arab Spring ..................................................................................... 253	  
(i) An overview of the Arab Spring in Middle East politics ............................... 253	  
(ii) A preliminary analysis of the Arab spring protests ....................................... 257	  
iii) The Arab Spring opposition movement in Jordan ......................................... 258	  
iv) The effects of the Arab Spring in Jordan ....................................................... 261	  
(v) The context of the Arab Spring protests in Jordan ........................................ 266	  
Section B: The protests in Jordan ............................................................................ 271	  
(i) Arab Spring protests in Jordan ....................................................................... 271	  
ii) The protest movement in contemporary Jordan: The case of the Hirak ......... 275	  
8 
 
(iii) Jordan’s segmented and appeased opposition .............................................. 277	  
(iv) Hirak opposition in Jordan ........................................................................... 281	  
(v) The youth group Hirak in Jordan ................................................................... 282	  
(vi) The government’s response to the protests in Jordan ................................... 284	  
(vii) Political opposition and reforms in Jordan .................................................. 289	  
(viii) The reform question in Jordan .................................................................... 291	  
(ix) Protests gaining little traction in Jordan ....................................................... 294	  
(x) The issue of identity in Jordanian politics today ........................................... 296	  
Section C: The Syrian Crisis .................................................................................... 298	  
(i) Inside alliances against the backdrop of the Syrian civil war ......................... 298	  
(ii) Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan ...................................................................... 300	  
(iii) The refugee crisis and its impact on identity in Jordan ................................ 305	  
Conclusion: Jordan since the Arab uprising: between change and stability ............ 309	  
Chapter Six: Conclusion. ........................................................................................... 312	  
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..319 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
Thesis Structure 
 
For this thesis, national identity in Jordan will be examined in the post-disengagement 
period since 1988. National identity in Jordan has come full circle with the 
announcement of the ‘Jordan First’ policy. The Jordan First policy was enunciated to 
put the interest of the county first over other influences that were perceived to be 
inimical to the development of a strong national identity. After the Second World War, 
Jordan was still unsure of its national identity and its place in the Middle East state 
system. This thesis will examine the evolution of nationalism in Jordan and its impact 
on identity politics in the post-disengagement period since 1988. The first chapter will 
provide a modern history of Jordan up to the late 1980s, analysing the key events and 
the policies implemented in the country. Building on this, a detailed literature review is 
undertaken to examine the existing literature in the field and to show the development 
in the analysis of the literature written on Jordan. Key texts will be examined as well as 
key scholars. How one research work builds on another will be highlighted, as well as 
how the different schools of thought vis-à-vis nationalism and national identity in the 
Middle East. Gaps will be identified that will prove fruitful for further research. My 
thesis will build on the literature on the field and make an original contribution to the 
subject area of Middle East politics. The methodological tools used for the research will 
also be highlighted. Chapter One examines the different theories of nationalism in the 
Middle East and looks at ethnicity. From Gellner to Kohn, key theoreticians in the 
subject area will be examined. Chapter Two seeks to analyse the Hashemite monarchy 
and the Jordanian national discourse after disengagement. Key to this chapter will be an 
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understanding of tribal politics and the role of the army in the debates concerning 
national identity.  
Chapter Three will examine relations between Jordan and the Palestinian authority with 
a view to understanding how the Arab-Israeli conflict influences the discourse of 
national identity in Jordan. Fundamental to the analysis in this chapter will be a 
discussion of the confederation scheme between the Jordanians and Palestinians. Lastly, 
the administration of the holy places in Jerusalem and its impact on Jordanian politics 
will be examined. 
 Chapter Four builds on the previous chapter by undertaking a study of the Jordan-
Israeli Peace Treaty and its effects on identity formation. The Arab-Israeli conflict 
affects Jordanian politics more than any other Arab state, and its resolution would be 
key to the building of a strong identity in Jordan. The fifth and final chapter will bring 
the analysis up to date by examining the role of the Arab spring on identity formation in 
Jordan. Key to this will be an understanding of what inspired the protests, the role of 
the Hirak and the continuing civil war unfolding in neighbouring Syria.  
In sum, the thesis will provide a thorough examination of the development of 
nationalism in Jordan since the 1980s. Its conclusion will be that national identity as a 
result of the factors examined above has undergone difficult tests and trials but has 
emerged coherent and further strengthened. 
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Introduction: Modern History of Jordan from the 1950s to the 
Disengagement of 1988 
 
In this opening chapter of the thesis, I will be providing the historical context and 
foundations for the subsequent study to follow. My thesis will be looking at the 
development of Jordanian nationalism in the post 1988 disengagement period. The 
thesis will offer a critical and analytical examination of the development of national 
identity and discourse of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan.  
This chapter will have a four-way division. The purpose of the four-way division will 
be twofold: 1. To give a sound historical foundation to the argument and analysis to be 
advanced later in the thesis; 2. To show in each of the four sections the precise nature of 
the development of Jordanian nationalism in the concerned period. 
The four-way division of this chapter is as follows: 1. The first section of the first 
chapter will look at the reign of the late King Hussein primarily focusing on the 1950s 
an how in this early period the idea of the Jordanian national identity was first mooted 
and began to be formulated; 2.  The second section of the chapter will have as its focus 
the Six-Day War of June 1967 as its linchpin; the larger discussion of the section will 
highlight developments in the 1960s. The 1960s was an important period in the 
development of Jordanian nationalism because this was the time when the pan-Arab 
sentiment was at its height and also the time in which Jordan had to cede control of the 
West Bank of the River Jordan to the expansionist Israeli state 3.  The third section of 
the thesis will look at the Palestinian factor in depth with the events of September 1970 
very much in the forefront of the discussion. The challenge of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation to the reign of King Hussein and the territorial integrity of Jordan was a 
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very real threat. These events prompted Hussein to take the forceful measures he did, 
culminating in Black September 1970. The 1970s were a crucial decade in the 
development of the Jordanian nationalism because of the heightened consciousness of 
an emergent Palestinian identity distinct to and in places in contra to a Jordanian 
national discourse .The very foundations and viability of a Jordanian national 
consciousness were challenged by a Palestinian alternative. The fourth and concluding 
section of the first chapter will bring the historical narrative up to the late 1980s, 
specifically 1988, and the decision of Jordan to formally disengage from claiming 
ownership of the West Bank and thereafter the coining of term ‘Jordan First’.  
History of Trans Jordan 1921-1948 
Before the thesis begins to examine the early years of King Hussein’s rule and what 
happened in the 1950’s as far as Jordanian history is concerned.It is necessary to 
examine Briefly the History of what was then called Trans Jordan and how it helped 
shape Jordanian Identity. Before 1921 there was no territory, people, or nationalist 
movement that was designated or designated itself as Trans Jordanian.  Trans Jordan as 
a nation state was established in the wake of World War 1 in 1921 by the British and 
the recently arrived Emir Abdullah.  This was Trans Jordan’s inaugural moment.  The 
British replaced the few existing state structures left by the Ottomans and the small 
short lived regional governments that regionalists has established in 1921 to 1921 
during the interregnum period following the end of Ottoman rule and the beginning of 
British Rule.  The first decade of the rule was characterized by the British and the 
Amir’s attempts to set up a governmental structure, an army, an police force and a 
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bureaucracy followed by the establishment of laws that began to be decreed in 1927.1 
Trans Jordan’s first constitution was set up in 1928 as the Organic Law concomitant 
with many other laws governing every aspect of life in the new state. Also, Trans 
Jordan expanded demographically and geographically through the annexation of an area 
extending from south Ma’an to Aqaba that was part of the Hejaz before. 
Consolidation of state power proceeded apace in the 1930’s through coercion and co-
optation of local elites, whose resistance to the non-representative state in the late 1920s 
and through the mid-1930s was crushed or neutralized by different means through the 
recruitment and subjugation of the previously recalcitrant Bedouin population, 
consisting almost half the nascent country population.2 
Anticolonial uprisings took place in the second half of 1930’s in solidarity with the 
neighbouring Palestinians who were revolting against the British and the Zionist. 
Project. These were also crushed. The 1940s witnessed many changes in the country, 
Trans Jordan’s mostly Bedouin army which is also called as the Arab legion acquired 
an international role through intervening in Syria and Iraq in behalf of the British 
Government and a domestic one of disciplining the Bedouin population itself declaring 
itself through its integration to state structures. Trans Jordan was transformed from an 
emirate to an independent country with emir Abdullah declaring himself as King.  The 
very name of Transjordan which was named by the British government after World war 
one was changed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.3 
 
                                                
1 Jospeh, Masa’ad Colonial Effects  The making of National Identity In Jordan. Columbia University 
Press 2001 p.35 
2 Ibid.p.36 
3 Ibid.p.37 
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The newly independent country experienced even more fundamental transformations 
before the decade was over. It had expanded to include central Palestine, the largest 
land that the Zionists did not conquer and a large Palestinian population that consisted 
of citizens of central Palestine that was later named The West Bank and the refugees 
expelled from the part of Palestine that became Israel more than tripling the population. 
This was the second time that Jordan expanded geographically and demographically.  
The 1925 and 1940 to 1950 expansions constitute an important moment in the history 
of the country as the country’s physical boundaries and demographic constitution were 
transformed in ways that was detrimental to its national identity and culture. 
I. The early years of King Hussein’s rule and the 1950s 
To begin with we shall be looking at the reign of King Hussein of Jordan and the events 
that took place during 1953-1966 periods. 
Amir Abdullah’s Hashemite family actually hailed not from Jordan itself but from 
Mecca in western Arabia. The Hashemites had fought with the British in the ‘Great 
Arab Revolt’ against the Ottoman Turkish Empire during World War I. However 
shortly after the war ended, the Hashemites were defeated and expelled from Arabia by 
their rivals the Saudis, who ultimately carved out the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
to which they attached the family name. In the post-war mandate period, the British 
government decided to install two brothers of the House of Hashim, Abdullah, and 
Faisal, in their mandates of Jordan and Iraq respectively. This move was in large part 
intended as a reward for Hashemite support in the Arab revolt against the Ottoman 
Empire during World War I. 
The events of the First World War, the Arab revolt specifically, and the Hashemites 
being the standard bearers of the incipient Arab identity all contributed to raising the 
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consciousness of an educated class of Arab notables and them espousing through 
nationalism a demand for greater Arab recognition and power vis-a-vis a declining 
Ottoman empire and a resurgent Turkish nationalism. A Jordanian national identity had 
not as yet been formed simply because Jordan as a country did not yet exist. The 
antecedents of a Jordanian nationalism as I will argue in my thesis are to found in the 
Arab revolt and the incipient Arab nationalism in the inter-war years in particular. The 
Hashemites heading up of the Arab movement in the Middle East allowed them to place 
themselves as its chief spokespersons and therefore the family and the group that was to 
benefit the most from any redrawing of national frontiers in the post- war peace 
settlement. 
From such inauspicious beginnings, Jordan has developed into a modern state that has 
long defied predictions of its imminent demise. It was anticipated by a number of 
commentators of the region that Jordan would not long survive its creation in the post 
war period. It was deemed that it was an artificial creation on the part of the European 
powers and that it would only survive on British subsidy, however Jordan today is a 
fully-fledged participant of the Middle East state system.4 What began as the British 
Mandate of Transjordan in 1921 evolved into the Emirate of Transjordan and following 
independence from Britain in 1946, finally evolved into its current form as the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1949. Jordan can therefore be seen – at least in its 
origins – as among the most artificial states in the modern Middle East. Over time, 
however, a sense of nationhood and national identity has developed within the kingdom 
                                                
4 Nasser Aruri, Jordan A study in political development 1921-1965, the Hague 1972 pp.15-33 
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so that the notion of ‘Jordanian’ does carry very real meaning for many Jordanians. 5 
When Jordan came into being as a country there was little sense of a distinct national 
identity and discourse. What were in place however were the ingredients with which to 
‘bake’ a national consciousness. The key factors in this respect were: 1.The Hashemites 
leading of the Arab independence movement; 2. The Hashemites standing in the Middle 
East as a family of repute and lineage, drawing on their ancestry and tracing their roots 
back to the family of the Prophet and also crucially the custodians of the sacred 
sanctuary in Mecca and the holy cities in the Hijaz. 3. Princes Abdullah and Faisal had 
made contact with the Arab nationalist groups in Syria and were in communication with 
them with the view to be the leading protagonists of the Arab cause. The above three 
factors were the prime reasons for the Hashemite family to be viewed as the 
representatives for the Arab nationalist movement. This analysis has shown that even 
before the historical of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan in the post war period, the 
family of the Hashemites were intimately and closely associated with a school of 
thought that had advanced nationalism as its primary ideological concern. My argument 
in this chapter will be that Arab nationalism was a precursor to Jordanian nationalism 
and Jordanian nationalism was built on the foundation stones of the Arab nationalist 
discourse of the post-war period. 
In the years after the Jordanian state was founded, King Abdullah I took control of 
Transjordan after liberating it from British rule. However it was his grandson King 
Hussein who led Jordan’s political development, created many of its institutions, and 
ensured that the Western great powers would view the kingdom as having vital 
                                                
5 Curtis Ryan, Jordan in transition: from Hussein to Abdullah, Lynne Rienner publishers published in 
united states, 2002 p. 5. 
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geopolitical and geostrategic importance in both the Cold War and the Middle East 
peace process.  
From the foundation of the Hashemite state onward, Jordan maintained close strategic 
ties to Britain. After World War II, and with the onset of the Cold War, Jordan also 
established stronger links to the United States, as the Western powers came to view 
Jordan as a conservative bulwark against communism and radical forms of pan-
Arabism, and as potentially a moderating element in the Arab-Israeli conflict. King 
Hussein played on these concerns and his regime’s conservative and anti-Communist 
credentials to solidify ties with the United States in particular. From its emergence as an 
independent state, Jordan has held close ties to powerful Western states and has in fact 
depended heavily on foreign aid from these countries to keep the kingdom afloat.6 
King Hussein was not only instrumental laying the operational and logistical 
foundations of the modern Jordanian kingdom but was also crucial and innovative in 
laying the ideological bases for the emergent Jordanian identity and its attendant 
national discourse. In broad terms, there were a number of key decisions which the 
young king took which helped in the development in the national discourse. These were 
related to the military, the Bedouins and the formulation of a constitution for the 
country. Underpinning these endeavours was King Hussein’s unique reading of Arab 
nationalism and Jordan’s place in the larger scheme of events. As far as King Hussein 
was concerned the unity and strength of an Arab nation lay in the constituent parts that 
comprised the larger family of nations, he was quite clear as to Jordan’s role in this7. 
                                                
2 Ibid., p.6. 
7  King Hussein’s view on Jordan’s view on Unity 	  	  http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/views_arab2.html 
accessed on 10/10/2012. 
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Jordan’s particular territorial integrity and its incorporation of first Bedouin and 
secondly Palestinians elements were factors which made Jordan unique to other Arab 
nations. This uniqueness and ‘ separateness’ was first to be respected and recognised 
before any pan-Arab scheme could be realistically embarked upon.8 
But beyond this emphasis on a religious and cultural source of legitimacy, the 
monarchy also established itself immediately as the premier and centralised political 
power in the emerging Jordanian state. At the time of the initial organisation of the 
Jordanian state, the nation itself was new and based on artificial boundaries, which 
therefore included disparate groups of settled and nomadic peoples on both the East and 
West Banks of the Jordan river.9 
This did not amount to a political void, but nonetheless civil society, like the economic 
basis for the new state, was weak. The emerging state almost immediately filled these 
gaps itself. Jordan’s new government began the process of establishing a large role for 
the public sector in the economy (a legacy undergoing transformation only today), 
ensuring a similarly large role for the military in backing the political regime, and 
finally co-opting the fragmented aspects of much of society into the new Hashemite 
political order. With this process well under way through the efforts of King Abdullah 
I, King Hussein would later develop the power of the state still further while also 
allowing intermittent and minimal levels of pluralism.10  
                                                
8 Adid Daweesha,Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, Princeton 
university press 2003, p.210.  
9 Eugene Rogan and Tariq tall, Village, steppe and state: the social origins of Modern Jordan London 
British academy press 2004 p.187  
10 Peter Gubser, ‘Jordan: Balancing Pluralism and Authoritarianism’ in Peter J.Chelkopwski and Robert I 
Pranger, eds.,Ideology and power in the Middle East: Essays in Honor of George lenczowski, Durham 
N.C. Duke University Press, 1988 pp89-114. in terms of political liberalisation in the early 1950s, after 
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Given its location, Jordan was from its emergence under the British deeply involved in 
the various dimensions of the Palestinian-Israeli and broader Arab-Israeli conflicts. By 
the time of Jordanian independence in 1946, tensions were peaking in neighbouring 
Palestine between Jews and Arabs over the issue of Zionist versus Palestinian mandate 
aspirations to full statehood. When the United Nations voted to partition Palestine 
between the two peoples in 1947 and Israel declared its independence the following 
year, Jordan’s Arab Legion was one of the Arab armies that attacked the new state, 
joining fighting that had already begun between the two communities. In that hard-
fought campaign – a defeat for the Arab forces – Jordan’s Arab Legion held on to East 
Jerusalem and the West Bank. 11 
The Arab Legion’s performance in the first Arab-Israeli was of 1948 was one that was 
widely commended and this indirectly helped Jordan to A) lay claim to the 
administered West Bank formally part of historic Palestine B) raised the stature of the 
Hashemite monarchy and its conception of Jordanian nationalism amongst the wider 
family of Arab states. Although the 1948 war represented a defeat for the Arab states 
and marked the great Nakba for the Palestinians, of all the Arab forces the Jordanian 
Armed forces (Arab Legion) performed most valiantly fighting of the Zionist militia 
forces and retaining east Jerusalem and a large part of the West Bank. The loss of 
Palestine and the creation of the Israeli state was forever to bedevil the Jordanian 
national discourse and also in many ways to impact on the evolvement of a national 
identity in Jordan. I will argue in my thesis that Israeli expansionist goals in the Middle 
                                                                                                                                         
the appointment of a new prime minister in 1953 King Hussein introduced press freedoms and allowed 
for more greater political participation by the political parties and the newer pressure groups in society. 
11 Benjamin Shawdran, Jordan a state on tension, council for Middle eastern affairs New York. 1959 
pp.201-221 
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East indirectly fed into a strengthening of a Jordanian national identity, vis-à-vis the 
enemy across the river Jordan. The fact that there was a resolute opponent to Jordan in 
the form of the Israeli expansionist state, this fed into a narrative in Jordan that 
bolstered national resoluteness and opposition to Israeli designs on Jordan. Having a 
common enemy served to strengthen the Jordanian understanding of the self and 
brought unity to the disparate groups within the country. The existence of a common 
enemy brought all Jordanians together and made them identity themselves as 
Jordanians. 
In what remains one of the most controversial moves in the history of modern Middle 
East politics King Abdullah I formally annexed the West Bank to his Jordanian 
kingdom in 1950. The debate ever since has turned on whether King Abdullah (I) move 
preserved Arab territory from complete Israeli control, or whether he had foreclosed the 
possibility of a smaller Palestinian state by annexing the territory. 12 
Abdullah paid for that decision with his life, when a Palestinian nationalist gunned him 
down outside the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem in 1951.Standing beside him that 
day was his grandson and the future King of Jordan, Hussein. The assassin’s bullets too 
had hit him, but the one that hit him did no harm, as it amazingly ricocheted off a medal 
on the young King Hussein’s chest.13 This soon became the stuff of legend: the 
martyred founder of the regime, the assassination at one of the holiest of Islamic sites, 
and the deflected bullet that marked the beginning of the ‘survivor’ image so associated 
with King Hussein throughout his long reign. After a brief transitional period in which 
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his father, Talal, was judged mentally unfit to rule, Hussein became King of Jordan in 
1953. Thus for most of Jordan’s modern history (1953-1999) it knew only one king as 
architect of the kingdoms domestic development and of its foreign policy. King Hussein 
consolidated the Hashemite regime in Jordan and defended it against internal and 
external challenges, neither, of which was in short supply.14 
The preceding discussion has highlighted some of the key events of the early history of 
Jordan as an infant and distinct Arab country. I have tried to demonstrate how the 
development of the idea of Jordanian nationalism took root in the early period and then 
subsequently gained a momentum of its own. Key to these developments was the very 
real danger of the artificial state collapsing or disappearing overnight (just as it had 
emerged over night), but it is a testimony to the strength of character and forcefulness 
of purpose of the late monarchy, in great part, that Jordan was able to stand on its feet 
and its national identity gradually plant roots. 
The challenges faced by King Hussein in his early years 
King Hussein took office on August 11 1952 when the Jordanian parliament relieved 
King Talal from his duties and installed Hussein as King of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan.15 Having led the Arab revolts against the Ottoman Empire the Hashemite 
dynasty had a claim on the origin of Arab nationalism.16 The young king’s view on 
Arab nationalism was not only focused on the search for political unity but also a desire 
to have a strong cultural, social and secure relations with the larger Arab family of 
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nations17. The king played an important role in developing the political system in 
Jordan and also made sure that his people’s welfare was being met (i.e. more jobs were 
created during his reign and better education was assured for a greater part of the 
citizens).  
The first challenge faced by King Hussein of Jordan was the Bagdad Pact. The pact was 
an alliance that was inspired by the British government and that aimed at limiting the 
influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East by encouraging governments in the 
region to join the NATO and CENTO security systems.18 It was itself a flawed strategy 
that under-estimated the Arab nationalist preoccupation with the attainment of full 
sovereign independence from the residue of European colonialism; Egypt and Algeria 
were an example of two such countries. It was a rather transparent device through 
which the British tried to maintain their influence in the region in the face of the decline 
of post-war imperialism. Britain then secured the participation of Turkey, Pakistan, and 
Iran in the pact. With the membership of Iraq interest in the Arab world in the 
organisation increased.19 King Hussein’s reaction to the above countries joining the 
pact was to evince interest initially and eventually become a fully-fledged member 
himself. Undoubtedly this was also an opportunity on the part of Hussein to show to the 
world the stature of his leadership at both home and on the wider Arab canvas. Despite 
the above, King Hussein spent much of 1955 unwilling to place the Hashemite 
Kingdom under London’s pressure and Britain eventually came round to agreeing with 
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Hussein’s line of reasoning.20 Such actions only helped the cause of anti-Pact forces 
and with the increased criticisms of the Egyptian’s winning over an overwhelming 
majority of the Jordanian government matters became increasingly precarious for the 
King. Every party in Jordan, at the time, from the Ba’ath to the Muslim Brotherhood 
were all united in their hostility to the British sponsored Baghdad Pact and openly 
campaigned against Jordan’s premature membership of the organisation. The Bagdad 
Pact issue proved to be a very divisive matter for the politically conscious Jordanian 
people. It had mobilised and radicalised much of the Jordanian population at a time 
when there was no shortage of radical parties on the political scene in the country. It 
had shown for one how precarious was Jordan’s political balancing act and how the 
mass of the Jordanian people had reacted to the populist appeal of the Egyptian 
president Jamal Abdul-Nasser. It had exposed the indecisiveness of Britain, Jordan’s 
traditional sponsor and had drawn attention to the growing limitations to its increasing 
influence in the Arab region.21 Lastly, it had been a damaging experience for Jordan’s 
political class with the incentives to remain loyal to the centre diminishing at an 
alarming rate. 
It was also a somewhat a transparent device through which Britain tried to maintain its 
sagging influence in the region in the face of post-war imperial decline. Britain quickly 
secured northern tier participation in the alliance in the form Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, 
with Iraqi membership exciting a flickering interest in the Arab World. With Hashemite 
Iraq on board, but Egypt already implacably opposed, Jordanian participation was the 
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only though risky option for its extension option for its extension into the Levant.22	  
Jordan did not promptly join the Pact because of adverse public opinion and the sharp 
criticism of Iraq in the Arab League. Jordanians were in no mood to accept further 
involvement in the western military pacts. The Palestinian majority, which is made up 
of two thirds of the population of Jordan, considered Israel rather than the Soviet Union 
as the aggressor in the Middle East. Egypt in the meantime denounced the pact, 
claiming Baghdad’s participation was inconsistent with the treaty of Joint defence and 
economic cooperation signed by the Arab League members between 1951 and 1953.23 
As the foregoing discussion about the Bagdad Pact has demonstrated Jordan was 
reluctant to join this British instigated alliance to restrict soviet influence in the Middle 
East. Public opinion in Jordan at this moment in time was in support of Nasser’s foreign 
policy which was centred on non-alignment and opposition to any western inspired 
alliances that was read by the Arab street as being supportive of American and 
indirectly Israeli Agendas. At this critical early phase in Jordanian history King Hussein 
was careful to align Jordan’s national identity in the progressive revolutionary camp as 
opposed to the reactionary western front. This analysis has demonstrated to me as a 
researcher how difficult a balancing act King Hussein had to play in nurturing and 
fathering a Jordanian national identity and steering a steady course between a pro-
Western Bagdad Pact influenced alignment or at the other end of the spectrum a pan 
Arabist radical reading of nationalism as espoused by Jamal Abdul-Nasser and the 
reach of radio Cairo. King Hussein was able to chart a middle course that preserved 
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Jordanian national territorial integrity and at the same time charted a distinct path for 
the Jordanian national discourse, rooted in the specificities of Jordan but amenable also 
to the sway of Pan-Arabism.24 
The next challenge facing King Hussein was the dismissal of the Arab Legion’s 
General Glubb Pasha (1956). The Jordanian government’s reputation was at such a low 
ebb. This was because of the harsh way in which the government supressed opposition 
to the joining of the Baghdad pact, after being overwhelmed by the pressure of public 
opinion the government in Jordan felt that it must reach a deal with the opposition at 
home and abroad. The opposition demands were made true before the end of the year 
by the dismissal of the leader of the Arab legion Major General Glubb and other British 
generals.  
March 1956 was referred to by King Hussein as one of the most important months of 
his life.25 General Glubb who was the head of the Arab Legion was dismissed and was 
ordered to leave the country in the same month.26 Whereas the dismissal of general 
Glubb was the necessary move made by the king to satisfy the opposition, several 
specific interpretations to explain his dismissal were advanced. 
King Hussein explained that the reason for Major General Glubb’s dismissal from the 
Arab region was the result of a long period of consideration and thinking in the best 
interest of Jordan and the Jordanian people27. King Hussein said that the only reason for 
dismissing Major Glubb from the legion was disagreement on two issues: the first issue 
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was the role of Arab officers in the army and the second was the strategy of defence in 
the Hashemite kingdom. The king asked for more promotions for Arabs in the army and 
training for higher ranks so that the Jordanian army was arabized.28 King Hussein 
accused Glubb Pasha of giving his allegiance to Britain and berated Britain for the lack 
of response to the nationalist aspirations. 
The preceding episode in regards to the dismissal of General Glubb was prompted on 
King Hussein’s part by his wanting to appease the nationalist opinion in Jordan in 
1950s. There were two reasons why King Hussein dismissed Glubb Pasha from his post 
in 1956. The first reasons was personal, there was a generational gap between the two 
men. Glubb was close to Hussein’s grandfather King Abdullah, it was said the two had 
a good personal report. This relationship was aided by the fact that Glubb was the 
junior man, in effect meaning that the late king was in a more senior position. After 
King Hussein accession to the throne matters changed and now Glubb was the elder, in 
fact by almost 40 years. Given this generational gap it might be asserted that tension is 
going to be inevitable.29 
The other reason for Glubb’s removal from office was political; the scenario of national 
and local politics had repercussions on the context and outcome. In the immediate short 
term the removal of Glubb Pasha was the way for monarch to change his political 
standing. The removal of Glubb was predetermined to be a popular move at home and 
about this there can be little doubt. In the Middle East people were still caught up with 
symbols of political independence, the removal of a British head of the military was a 
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wonderful and extremely popular move in the part of the King.30 
The removal of Glubb was helpful to King Hussein at the time of the Suez crises in 
1956, soon after this incident, the young king was able to fight domestic criticism, a 
path of action that was helped by his proclamation of brotherhood with Egypt during 
the international crises. Because of the critical events at the time of the Baghdad Pact, 
because of Nasser’s popularity on the Jordanian street and in order to assert his own 
position and leave a mark the young monarch was compelled to take this bold step 
which in the end bolstered his opinion at home and abroad.31 
The next and last challenge faced by King Hussein was the dismissal of Suleiman al 
Nabulsi, leader of the Nationalist Socialist Party and Prime Minister at the time. Since 
King Abdullah’s death in 1951, the National Socialist Party had emerged as the 
strongest electoral force in Jordan. Led by Suleiman al Nabulsi, the political and 
economic platform of the party was ambiguous, but it was considered a modernist and 
loyalist party. 32 
Al Nabulsi was considered to be a modest, patriotic figure with liberal instincts that 
pushed him to tolerate radicals but not to share their demands for widespread social 
change. In stark contrast to Al Nabulsi and his nationalist party, amongst the other 
ideological parties king Hussein and his aids viewed the leftist Ba’ath party and the 
Communist party as radicals who opposed monarchic rule in Jordan. Radical candidates 
from other parties focused on the more dramatic and regional issues during their 1956 
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election campaign, however both the Ba’ath and the communists embraced programmes 
for fundamental socio-economic domestic change targeting a socialist re-distribution of 
wealth via pro-peasant and labour policies and progressive land reforms.33 
The proven electoral strength of the Nationalist Social Party before the election took 
place made it more likely that the party would return to its parliamentary influence.34 
As the leader of the most successful party in Jordan, Al Nabulsi was asked by the King 
to lead and form the new government. The king was happy to set the pattern that the 
monarch is the one who appoints the Prime Minster not the wining party. What amazed 
King Hussein is that his prime minister wanted to form a coalition government with the 
Ba’athists and the communists on the basis of shared Jordanian nationalism.35  
The cabinet of al Nabulsi’s government consisted of six members of the National 
Socialist party, three independents, one communist, and one Ba’athist. From the King’s 
point of view, the policies of the al Nabulsi government quickly became intolerable. 
The radical ministers and members of parliament used their ability to mobilize the 
street, namely to ask people to help them push their agendas forward. 
By spring of 1957 the Eisenhower doctrine had proposed replacing the British aid with 
American aid to Jordan in exchange for support against the spread of communism.36 
Many members of the National Socialist Party had favoured  exchanging the declining 
British aid assistance for American.37  
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The liberal Al Nabulsi government strayed beyond the limit envisioned by the king in 
his struggle to assert his own role as the originator of all policies. The continuing crises 
stemmed from the fact that al Nabulsi’s government did not represent the moderate and 
conservative majority elected to the Jordanian Parliament. The acquisition of the power 
to implement reform by the Ba’athists, communists, and their supporters threatened to 
sweep aside traditional socio-economic elites. Therefore the group of privileged elite 
could not have seen a potential radical government as anything less than disastrous to 
their interests. 38 
 The above episode demonstrates to me that the internal dynamics of Jordan in the 
1950s particularly with respect to al Nabulsi rise to ascendency created a potentially 
divisive situation for king Hussein and Jordan. With the prospect that under Nabulsi’s 
leadership Jordan would steer a more radical pan-Arabist agenda, partly influenced by 
Nasser’s Egypt, King Hussein and the monarchy checked the increasing shift to the left 
of Jordanian politics by dismissing al Nabulsi government. King Hussein opted for a 
Jordan specific centrist reading of Jordanian nationalism in arriving at this decision he 
seems to have wanted to negate the influence and popularity of pan-Arabist 
revolutionary discourses. The Nabulsi government was cognisant that Jordan as a state 
would not survive for very long and the idea that Nabulsi proposed was that Jordan 
would form a federation with other Arab countries i.e. Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. 
A pan Arab fund would replace the British subsidy and this would facilitate Jordan 
being more pro- Arab in its International Affairs. The Nabulsi government in order to 
ride the Arab nationalist wave have signed an agreement with a number of Arab 
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countries as mentioned above.39 
 
II Jordanian nationalism in the 1960s and the Six Day War, 1967. 
The next section shall be looking at the events that took place in Jordan during the 1967 
war. The first event we shall look at is the Israeli forces raid on the Jordanian town of 
Samu 1967. The second event we shall look at is the unification of the East and West 
Banks and the loss of East Jerusalem to Israel in1967. 
This section of the chapter will look at the development of Jordanian nationalism in the 
1960s with special reference to the Samu raid and the war of 1967. The 1960s were a 
time of rapid change and the maturity of specifically of Jordanian national discourse. If 
the 1950s were a decade in which nationalist discourse in Jordan was finding its feet, 
the 1960s were a period of the consolidation of the main elements of Jordanian 
nationalism. The factors integral to Jordanian nationalism were the monarchy, the tribal 
forces, the Bedouin confederations, and the Palestinian diaspora. 
King Hussein of Jordan was pulled into the 1967 war and did not join the Arab Alliance 
willingly as was traditionally believed. King Hussein was obliged by the Palestinian 
population in Jordan to consider seriously joining the Arab camp in the war against 
Israel. Had Jordan not participated in the 1967 war events internally would have 
conspired against the monarchy meaning the large Palestinian population would have 
lost confidence in the King’s nationalist credentials. More recent scholarship maintains 
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that it was internal factors over regional that pushed Jordan to join the 1967 war and 
which proved in the long run to be a disastrous path for Jordan and its administration of 
the West Bank.40 
(i) The Samu raid 1966 
On 13 November 1965 the Israeli army crossed the border between Israel and Jordan. 
The Israeli army’s motives for attacking Samu was to convince the Jordanian 
government that Israel did not see any difference between one Arab state and the other. 
For this reason the Israelis mentioned that one reason for the attack was to show the 
Arabs that they were Israel’s enemy whether they were Syrians, Jordanians or 
Egyptians. This raid made the Jordanians feel that the sheer logic of this attack 
demanded that Amman belong to an Arab regional defence system.41 
It also made the Jordanian government aware that the Israeli army might try to take 
control of the West Bank since the Jordanian army was perceived to be very weak. The 
Jordanians also felt that the Samu raid was made to convince them to retaliate against 
the Israeli army. This gave them (the Israelis) a great opportunity, namely excuse, to 
invade Jordan and destroy the Jordanian army detachments and also occupy the West 
Bank. The Jordanian government felt that the raid on Samu was made to widen the 
divisions of the Arab world. The Jordanians believed that the Israeli government had 
wished that the Arabs would be divided in a way that they would not be able to attack 
Israel.42 
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For King Hussein the lead up to the 1967 war began with the Israeli attack on the West 
Bank village of Samu. This was a very devastating attack it killed upwards of twenty 
Jordanians soldier, and even more civilians.43 The Samu attack had a very negative 
influence on the national identity in Jordan. Most importantly it highlighted the relative 
weakness of the Jordanian national Army. These developments also fed into Palestinian 
frustration at the country’s inability to safe guard them or provide them with the 
necessary means to look after themselves. As Clinton bailey has analysed ‘the need to 
wield the Arab Legion against the Palestinians wiped away six years of effort to win 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Israeli people’.44 
The Jordanians believed that the raid of Samu was designed to weaken the defences of 
the Jordanian army. The raid resulted in a feeling of insecurity in the minds of 
Jordanians living next to Israel, this itself gave pressure to the Jordanian army to spread 
around the city and protect it from any invasion. The Jordanians believed that the raid 
on Samu was designed to force the residents of the West Bank to initiate a rebellion 
against the Jordanian government45. This rebellion would increase the possibility of 
civil unrest in the West Bank and would potentially give Israel a good reason to invade 
the city. The Israelis could make a point that the Palestinians gaining the upper hand in 
Jordan was by itself a serious threat to their national self-interest.46 
The Samu raid and the activities of the Fedayeen across the Israeli –Jordanian border 
prompted unrest in a number of West Bank cities, which was directed against the 
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Hashemite monarchy. Israel may have wanted to weaken Jordanian control of the West 
Bank and thereby de-legitimise its presence. In return Jordan would have seen Israeli 
provocations as a measure to incite Jordan to War, with the view of taking further 
territory from it in the West Bank. In terms of the articulation of a Jordanian National 
Identity such episodes would not have been conducive to building a cohesive and 
coherent Jordanian identity and discourse. King Hussein and the monarchy would have 
wanted to consolidate their rule of the West Bank with the view to building a Trans-
Jordanian identity spanning the two Banks of the river Jordan. However the Israeli and 
certain Palestinian elements for different reasons may have wanted to question and 
debunk any Jordanian identity incorporating the West Bank. 
(ii). The unification of the West Bank 
The project of the unification decision or mashru’ Qarar al wihdah was the way the 
Jordanian government titled the annexation proposal. The opening statement of the 
government declaration, inaugurating parliamentary debates on the question, asserted 
that its decision was based on the reality of both banks (of Jordan) the Eastern and the 
Western, its nationalist, natural and geographic unity and the necessities of their 
common interests.47 	  
The parliamentary decision called for the complete unity between Jordan’s Eastern and 
Western Banks and their consolidation into one state that is the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan or al-Mamlakah- al-urduniyaah al-hashemiyah. King Abdullah (I) speech at the 
throne that inaugurated the parliamentary session that voted for unity stressed that this 
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‘is the first time in the history of the constitutional life of Jordan that the parliament 
which grouped both banks of Jordan, emanates from the will of one people, one 
homeland and one hope’. 	  
King Abdullah (I) also motioned that this is a blessed step which the two banks have 
embarked upon and which the people who are the concerned party have set to achieve, 
aiming to strengthen its national unity, its patriotic pride (wihdatihi- al Qawmiya wa 
izzatihi al wataniya) and its common interests. ‘Abdullah analogizes the new expanded 
Jordan to a bird whose wings are a East and a West and who has a natural right to have 
its people and relatives come together’.48 	  
Whereas the bird’s wings correspond concretely to the east and west banks, the bird’s 
body representing Jordan has no concrete geographic correspondence. In its response to 
his majesty’s speech from the throne, the senate described the East Bank as the sister of 
the West Bank and described King Abdullah (I) as an experienced captain of the ship 
ploughing a way for his ship in the middle of raging storms of whims and inclinations.49	  
Abdullah asserts that the unity of both banks is a nationalist and factual reality. Its 
nationalist reality is attested to through the entanglements of people’s origins and 
branches of the coalescence of vital interests and the unity of pain and hopes. Its factual 
reality is attested by the establishment of strong unionist links between both banks since 
1922, those important and notable links included unity of currency, common defense, 
utilization of ports etc., all based on unity of interests and cultural and legislative 
exchange which have rendered each of the two banks as an excellent center for the 
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other.50 	  
The discourse permitting this union, like the one used to found Transjordan back in 
1921, is Arab nationalism. Abdullah stresses that when Great Britain surrendered its 
mandate over Palestine, which has been excised from the Mother county (al-watan-al 
umm) and the storms of the Arab-Zionist dispute raged, it became imperative to assert 
the rights of the Arabs and to stand up to aggression through a general Arab co-
operation and in our opinion there is no security to any Arab people except in its real 
unity and in the coming together of its scattered parts wherever this is possible and 
reflective of the general will and is not a breach of covenant or agreement.51	  
King Abdullah (I) viewed  the parliamentary elections in both banks preceding their 
unification as evidence of a sense of self that the people of both banks have. His speech 
further stipulated plans to unify both banks. He concluded by saluting and 
congratulating members of parliament and stressing that you have marched with me in 
past years and I shall march with you in forthcoming years under your constitutional 
responsibility and with my paternal guidance, wishes the best for the homeland.52	  
The parliament in Jordan voted for unity based on the right of self-determination, the 
reality of self-determination, the reality of Jordan’s two banks the east and west, its 
nationalist, natural, and geographic unity and the necessities of their common interests 
and vital domain.53 Whereas the Jordanian senate likened the Jordanian kingdom to the 
mother of both banks, Abdullah is clear on his role as father to all whom his kingdom 
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encompasses. His paternal guidance was much appreciated by the lower house’s 
response to the speech from the throne. In it, those pretending to speak for parliament 
‘praise… your majesty’s response towards the Palestinian refugees and your work to 
save them from despair’.54	  
Certainly such metaphors are not specific to Jordanian nationalism as they are rampant 
in all European nationalism where the idea of the nation as a motherland or fatherland 
depending on the context and its leaders/founders as fathers- note the use of the term 
founding fathers in the U.S. context was first used.55 Whereas Arab nationalism is the 
discourse deployed to unify Jordan and Palestine, Transjordanian nationalism, not Arab 
nationalism must define the new unified and expanded unity. 
As the proceeding discussion has demonstrated King Abdullah and his government 
were clear sighted and adamant in their wish to legitimise the unity of the East and 
West Banks. King Abdullah specifically wanted to emphasize the shared history, 
linguistic bond, and cultural interdependence and evoked the motherland to symbolise 
this. It is clear in this discussion that prior to disengagement of 1988 Jordanian 
monarchs has made consorted attempt to unify both wings of the Jordanian Kingdom 
and to legitimize the incorporation of the West Bank into the Unified Kingdom of 
Jordan. One could assert that King Abdullah (I) was trying to assert the Jordanian 
primacy over any Palestinian identity or he was clear in the above quotes that a 
Jordanian Arab identity took precedence over any Palestinian specific sentiment. It is 
noteworthy that there is no mention of the Palestinian people whereas in the current 
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debate in Jordan there is a recognition that a Palestinian state must live side by side 
with Jordan and cantered on the West Bank. 
The proceeding discussion explained what happened when the West Bank was unified 
with the East Bank. The following discussion in this section will now explain how the 
West Bank was unified with the East in terms of the electoral procedure and the legal 
technicalities of the ratification of the West Bank 
The unification of the East and West banks took place in the 1950s. The West Bank was 
placed under the rule of the military from 17 May 1948 until 2 November 1949.56 
In the 1950s, the first election was held in both the East and West Banks, after the 
election took place members of both the East Bank and West Bank parliaments met 
together with a Jordanian assembly and made an announcement. Below is an excerpt 
from this announcement: 
a. To confirm the unification of both the East and West Bank in one state 
called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and having King Abdullah I 
elected as King and ruled by a constitutional representative assembly 
where all citizens are treated equally.57 
2. To affirm the safeguarding of all Arab rights in Palestine and the defence of all 
rights by all means without prejudice to the final settlement of a just cause. 
3. To refer this resolution to King Abdullah I for approval. 
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4. This resolution shall be confirmed when King Abdullah I endorses it.58 
With the unification of the West Bank with the East Bank, Jordan proposed to bring 
into being a Trans-Jordanian Identity incorporating both East Bankers and West 
Bankers, incorporating both Palestinian and tribal, Bedouin elements in one unifying 
state. The purpose of this exercise and how it affected the development of Jordanian 
nationalism needs to be carefully understood. 
 As far as king Hussein and Jordan was concerned, matters were deliberately 
engineered to dilute the specific and distinct Palestinian national identity, since this was 
viewed in conservative quarters as a direct threat to a specifically Jordanian discourse 
and the paramount position of the Hashemite monarchy. Jordan benefited from an 
expansion of the territory under its control but it distrusted the Palestinian narrative 
rooted in the West Bank. For The Jordanian national discourse it was imperative that 
the Palestinian identity be subsumed under a larger and more overarching Jordanian 
National identity. To summarise the annexation of the West Bank and its incorporation 
into Jordan smothered a specifically Palestinian expression of identity in the interest of 
a more overarching and inclusive Trans-Jordanian narrative .up until the 1988 and 
disengagement the official position in Jordan was the West Bank was an integral part of 
an enlarged and all-inclusive Jordanian national state. 
On 8 January 1952, a new constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was 
introduced. According to the Jordanian constitution of 1952, the courts had jurisdiction 
over all Jordanian citizens in both civil and criminal matters. The executive branch of 
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the state was placed in a three-tier system. 
The executive branch of the state such as the governmental ministries were placed on 
top, below it was the district level which was directed by district commissioners and 
other high ranking officials who represented the central government in their areas as 
well as the link between central and local governments. Next was the local government 
constituted of municipal councils and village councils. The council of ministers were 
the authority along with everything else of public life in Jordan.59 
The constitution adopted in 1952 was generally believed to be a liberal document with 
well-intentioned rules and regulations. One criticism that can be levelled against the 
constitution however was the degree of powers invested in the monarch. The state 
religion was identified as Islam and the language of the government was identified as 
Arabic. Together the three constituent elements of the constitution: Monarchy, Islam, 
and Arabic language can be considered the linchpins of Jordanian nationalism in the 
1960s. To summarise the above argument in terms of the development of the Jordanian 
national Identity and discourse, the Hashemite family, place of religion and contribution 
of language have all remained common denominators in the history of Jordanian 
Nationalism. 
(iii) The West Bank 
Given the history of Jordan’s control in the West Bank, its legal status before 1967 may 
be well said something less than that of a legitimate sovereign and something more than 
that of a belligerent occupant. Belligerent occupancy can only happen when the 
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occupying force is at war with the government of the territory it occupies.60  
Jordan’s entry to the West Bank occurred without the express permission of the 
inhabitants of the area; the Arab population of the West Bank certainly did not request 
it who by virtue of the partition resolution and general international consensus had the 
right to proclaim authority over the area of Palestine not given control to the Jewish 
state. Jordan’s status in its term of control over the West Bank was to be that of a 
trustee-occupant; however its responsibility in administering that trust was subject to 
debate.61 
The institutionalization of a Palestinian identity was feared as a threat to Jordan’s 
mission for permanent control of the West Bank. While regretting the loss of territories 
in the Palestinian rule, Jordan simultaneously inhibited Palestinianism as part of a 
policy that was aimed at retaining control of a majority population that was Palestinian. 
Given Jordan’s legal status in the West Bank between the periods 1948-1967 as a 
trustee occupant and given the disaffection between the West Bank and Jordan it 
became difficult to explain Israel’s legal status in the region. If we say that Israel gained 
control of the West Bank in 1967 in exercise of its self-defence, we can assume that 
Israel’s status can only be that of a lawful belligerent occupant.62 The West Bank is still 
a big talking point in Arab politics today therefore the West Bank issue will be 
discussed in more detail when we talk about the disengagement of 1988. 
The preceding analysis highlights the protracted nature of the evolution of Jordanian 
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national identity in the face of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967. After 
the loss of West Bank to Israel Jordan has to fall back on demarcating a national 
identity based upon the history, people, and rule of the monarchy in the East Bank 
solely. The evolution of Jordanian nationalism in the post 1967 war period is then 
dependant solely on dynamics specific to the East Bank, and the consequent temporary 
removal of the Palestinian question. The loss the West Bank was not only ideologically 
disastrous for Jordanian nationalism but economically the setback was incalculable. The 
tourism industry and the agricultural sector were given a severe blow with the loss of 
the West Bank. In addition to the preceding, Jordan now had to give refuge to an 
addition 300,00 Palestinian refugees, this inevitably had an effects on the demographics 
of the East Bank. Jordan now had to placate a restive Palestinian population that now 
had to saw its destiny not in Arab but in Palestinian Hands. The Nurturing of Jordanian 
Nationalism in 1948-1967 periods had been a slow and arduous exercise and with 
defeat in 1967 war and the loss of the West Bank, the dynamics determining national 
identity and discourse were given an unexpected shudder. 
Transjordanians are divided between ‘Jordanian nationalists’ and ‘Pan Jordanians’. The 
former group consisted of those who after the defeat of 1967 were happy to see the 
West Bank dismembered from Jordan. This particular group maintained the presence of 
the West Bank within the nation of Jordan before 1967 had made difficult the building 
of a more geographically and specifically Jordanian national identity. The members of 
this group argued that the PLO and Arafat should represent all Palestinians in the West 
Bank and the PLO should eventually be the leader of a liberated Palestine. Furthermore 
they maintained Jordanian passport holders of the East Bank who thought of their 
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national identity, as being primarily Palestinian should leave the East Bank and live in 
the new Palestinian state when conditions allow it.63 
The pan Jordanians were called the followers of King Abdullah (I) in the 1950s. This 
group believed in the Unity of the Two Banks as a geographical basis of the Jordanian 
national Identity, they maintained that the centre of power of such a country should 
remain in the capital Amman. This group called the PLO and Arafat as rivals and 
competitors, they believed no concession on representation or governance should be 
made to the PLO. This group tendered to consist of those Jordanian from Palestinian 
background, whose forefathers who arrived in Jordan before 1948 and they had 
established businesses in the East Bank but they were not fond of Jordanian national 
identity which excluded the Palestinian element.64 
(iv) Jerusalem 
The following section on Jerusalem will analyse the role of the Holy City in the 
evolution of Jordanian identity. From the time of the unification of the West Bank in 
1956 to the time of disengagement of 1988, Jordanian official policy was centred on 
harnessing the symbolic power of Jerusalem and to utilise it for Jordanian legitimacy. 
Jordan wanted to be seen to be the protector and the maintainer of the holy sites in East 
Jerusalem and the Old city, this responsibility to maintain the holy sites of Islam would 
give the Kingdom Much needed legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinians in the West 
Bank. Jordanian national identity in the pre-disengagement period was clear about the 
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role of Jerusalem as being central in the Jordanian, Arab, Islamic, narrative.  
In April 1947 the United Nations established a committee on Palestine to inspect the 
situation in Palestine and propose a solution to the problem. In 1947 the United Nations 
voted by 33-13 votes for the majority scheme that suggested the partition of Palestine 
into Jewish and Arab states with an international district consisting of Jerusalem and 
Bethlehem. The Palestinians rejected the above proposal from the United Nations. 
There were disturbances that resulted in the first Arab-Israeli war, after the Jewish 
authority declared the establishment of the state of Israel in May 1948.65 
During the war of 1948, Israeli forces took control of much of the areas assigned to the 
proposed Arab state that included eighty five per cent of Jerusalem. The Jordanian army 
(Jordanian Arab legion) took control of the West Bank that also included a small 
proportion of the eastern part of Jerusalem. 
On 2nd February 1949, the Israeli Prime Minister, Ben Gurion, announced that the 
Israeli-controlled west Jerusalem was no longer occupied territory but a part of the state 
of Israel. On 13 December 1949 west Jerusalem was ‘illegitimately’ announced the 
capital of Israel.66 
Israel’s control of Jerusalem seen as the eternal capital for all the three monotheistic 
faiths was a setback to Palestinian and Jordanian hopes of religious legitimacy and 
control of the third holiest sanctuary in Islam. In terms of the development of Jordanian 
Nationalism, Jerusalem occupation by the enemy served two purposes: 1) it dealt a 
blow to the Hashemite monarchy wanted to project itself as the rightful custodians of al 
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Quds; 2) it gave a sense of re-invigoration to a Jordanian-identity increasingly defined 
in respect of the Israeli ‘other’. 
(v) Jerusalem’s role in the 1967 war 
Jordan joined the June 1967 War to appease pan-Arab and Palestinian opinion that 
threatened to worsen into serious internal challenge to the Jordanian government and 
the stability of the Jordanian state. The June 1967 War was a victory for Israel, which 
was able to annexe the West Bank, and unifies both parts of Jerusalem (East and West 
Jerusalem). As far as Israel was concerned, three Arab states could not defeat it and it 
managed to secure its main objectives. The war of 1967 and the victory for Israel gave 
rise to different schools of thought in the country as to its future.67 
. One saw this as an opportunity to use the newly acquired land as a basis to establish 
peace with the neighbouring Arab states.68 The other perspective was to believe that 
this was a divine intervention that justified the very existence of the Jewish state and 
saw the dreams of expansion into Jerusalem come true. Jews who had been reconciled 
to the idea of a portioned Jerusalem from 1947-1967 even accepting the United Nations 
Plan for the city in 1947 now believed Jerusalem to be a part of Israel and many Israelis 
believed that it was meant to be the capital of Israel. Israel was confident and wanted to 
have peace talks with its Arab neighbours after the Six Day War ended. The heavy 
defeat and a deep sense of humiliation stopped the Arab nations from negotiating peace 
without an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the war.69 
The reasons for delineating and analysing the Israeli position on Jerusalem has been 
                                                
67 Mutayam al Oran, The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Building Experience, Rutledge, 2008, p. 11. 
68 Don Peretz, The West Bank, Best View, Boulder 1984p.34 
69 Joles S. Migdal ed. Palestinian society and Politics,Princeton University Press, NewJersey, 1980 p.39 
45 
 
demonstrate how to competing narratives, the Jordanian and Israeli concerning the one 
city were both on odds and overlapped. For the Israelis Jerusalem was their symbolic 
and eternal capital it tied in very neatly with the spiritual prayers ‘next year in 
Jerusalem’. As far as the Jordanian narrative was concerned Arab East Jerusalem and 
the sacred sites, the al Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock mosques was integral to 
Hashemite claims of leading the Arab Muslim on the safe guarding of Islamic holy 
sites. In an ironic way national identity in both the Jewish state and the Arab Jordanian 
coalesced around the competing visions for the sacred sites of Jerusalem and its holding 
by the respective competing states. Jerusalem symbolised for both countries the 
Kingdom of God in earth. 
To summarize, the 1967 war was an undisputed victory for Israel, Jordan however 
suffered terribly it lost East Jerusalem and the West Bank to the enemy. The defeat in 
1967 war meant Jordan had to re-envision a national Identity minus the West Bank. 
Within Jordan Arab nationalists were discredited and a more sharpened Palestinian 
identity came into being. This more assertive Palestinian discourse prompted Jordan 
also to define a sharper sense of it vis-à-vis the neighbouring countries and an internal 
Palestinian refugee population. This new Jordanian nationalism never the less continued 
to embrace the idea that the occupied West Bank was an integral part of a unified 
Jordanian state (this position was only formally reversed with the announcement of 
disengagement in 1988). 
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III Black September 1970 
(i) Events prior to September 1970 
This section provides an explanation of the battle of Karamah of 1968, in which the 
Jordanian army and the Palestinian guerrillas (al Fedayeen) fought against the Israeli 
army and forced them to move out of the Jordanian town of al karamah. 
At the outset of the battle the Israelis demolished the town of al karamah, this resulted 
in heavy casualties amongst the Palestinian guerrillas and detachments of the Jordanian 
army. Both the Jordanian army and the Palestinian guerrillas minimized the role of the 
other in the operation and claimed victory for themselves. The Karamah battle became 
a rallying cry of the Palestinian population in Jordan who were thirsty for any kind of 
victory over their enemy i.e. the Israeli army.70 After this victory thousands of 
Jordanian Palestinians became volunteers and joined the Palestinian guerrilla 
movement. As far as the Jordanian military was concerned the Karamah battle became 
one of the most important occasions in Jordanian history.71 The approximate number of 
soldiers who were involved in the battle of al Karamah was well around 300.72 
The battle provided a victory for the Jordanian forces over the invading Israeli enemy. 
The Battle of  Karamah on 21st march 1968 was a success for the Jordanian and 
Palestinian forces. On this occasion the Israeli forces attacked a Palestinian strong hold 
                                                
70 Joseph massad,colonial effects the making of national identity in Jordan, Columbia university press 
2001, pgs 23 
71 Ibid. 
72 Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s security and Foreign Policy 
University of Michigan press, 2006 pp.244-246 
47 
 
in the Jordan valley. Jordanian troops joined with the Palestinian fighters in confronting 
the operation forcing the Israelis to withdraw. Both the Palestinians and Jordanians 
hailed this operation as a military success against Israel.73 The occasion gave rise to joy 
amongst the Palestinians diaspora in Jordan and also in the national level it brought the 
Jordanians together with the Palestinians in celebrating for the nascent state. In terms of 
relevancy to our study this occasion provided for the cementing of Palestinian and 
Jordanian identity and for a sense of national pride. 
In sum, this incident heightened Jordanian national consciousness and contributed 
towards the coming into being of a combative spirit and strengthened Palestinian 
allegiance to Jordanian national interests. Every year Jordanians and Palestinian 
Jordanians descend onto the town of karamah to show their support to their Palestinian 
brethren across the border in the Palestinian authority. 
For many Jordanians, the Karamah battle has become a significant event in the national 
narrative of Transjordan. Jordan has adopted this battle as part of its national heritage 
and has transformed this event implying presently that it was a victory of the Jordanian 
national state as opposed to a successful operation on the part of the Palestinian 
resistance movement. The Karamah battle has become a political illusion paving the 
way for the creation of a Jordanian national identity and an important pillar in the 
development of a Palestinian nationalism.74 
Jordanians and Palestinians initially hailed Karamah battle a success however very soon 
after the Hashemite monarchy became wary of the recruitment drive by the Palestinian 
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resistant group in Jordan. As the Palestinian resistant group gained prominence this did 
not sit comfortably with those Jordanian nationalists who feared that Palestinian activity 
on Jordanian soil would invite disproportionate Israeli retaliation. In short the battle of 
Karamah was the beginning of the end of the Jordanian-Palestinian comradeship. After 
this Palestinian resistance activity meant an articulation of a more clearly defined 
Palestinian identity vis-à-vis a Jordanian identity. 
(ii) ‘Black September’ 1970  
In the early 1970s, one event shaped internal politics in Jordan. The brief civil war that 
took place between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian population, which was led 
by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). It was during this period that the 
future of the Hashemite kingdom reached a point of instability that shook the notion of 
the Hashemite state, territoriality and its existence to the core.  
The term Black September is used by the Palestinians to mark the events that led the 
Jordanian army to do battle with the Palestinian Liberalization Organization and the 
subsequent defeat and expulsion of Yasser Arafat and his followers.75 The events that 
followed the Black September conflict were marked by increasing tension in the 
relationship between King Hussein’s government and the Fedayeen movement, which 
was headed by the PLO. While it was evident to King Hussein when he assumed the 
throne in 1953 that the national make up in Jordan would always have a Palestinian 
element, the events of the late 1950s had led the king and his followers to believe that 
any disruption to the state could be contained without excessive difficulty. In the late 
1950s king Hussein could believe he could control the restive Palestinian population 
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however subsequent events, Black September being a case in point, demonstrated that 
monarchy only with difficulty could keep a constrain on Palestinian activity. 
While the Jordanian government knew of the threat posed by the large influx of 
refugees and the radicalisation of the Palestinian issue, at a regional level the 
Palestinians resisted its policies of containment at every stage. In the wake of the Black 
September war the Palestinians blamed Jordan for their predicament and mocked the 
Jordanian army. Criticism of the performance of the Jordanian army in the war struck at 
heart of the Jordanian government and was considered as a personal insult to the king. 
The ability of the king and his government to re-assert their authority over the 
Palestinian population became important. What became clear was that a resort to 
legislative or constitutional measures would not be enough to contain the threat. While 
martial law had been announced in 1967 as a means by which the coercive arm of the 
state could be given more freedom and authority to deal with the threat, this had barely 
done enough to address the growing strength of Palestinian nationalism as constituted 
within Jordanian borders76.  
The events of September 1970 demonstrated to the Arab world two competing 
nationalism Jordanian and Palestinian could not co-exist within Jordan. Palestinian 
nationalism in the form of the defeat of the grillers and the eviction of the PLO to 
Lebanon re-enforced the non-accommodation of a Palestinian revolutionary identity 
within a more conservative nationalist and resurgent Jordanian only nationalism. 
By the 1970s the possibility of a serious military engagement between the Jordanians 
and the Palestinians appeared inevitable as tensions grew on both sides. Palestinian 
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confidence had been reinforced by the battle of Karamah and the ever-increasing 
military forays over Jordanian borders and into Israel. The turning point in the crises 
came in the summer of the 1970s when Arab support for the Palestinian cause appeared 
to be further eroded by the acceptance of both King Hussein and Jamal Abdul Nasser of 
the American formulated plan which placed resolution of the Palestinian issue outside 
the Palestinian liberation organization control.77 
The goodwill that the Jordanian government had built amongst the Palestinians partly 
as a result of al Karamah incident and other actions over the course of the 1950s and 
1960s dissipated now. Any sense of allegiance to Jordan, the Palestinians harboured in 
the period prior to Black September was lost as a result of the brutal and harsh 
crackdown. In the overall context the events of September 1970 undermined Jordanian 
national identity by making the Palestinian population restive and questioned their 
allegiance to the Jordanian government in other words the Palestinian population in 
Jordan were asked at that time if they are with the Palestinian rebels or are they are with 
the Jordanians in their battle against the Fedayeen. The reason behind this is that the 
Jordanian government felt that the Palestinians in Jordan are against them and is 
backing the Palestinian rebels in their war against The Jordanians  
Further Arab involvement was approaching by the end of September as Nasser and the 
Egyptian government stepped in to put pressure on both sides to stop the conflict and 
negotiate a ceasefire. The involvement of the Egyptian government successfully 
resulted in a ceasefire by the beginning of October but this was a temporary relief. In 
the shorter term this war left the Palestinian Liberation Organization seriously 
                                                
77 Ibid., pp.46-47. 
51 
 
weakened and the Jordanians had seriously undermined the activities of the guerrilla 
movement. Despite this success, the events of the September conflict were chalked up 
as nothing more than round one in the Jordanian government’s confrontation with 
Palestinian nationalism.  
By 1971, the Jordanian government had achieved what they wanted by forcing the PLO 
to leave Jordan and the last remaining guerrilla bases including Ajlun were overrun in 
further engagements. In November 1971 the king ordered the final surrender of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization and closed down the remaining offices of the 
movement in Amman.78 
The 1970-1971 events were an important turning point in the formation of Jordanian 
national identity. After 1970 Jordan refocused its national orientation on a more 
specifically Jordanian basis relegating the Palestinian element to a secondary basis. It 
became increasingly apparent to all that an assertive and revolutionary Palestinian 
identity in the wake of 1967 war was not going to be accommodated within a Jordanian 
narrative that emphasized Hashemite, tribal and East Bankers traditions. From that 
point onwards, the Transjordanian identity became an amalgamation of a constituent 
number of identities, which included: Bedouin tribal identity, Islamic identity, and 
Hashemite identity. Following the 1970-1971 civil war event, the Jordanian 
government found a new Jordanian nationalism based on East Jordanian tribal and 
Islamic traditions, loyalty to the Hashemite royal family and to his majesty the king of 
Jordan and his armed forces. The new national identity was going to be disassociated 
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from Palestinian, pan-Arab and liberal ideologies.79 
The events of 1971 had showed many trans-Jordanians that Palestinian nationality was 
a distinct autonomous nationality and as a result of this the trans-Jordanians believed 
that they should have their own nationality. Many Transjordanians saw the civil war of 
1970-1971 as a victory against the Palestinian army (Fedayeen) that was seen to be an 
integral part of Jordanian society previously.80 The civil war was a turning point in 
bolstering the growth of trans-Jordanian awareness, due to the fact that the challenge 
the Palestinian organisations posed to the authority of the state was seen as traitorous. 
The sense of local awareness among trans-Jordanians had been rising since the civil war 
of 1970-1971 and had been linked to another important consequence of the civil war of 
1970, which was the implementation of the policy of the Jordanisation of the state. This 
meant turning the Palestinians in Jordan into Jordanians. The civil war of 1970-1971 
actually led to a narrower and more specific concept of Jordanisation which meant that 
privileges were granted to trans-Jordanian nationals in preference to the Palestinians 
including those living in the East-Bank, especially in the state public sector i.e. the 
Jordanian army, universities etc.81 The Palestinians being side-lined and being reduced 
to a second class citizenship meant that their allegiance to Jordan became questionable 
and also they were not perceived as being one hundred per cent Jordanians . To add to 
this discussion this distrust of the Palestinians is still happening to Palestinian 
Jordanians as we speak and the Jordanian people still do not recognise that they are part 
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of the Jordanian society. 
This policy that took place as a result of the Trans-Jordanian opinion of the Palestinians 
as traitors during the 1970-1971 civil war was described by the state as East Bankers 
first.82 This East Banker’s motto that targeted Palestinians in the Hashemite kingdom 
and also discriminated against the Palestinians who were working in the Jordanian 
public sector has left a lasting impression of distrust amongst the Palestinian diaspora in 
Jordan.83 
The monarchy in Jordan tried to handle this division by manipulating it at times when it 
saw its position threatened by Palestinian nationalism, and suppressing it at other times 
when it deemed necessary to forge a pan-Jordanian communal solidarity. It has been 
maintained that the Jordanian monarchy has been trying to foster a hybrid Jordanian 
identity for both Jordanians and Palestinians, based on two elements of association with 
the Hashemite monarchy as a symbol of Jordan: commitment to and expression of 
Arabism and a commitment to Palestine and an appeal for the unity of the two peoples 
as branches of the same family. 84 
Such identity has been described as a mixture between the two communities with the 
king acting as a sort of meditative filter between the two halves in Jordanian society. 
Other than the above factors, political Islam played a role in re-integrating some Trans-
Jordanian and Palestinian sectors within the Jordanian community. It has been said that 
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Islam is a powerful rubric in helping the Palestinians in Jordan to express antipathy 
towards the Israeli state in religious terms without compromising their experience as 
Jordanian citizens and hence not alienating East Bankers. Islam has been a successful 
means in transcending divisions within the Jordanian society. 85To give an example of 
the above, some Palestinians and Transjordanians have been joining ranks through the 
Islamic Front in order to criticise the government in Jordan and some regime policies.86 
Another implication of the Jordanian civil war of1970-1971 has been the solidarity 
between the tribes in Jordan and the monarchy. This has been evident in the royal 
patronage given to the tribes for example giving them positions in the state. 
To summarise the finding of this section it has been demonstrated above that the civil 
war of the1970 was a life changing experience for many Palestinians in Jordan. The 
events of black September hastened the development of a sharper sense of Palestinian 
consciousness vis-à-vis the Jordanian state and more importantly for our study it laid 
the antecedents for the emergence of such policies as ‘East Bankers First’ and latterly 
‘Jordan First’. 
 
IV. Jordan in the 1980s (pre disengagement) 
The early 1980s were known as a period of political stability period in Jordan, this was 
due to the place of martial law in Jordan and a heavy security operation. Political 
activists expressed discontent in a variety of forms, but in particular non-governmental 
organisations such as student movements, the Muslim brotherhood movement etc. In 
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absence of formal provisions of democracy, elections to such organisations were the 
only method of measuring the political state of play in the country. In these forums a 
semblance of political life came to the fore, particularly leftist activists and Palestinians 
who could use these bodies to play a political role in the countries heavily contested 
elections.87  
In the 1980s the Jordanian government looked more concerned with the strategic and 
internal challenges posed by the new revolutionary regime in Iran. Having toppled the 
shah in 1979 and established the Islamic republic of Iran, the Islamic regime of 
Ayatollah Khomeini was viewed by the Hashemite monarchy as deeply threatening. 
Basically the reasons for Jordan fearing Iran were centred on Jordan fearing that Iran 
would export its revolution to neighbouring Iraq and thereby install a radical Shia 
regime in Baghdad. (Indeed Iran did not pose any threat to Jordan, but the Hashemite 
monarch focused on Iran’s potential to disrupt Jordan’s domestic and economic 
stability.) Despite the Jordanian government’s continuing concern with security threats, 
these no longer seemed to include fears of invasion or war on Jordanian borders. By the 
early 1980s the external-military threat appeared to be declining relative to the concerns 
of economic security for the regime and concurrently for the stability of the Hashemite 
kingdom.88 
With the beginning of the first Palestinian intifada of 1987 and the consequent unrest in 
the occupied territories, king Hussein and Jordan were forced to re-examine their 
relations with the Palestinian territory.  
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The intifada was the first Palestinian grass root protest movement against Israeli 
occupation in the West Bank and Gaza strip. The beginning of the intifada caught 
everybody unaware. For it was a movement which was not directed by the PLO, Jordan 
or any other Arab state. In terms of Jordanian national identity the intifada was a further 
reinforcement to King Hussein that the West Bank could not indefinitely remain under 
Jordanian rule and that disengagement was a very serious consideration.89 
Despite the intifada originally seen as a threat to Jordan’s national interests, King 
Hussein was able to exploit the situation to Jordan’s long-term national interest and 
benefit. King Hussein realized that he could win greater approval and support within 
Jordan and without if he renounced all Jordanian claims to the West Bank. The King 
had to undertake a bold response to look after Jordan’s long-term interests hence the 
announcement of disengagement. Post disengagement Hussein envisaged two crucial 
roles for Jordan: 1) Jordan would be a big brother to the Palestinian State and 2) Jordan 
plays the role of mediator between the Israelis and the Palestinians. As far as Jordanian 
national identity was concerned this move was the next logical step to provide for a 
territorially homogenous and a strong nation in which the primary allegiance was to the 
Jordanian state. 
In 1986 demonstrations broke out at the University of Yarmouk, as students protesting 
the rise of student fees engaged with a fierce battle with the Jordanian police. In the 
same year king Hussein introduced and the parliament approved a new electoral law. 
The new law was important for a number of reasons, not least because in theory it 
enfranchised women for the first time in Jordanian history and the number of deputies 
                                                
89 Andrew Terill, Global security watch Jordan Santa Barbara 2010 p.54 
57 
 
to the House of Representatives was raised from 60 to 142 seats. Also there would be 
further future allocations of seats along sectarian /ethnic/national lines, reserving seats 
in the parliament for refugees, Christians, Circassians and Chechens.90,91 
In April 1989 the nationalist critique of king Hussein’s policy was validated when anti-
government riots erupted in southern Jordan. For the first time the Hashemite monarchy 
faced violent opposition from Jordanians who had traditionally formed bedrock of 
support in the armed forces and the government. These protestors were speaking against 
the government austerity measures imposed by the international monetary fund. The 
demonstrators sent a clear message that king Hussein has lost his grip on the East Bank. 
The riots also sharpened the line, blurred in the 1970s that differentiated Jordanians and 
Palestinians. The Palestinian refugee camp and business community remained quiet 
during the disturbances. King Hussein responded by calling Jordan’s first election in 
twenty-two years. He subsequently legalized political parties, lifted martial law and 
approved a new electoral law changing Jordan’s voting system.92 
As a result of political demonstrations and protests Jordan’s experienced a period of 
political liberalisation, the monarchy and the government solved this exercise as a 
considerate response on the part of the authorities to the legitimate grievances of the 
people. Elections were held and political restrictions were removed all with the 
intention of taking the steam out of the opposition’s drive for reform. Ultimately Jordan 
in the 1980s refashioned its national identity to embrace a more liberal and people 
orientated understanding of nationalism. The purpose of the earlier section has been to 
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give context on the internal Jordanian scene with respect to the larger discussion to the 
disengagement. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a historical account of the development of nationalism in 
Jordan. It has achieved this objective by looking at the key incidents that shaped 
Jordanian history in the post war period to the late1980s. When analysing this historical 
activity I have tried to remain relevant throughout to the title of the thesis. The analysis 
forwarded in this chapter has shown Jordan to be a relatively secure state but a weak 
corresponding nation, meaning although the government has strengthened its position 
and outreach, the concept of a Jordanian nation has been less quick to evolve. This has 
been primarily because of the constituent elements that have comprised the Jordanian 
state, namely East Bankers, West Bankers, tribal groups, Palestinians and Circassians. 
This chapter has set the foundation stone for the study to follow and it has done this by 
providing a comprehensive and exhaustive account of the history of Jordan in the 
twentieth century and how this history has impacted on nationalism and national 
identity. In subsequent chapters of the thesis I will explore the political and recent 
historical discussions that have taken place inside Jordan vis-à-vis national identity. The 
work will now focus on the period post-disengagement, post 1988 with the view to 
shedding light on the development of Jordanian nationalism after King Hussein’s 
momentous announcement of renouncing Jordanian claim on Jordanian territories. 
Before analysing  other sections of the thesis the study will have provided a 
comprehensive historical account of the different time periods before the 
disengagement of 1988 and also the study will give the reader a brief insight of 
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Jordanian politics and how this discussion will help in the development of the politics 
in the country after Jordan’s disengagement with the West Bank in 1988. Jordan after 
disengagement stood by the Palestinians in their cause in establishing their own state. 
The Jordanian state would also work with the Israelis to help them to establish a 
dialogue with the Palestinians and there is a two state solution just and fair to both sides 
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Chapter One: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Jordan 
 
In the opening chapter of the thesis, I examine the concept of nationalism as it 
originated in Europe. Thereafter, I look at this concept as it was transposed to the 
Middle East at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. 
The contours and constituents of Arab nationalism in general are examined before a 
detailed study is made of nationalism in Jordan, from the inception of the Hashemite 
kingdom to the present day. The thesis examines in greater depth and in more 
methodical fashion the development of national identity in Jordan after the 
disengagement of 1988. 
In this work, I contend that nationalism in Jordan, unlike in many countries, is defined 
on the basis of external and political, rather than ethnic factors. The influence of 
different external groups and political discourses can create conflicts and discussions 
about national identity; thus, politics in Jordan consists of different nationalist 
discourses that are in constant competition. I contend that the three national discourses 
shaping Jordanian national identity are the Hashemite, Palestinian and Pan-Arabic 
discourses. These are not entirely separate from each other, but are intertwined in a 
variety of ways; therefore, a successful analysis of nationalism in Jordan must also 
discuss the relations and interactions between these national discourses. 
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I. Early theories of nationalism 
In this section of the chapter, early theories of nationalism are examined and reference 
made to how these theories fed into modern discussions about the development of Arab 
nationalism. The purpose of such a delineation is to contextualise the analysis within 
early academic discourse; any discussion of Arab nationalism in the contemporary 
period must make reference to earlier theories of nationalism in the European context. 
For the purpose of this literature analysis and the topic under review, it is important to 
be aware that there are many competing theories and approaches to explaining 
nationalism, such as perennialism, primordialism and ethno-symbolism. 
First of all, as Smith suggests, ‘perennialism’ must not be confused with 
‘primordialism’, which conceives of the nation as a natural entity.93 Instead, 
perennialism follows an entirely historical account of nationalism and may reject any 
such ‘natural’ account; it may even reject any natural and historical argument. Smith 
groups perenialist views under fewer than two main headings. ‘Continuous 
perennialism’ is the type that is more applicable to European countries with a long 
uninterrupted cultural history, and it particularly emphasises ‘the slow rhythms of 
collective cultural identity’.94 The second type of perennial theory is ‘recurrent 
perennialism’, which argues that the nation ‘reappears in every period of history and is 
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found in every continent of the globe … even though it may be expressed in varied 
ways’95 in different historical eras. In this sense, even though particular nations appear 
and disappear during the course of history, the concept of nationhood prevails as a 
universal phenomenon applicable to different communities in all ages. 
From a different prospective, ‘primordialism’ puts emphasis on a concept of naturalism 
that makes reference to the intrinsic genesis of the concept of nationhood and to the 
beginnings of the contemporary processes and change in thought and behaviour 
occurring in the different cultural and political groups residing in the Middle East. For 
example, Geertz claims that, as individual human beings and participants of group 
loyalties, ‘we feel and believe in the primordiality of our ethnicities and nations – their 
naturalness, longevity and power’.96 However, Smith contends that this proposition 
cannot serve as a historical and sociological explanation for various kinds of cultural 
community, since it fails to capture their transformation occurring over time.  
Ozkirimli writes: ‘primordialism’ is nationality expressed as a natural part of individual 
human. This is apparent in the explanation of the term ‘primordial’, which can be 
explained while making reference to the original, intrinsic, and overarching principles.97 
Ozkirimli analyses primordialism by breaking it down according to three mutually 
exclusive approaches: naturalist, socio-biological, and culturist. The naturalist approach 
examines a nation as a natural extension of human beings, who are natural organs of a 
nation; therefore, it claims that every nation has a specific origin in nature as well as a 
particular, naturally oriented character and destiny. This evidently entails an ideological 
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view of the past from which a nation naturally arises.98 The second type of 
primordialism noted by Ozkirimli is the socio-biological approach, which employs both 
biology and sociology in the understanding of the ethnic ties between people, and 
ultimately the emergence of nationalism from these ties. Contrary to the naturalist-
ideological approach, socio-biological primordialism endorses physical symbolism, and 
focuses on the apparent similarities and discrepancies between different social and 
ethnic structures in its analysis of different nation formations. On the other hand, the 
third approach, cultural primordialism, prioritises the perceptions and beliefs of 
individuals and their relations to already established social entities.99 Geertz, for 
example, highlights the importance of the foundations of the primordial concepts, and 
what they may provide for the ideas, values, customs, and ideologies held by 
individuals.100 
Another theory of nationalism, which has arisen, as an alternative to modernism and 
which functions especially at the socio-historical and cultural level, is ethno-
symbolism. As a response to modernism, ethno-symbolic perspectives emphasise the 
relation between the social elite and the lower strata they represent. Research conducted 
by the ethno-symbolists is based on long-term analysis of social and cultural patterns, 
aiming to reveal the complex relationships between the past, present and future of the 
ethnicities and nations of history.101 They place the analysis of the rise of nationalism 
‘within the framework of earlier collective cultural identities and especially of ethnic 
                                                
98 Ibid., pp.66-67. 
99 Ibid., p.74. 
100 Ibid., p.73. 
101 Smith, Anthony D. Nationalism, Polity Press, 2001, p.58. 
64 
 
communities or ethnicities.’ 102 
Moreover, ethno-symbolism puts emphasis on the importance of shared passion and 
attachment in ethnic communities in its analysis of the development of national 
feelings. Smith also argues that, by focusing on cultural factors such as symbol, 
memory, myth, and value in particular communities, ethno-symbolism manages to 
provide an alternative to the essentially political, social and economic approaches 
developed by modernism and thereby enriches the theoretical debate on nationalism.	  
After explaining what ethno-symbolism is, we shall now look at the different 
approaches associated with its theory. Scholars in Middle Eastern studies have different 
perspectives on Ethnosymbolism, with some arguing its relevancy and others 
dismissing it as inappropriate in the Middle East. Proponents of Ethnosymbolism argue 
for nativist traditions such as language, tribes, ethnicity, and culture. Those not giving 
Ethnosymbolism primacy maintain that European notions of nationalism, allegiance to 
the state, notions of citizenship and democratic fraternity take precedence over 
attachments and loyalties located in the ‘distant past’.103 The first approach is termed 
‘la longue durée’. According to this, understanding nationalism requires us to first look 
at ‘the origins and formations of the nations as well as their future over a long period of 
time’, rather than linking their existence and formation to a certain period in time or 
specifically to the process of modernisation.104 
The second category of ethno-symbolism is concerned with the ethnic basis of nations 
and nationalism. According to this category, most nations are based on: 
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‘… Ethnic ties and sentiments and on popular ethnic traditions which 
have provided the cultural resources for later nation formation that sought 
to turn ex-colonies into territorial nations [and which] must forge a 
cultural unity and identity of myth, value and memory that can match that 
of nations built on pre-existing ties if they are going to survive and 
flourish as nations.’105 
Similarly, according to Brass: 
‘Nations may be created by the transformation of an ethnic group in a 
multi-ethnic state, into a self-conscious political entity or by the 
amalgamation of diverse groups and the formation of an inter-ethnic, 
composite or homogenous national culture through the agency of the 
modern state.’ 
This also suggests a need to use ethno-symbolism with modernism so as to have a more 
complete picture of nation formation. Therefore, continues Brass, ethnic nationalism 
can be considered as ‘a more general process of identity formation, defined as the 
process of intensifying the subjective meanings of a multiplicity of symbols and of 
striving to achieve multi-symbol congruence among a group of people defined initially 
by one or more central symbols’.106 However, Brass also points out the importance of 
politics in the transformation of ethnic groups into politically mobilised modern 
institutions,107 which may in turn transform into larger entities, namely nations. 
Therefore, social-structural formation is as important as having an ethnic-symbolical 
basis in the process of nation formation. Conversi stresses that ethno-symbolism, when 
deprived of the assistance of other theories like modernism, remains conceptually 
uncertain, and in practice falls short of explaining the distortion of ethnic symbols and 
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myths by political parties and elites.108 On the other hand, the very generality of its 
focus also renders ethno-symbolism applicable and adaptable to diverse nation 
formations in the examination of the ethnic and cultural basis of socio-political 
development.109Furthermore, Smith’s notion of nationalism considers ethnicity as a 
basis of nationhood (and thereby couples the theories of perennialism and ethno-
symbolism), even though it must be redefined according to the practical political and 
social context in which it continues to exist. Therefore, reconciling the ethno-symbolic, 
modern, and perennial definitions of the nation, Smith subsequently argues for the 
necessity of developing different approaches for diverse collective ethnic identities 
while examining the relationship to the general historical, social, and political 
context.110 However, this does not mean that a collective cultural identity can be 
rendered exactly like a modern nation, but rather that it may come to look like a nation 
after it is reconstructed in accordance with modern political and social actuality. In the 
end, attempting to move beyond the theoretical boundaries, Smith follows the ethno-
symbolic approaches only if ‘these earlier collective cultural identities may be related to 
modern nations while allowing for historical discontinuities between them and for the 
possibility of novel combinations of ethnic categories and communities in the making 
of recent nations’.111 In the end, Smith accepts the relevance and equal inclusion of 
these paradigms to the study of nationalism, prioritising modernism and perennialism 
for their focus on theory and history, and understanding ethno-symbolism as a 
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necessary corrective to the excessively general and universal arguments developed by 
the two main paradigms. 
Ethnosymbolism highlights the persistence between pre modern and modern 
understandings of communal cohesion, without neglecting the ruptures brought about 
by the modern age. The continuous characteristics in the development and furthering of 
national identities in Middle Eastern states such as Jordan are historical myths, distant 
memories, tribal values, Bedouin traditions, and Arab nationalist symbols. 
Despite Smith not focusing on the role of Arab intellectuals, he does discuss in his book 
the crucial role as the creators, inventors, producers, and analysts of the ideas of Arab 
ethnosymbolism.112 This thesis examines how Jordanian intellectuals have played an 
important role in Jordanian ethnicity and ethnosymbolism. These Jordanian intellectuals 
mostly act as ‘chroniclers’ of the Tribal Past, they research and elaborate on those 
distant memories which link the modern Jordanian state back to its envisaged ‘Golden 
Age’. 
My research acknowledges the key role of Jordanian painters, musicians, sculptors, 
photographers, novelists, play writers, actors, film directors, and television producers. 
Smith acknowledges the aforementioned intellectuals, strategic employment of national 
symbols as ‘perhaps even more potent than Nationalist principles and ideology’.113 
Through their work, the imagined Arab community becomes starkly popular, 
emotionally resurrected and at regular intervals celebrated. I would even go so far as to 
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suggest a historically deep tribal ethnic foundation is a precursor to the longevity of the 
Jordanian state in the 21st century. 
The next topic that arises for discussion is how can relatively isolated Jordanian 
intellectuals have such a wide appeal? Another question that arises is how that it 
possible to reassure the Jordanian people in the immemorial, perennial genesis of the 
Jordanian nation? The Answer according to my work is to be found in the category of 
Jordanian intelligencia and the Jordanian professionals. Smith identifies these people as 
a group of individuals exposed to some higher form of education.114 This class of 
people in Jordan have the Power and capacity to apply and disseminate the ideas 
developed by Jordanian intellectuals. To conclude these strata of people plays an even 
more critical role in the success of Arab nationalist movement. 
In the following section, modernist approaches to nationalism will be considered, the 
purpose being to link with the foregoing discussion and continue this line of analysis 
into the modern period. In terms of the analysis of Jordan, the early and modernist 
approaches are equally relevant to the development of national identity in the country. 
 
II. Modernist approaches to nationalism 
Among the many approaches to theorising nationalism, modernism constitutes the 
ideological core of the research. Smith divides the paradigm of modernism into five 
varieties; among these is ‘constructionism’, developed by Anderson and Hobsbawm. 
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Hobsbawm argues that most of the literature on nationalism defines a nation as ‘the 
chief characteristic of classifying groups of human beings … who belong to it [,] and 
the nation is in some ways primary and fundamental for the social existence … of its 
members [as human collectivities]’.115 He accepts Anderson’s theory that this definition 
of a nation is new in human history; but while most European nation-formations would 
support the objectivist theory, Hobsbawm criticises this objective definition of nation 
and calls it ‘fuzzy shifting ambiguous’.116 He finds such definitions of a nation 
misleading, and asserts ‘that the real nation can only be recognized a posteriori’,117 
meaning that a nation can only be understood and defined according to its political and 
historical transformations after these changes have taken place. In other words, 
following the modernist approaches, we need to define a nation by examining the 
present political and social structures in its society. Hobsbawm also argues that every 
new party coming to power redefines history in accordance with its political interests; 
therefore, there can be diverse narrations of national history, and different definitions of 
nation, operating within the same country. What is more, nationalism not only reinvents 
the past but also hides facts that must be avoided in order to create a common national 
identity. In this sense, according to social constructivism, knowledge and reality are 
actively generated or constructed by social and political relations and events. This 
argument will assist the main hypothesis of this project, which concentrates on the 
relationship between concrete political events and the abstract definition of the nation.  
Billig’s conceptualisation of ‘banal nationalism’ supports the modern constructionist 
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argument. He argues that nationalism is neither unusual nor uncommon but a humdrum 
part of our daily lives.118 That is, nationalism and its representations exist everywhere, 
on money and in media, films, newspapers, stickers, and flags. This can be said to hold 
true for the development of nationalism in modern Jordan, where the symbol of the 
monarchy appears everywhere in the different forms highlighted above. For Billig, we 
are reminded of our nationality by these symbols of nationhood, even though we forget 
that we are surrounded by these symbols. 
On the other hand, Kedourie, drawing attention to the ideological and political 
influences on the development of modernist nationalism, emphasises the links between 
the paradigm and the theories underlying the Age of Enlightenment in Europe.119 
However, he also states that in Middle Eastern countries like Jordan, the main division 
is between those who belong to the political administration and those who do not; 
therefore, the formation of nationalism is not initiated by a social class, unlike the 
nationalisms in Europe, which were constructed upon middle-class movements.120  In 
addition to the above when analysing Arab nationalism analysed the principle goals of 
nationalism in the Middle East as the struggle against foreign colonialism, in order to 
liberate the Arab motherland completely and finally; the fight to gather all the Arabs in 
a single free country; and the removal of the present discredited structure, an overthrow 
which would include all the sectors of intellectual, economic, social and political life.121 
                                                
118 Billig, Michael. Banal Nationalism, London: Sage, 1995, p.6 
119 Smith, Anthony D. Nationalism, Polity Press, 2001, p. 48 
120 Kedourie, Elie. ‘Nationalism and Self-determination’ in Hutchinson and Smith (eds.), Nationalism, 
Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 55 
121 Kedourie, Elie, Politics in the Middle East, oxford university press, Oxford, 1992 p298 
71 
 
Lastly, Gellner122 also holds that ‘Nationalism ... invents nations where they do not 
exist’,123 perhaps overstating the doctrine's arbitrary character, but without 
underestimating its creative potential.  
In the following section, the thesis will examine Gellner’s structuralist theory and how 
this is applicable to nationalism in the Middle Eastern context. Gellner wrote copiously 
on Middle Eastern culture and history, and by referencing this work the thesis will 
elucidate the structuralist theory of nationalism.  
 
III. Gellner’s structuralist theory 
The structuralist approach used by Gellner to deduce his theory has been the subject of 
much debate. His a posteriori synthetic calculation posits that industrial strength is 
conducive to political strength, which in turn paves the way for nationalism. It can be 
argued that Gellner has a Eurocentric perspective that limits the utility of his theory 
when considering non-European cases and taints his analytical lens. However, to 
presume that his theory is utterly irrelevant is to misconceive the value of the 
materialistic methodology that Gellner developed. In non-European contexts, such as 
the Jordanian experience, Gellner’s notion still holds a degree of validity on the 
grounds of its innovative approach to political and social aspects of the nation-building 
processes, even though it fails to address some crucial ethnic and historical questions. 
Gellner’s social, economic and political argument further strengthens the modernist 
paradigm of nationalism. He argues against the traditional understanding of 
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nationalism, which defines the nation as a formation based on traditional criteria and 
forces such as those of an ethnic, cultural, or religious nature. Gellner calls these ‘old, 
latent, dormant forces’, and instead considers the nation as a new socially constructed 
organisation, conditioned by the education-dependent high cultures which rule the state 
and determine the political discourses which dominate society as a whole. In this sense, 
his modernist theory entirely opposes the perennial-ethnic theories of nationalism. In 
doing so, like other social constructionists, he entirely distinguishes the modern 
political state from culture and considers it as an independent agent, building national 
identity, utilising social-political dynamics and disregarding the ethnic and cultural 
origins of the community.124 A second key tenet of Gellner’s argument is that 
nationalism is a self-generated response to the modern need for a mobile labour force, 
which necessitates a common education in a uniform language. The role of mass 
education is related to the industrial need for a semi-skilled labour force that must be 
easily replaceable. By losing their traditional roles in pre-industrial societies, men (and 
later women) become available in the labour market as a uniform mass rather than 
individuals. The ‘standardisation of expression and comprehension’ leads to the 
capacity for context-free communication.  
Third, Gellner’s interpretation of nationalism owes much to the fact that there is a 
radical discontinuity between industrial and pre-industrial societies. This contrast is, 
indeed, at the centre of all his explanations of nationalism. Moreover, Gellner focuses 
on the bureaucratisation of culture: ‘the state has not merely the monopoly of legitimate 
violence, but also of the accreditation of educational qualification. So the marriage of 
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state and culture takes place, and we find ourselves in the Age of Nationalism.’125 
According to Gellner, the high culture of the 'Age of Nations' is the vehicle of 
industrialism. This is a mass, rational and scientific-technological culture, which is 
communicated by a standardised script in the ‘national’ language.126  
But is Gellner’s theory essentially Eurocentric? Answering this question would allow us 
to evaluate to what extent it is possible to employ his type of modernism in the 
examination of Jordanian nationalism. Ernest Gellner is one of the first to have argued 
for the congruence of the political and the national unit under a primarily political 
principle. His theory explains the formation of nationalism by way of the political 
forces and historical processes which dominate the place and time frame in which 
nation formation occurs. For example, most of the people living in the kingdom of 
Jordan define themselves as Jordanian-Palestinians, the first element indicating their 
politically constructed national identity, the second revealing their ethnic and cultural 
identity. Because Gellner places industrialisation, which he sees as the facilitator of all 
forms of nationalism, at the heart of the methodology, his theory can be seen as 
Eurocentric; however, to derive the view that his theory is utterly irrelevant because of 
this analytical lens is to overstep the mark. 
It is hardly surprising if Gellner offers a Eurocentric perspective and universalises the 
European experience. One might ask whether Gellner was even aware that he was 
guilty of providing a Eurocentric account. The imperial psychology was such that it 
created hierarchies within cultural and academic literature, and this remains the norm 
even to this day. It is easy to objectify nationalism and to forget its individualistic 
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purposes. In the following analysis therefore, when I speak of nationalism and its 
development in modern Jordan in the post-1988 period, I will be using Gellner’s 
conceptualisation. That is:  
‘Nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic 
boundaries should not cut across political ones, especially ethnic 
boundaries within a given state.’ 127  According to Gellner ethnic 
boundaries and political boundaries should not be confused. However in 
Jordan’s case as any observer would highlight ethnicity plays a very 
important role in national identity. Ethnicity and tribal identities are 
paramount to a study of nationalism in Jordan in this context Gellner’s 
conceptualisation can be debated. 
This need not mean that other typologies of nationalism are unimportant. However, for 
our purposes it allows us to better evaluate the applicability of Gellner’s theory.  
That said, it might be the case that Gellner does not provide a purely Eurocentric 
account in that his theory is universalisable. The assertion that Gellner’s approach is not 
useful because it is Eurocentric is only valid if his European account is not applicable to 
the non-European world. 	  
The Jordanian state and nation must be analysed in terms of its regional context. In the 
Middle Eastern Arab world, the nation-state developed in a completely dissimilar way 
to European states, and not through a process of change in social structure. The most 
important element missing in Arabic nation-state formation was industrialisation, by 
which common modes of thought and belief were diffused in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century European societies. In Arab states, however, social structures could not entirely 
overcome strong religious, sectarian, and tribal identities. In this sense, Jordanians or 
East Bankers do not really constitute a nation according to the model created by the 
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modern Western world. Jordanian national identity is not centred on particular symbols, 
myths and memories, or on legal equality, common culture, and a shared economic 
system, but on loyalty to the monarchy and fidelity to the pronounced tribal traditions 
of the country.	  
As aforementioned, this need not mean that other typologies of nationalism are 
unimportant. However, for the purpose of the following discussion, it allows us to 
better evaluate the feasibility of Gellner’s theory. Snyder argues that nationalism can be 
seen as: (i) a force for anti-colonialism, which led to the creation of new nation-states in 
Africa, Asia and the Middle East128 (that is, it was transformed from a movement of 
opposition and defiance into a movement of nation-building in countries such as Ghana, 
India and Jordan); (ii) a force for economic expansion because nationalism 
accompanies the attempts of many powerful nations to obtain economic advantages vis-
à-vis less developed nations; and (iii) a force for colonial expansion, enabling older 
established nations to enhance their imperial ambitions.  
Hans Kohn will be the next theorist of nationalism, which the thesis will engage with. 
His dichotomy theory of nationalism will be analysed to better situate discussion on 
Jordanian nationalism in the twenty-first century. 
 
IV. The Kohn Dichotomy 
In this section of the thesis I will be analysing Kohn’s understanding of nationalism in 
particular with respect to the meaning and history of nationalism as a European concept 
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exported to the Middle East. Kohn illustrates the modern nature of the concept by 
highlighting old allegiances based on historic empires and city-states. Human 
civilisation was then downscaled to a national understanding of what civilisation meant, 
and the general and universal became the particular enunciation of national expression. 
Despite this, nationalism in the formative stage began in a country, which called for the 
‘liberty of man’. This was the conception of national identity in seventeenth century 
England.129 
The French Revolution signalled the beginning of the idea of the European nation state. 
This idea was transplanted into the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and it was this transplanting which gave nationalism first a territorial slant 
and then an ethically based foundation. Other scholars in their analyses of territorial and 
ethnic nationalism later adopted the binary division of European and Middle Eastern 
nationalisms, once elucidated.130 
The Kohn Dichotomy between Western and non-Western nationalism is useful for 
analysing whether Gellner’s theory is irrelevant. Kohn saw nationalism as a long 
historical process, arguing that one form of nationalism does not need to be the same as 
other types; rather, nationalism is dependent on the historical traditions and political 
climates in which each nation arises.131 The reason Gellner is highlighted in this section 
is because Kohn seems to take variance with Gellner’s understanding of nationalism in 
the Middle East. Both theoretician of nationalism for my study of Jordan are equally 
important and I will therefore be using those scholar’s conceptualism. 
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While the Western conceptualisation of nationalism tends to be based on political 
reality, nationalism in the non-Western world usually focuses on a search for the ‘ideal 
fatherland’, referring to the past, and to non-political and historically conditioned 
factors.132 On the other hand, critiques of Kohn argue that his classification is too 
favourable to the Western world and he disregards any manifestations of non-Western 
nationalism in the Middle East. 
Similarly, John Plamentaz’ conceptual differentiation is key to this debate. Plamentaz 
talks about two types of nationalism. One is ‘Western’, having emerged from Western 
Europe; the other is ‘Eastern’, originating from Asia, Africa. Both types depend upon 
the acceptance of a common set of criteria by which the state of development of a 
particular national culture is measured.133 
Brass finds some of the claims of the primordialist theory of nationalism implausible 
because of its narrow scope. He believes this is not sufficient to explain most aspects of 
the complex social structure of contemporary societies, which are mostly multi-ethnic 
and multilingual, and have more than one dominant religion. Even though Jordanian 
society is relatively less cosmopolitan and less complex compared to European and 
American nations, the simultaneous presence of separate influential cultures such as 
Palestinian and Bedouin makes it impossible for analysts to employ solely the 
primordial principles of nationalism, and makes the use of the modern criteria of nation 
formation necessary.134 	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Breuilly comments that the spheres of state and society are becoming detached from 
each other, even though state and society can never be totally separate but instead 
originate from the same social and political sources and forces within the community. 
This finding is relevant to understanding the relation between the culture in question 
and the political situation in the community: 
‘The leap from culture to politics is made by portraying the nation at one 
moment as a cultural community and at another as a political community 
whilst insisting that in an ideal state the national community will not be 
‘split’ into cultural and political spheres. The nationalist can exploit this 
perpetual ambiguity.’135  
According to the above quote, there are two understandings of national community, one 
is cultural and the other political. In the context of Jordan it might be said the country 
has a strong political community but a weak cultural community in the sense of a full 
acceptance of Jordanianess. This is also partly true for Jordanian society, where the 
political elite governs society defines and shape the national identity in accordance with 
the political ideology they support. This 'isolates' politics and the political sphere from 
wider society, and the nation comes to be constructed according to the official ideology 
of the Hashemite elite.	  
Kohn defines nationalism psychologically as a ‘state of mind’. He thereby argues that a 
process in a nation’s history can be analysed by looking at the dynamics of, and 
changes taking place in, the communal psychology regarding private and social life in 
the country. In this sense, the traditionally accepted categories such as language, 
territory and ethnic background make for a more clearly delineated group relevant to 
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the study of Jordanian nationalism. Nationalism, then, must be considered as an idea-
force that can directly affect the social relations in society, defining and redefining their 
meanings. Therefore:	  
‘Nationality is not only a group held together and animated by common 
consciousness; but it is also a group seeking to find its expression in what 
it regards as the highest form of organised activity, a sovereign state.’136 
This argument resembles that of the Hashemites, who established themselves as the 
sovereign social group defining the Jordanian national identity. As Kohn argues, the 
Hashemites established their rule, and thereby their national discourse, by influencing 
communal psychology. The discourse they have employed has naturally striven to 
correspond to the political dynamics of the historical era within which it has been 
created and organised into a force-principle governing the entirety of social life. Like 
the European nationalisms, in Jordan the Hashemites have become the dominant 
corporate dynasty even though they form essentially a non-national body such as 
churches or classes. Referring to these non-national governing bodies, Kohn claims:	  
‘These characters are not determined pre-historically or biologically, nor 
are they fixed for all time; they are the product of social and intellectual 
development, of countless gradations of behaviour and reaction…’137 
In this sense, the Hashemites themselves must be regarded not as an entirely separate 
governing, organising and reshaping brain, but rather as the ultimate outcome of the 
social structures within Jordanian society, and as the individuals acting and reacting to 
these by way of their social relations.	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As a summary to this section, the various theories covered included ethnosymbolism, 
the Kohn dichotomy, Billig’s banal nationalism, and Gellner’s modernist understanding 
of nationalism. All these theories and theoreticians are all important to any study of 
nationalism in the Middle East, they will form the theoretical foundation of the study. 
These theories will explain the development of nationalism in the Jordanian context 
before the thesis makes its own original contribution in analysing national identity in 
the post 1988 period. 
In the following section of this chapter, the thesis will examine Islam’s relationship 
with the development of nationalism in the Arab world. Contrary to much academic 
discourse, Islam and Arab nationalism are very closely intertwined and mutually 
interchangeable. 
 
V. Gellner and nationalism  
Following the extensive introduction to Gellner’s theory of nationalism and modernism 
in general, and in order to understand Gellner’s approach to the Middle Eastern 
countries in particular and to formulate a transition from the theory of nationalism to its 
practical outcomes in Muslim countries, it is necessary to focus on the relationship 
between Islam and nationalism. Islam is an integral part of identity in Jordan given that 
the Hashemite monarchs build their own family identity and legitimacy on a genealogy 
that goes back to the Prophet. Surprisingly, Gellner actually wrote extensively on this 
reciprocal relation between Muslim societies and nationalist ideologies. Referring to the 
economic and social aspects of nation-building processes in developing Middle Eastern 
states, he suggests that in spite of the different scenarios presented by countries in the 
process of industrialisation, it is nevertheless possible to forward a basic explanation for 
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their ideologies related to uncertainty, namely:	  
‘The reason why they are obliged to undergo change is of course to be 
sought in the technical, economic and military superiority of industrial 
society ... These societies are torn between “westernisation” and 
populism, that is, the idealisation of the local folk tradition.’138 
Applying this line of argument to the role of Islam in the structuring of the Middle East, 
Gellner argues that the Muslim faith has kept hold of and elaborated its communal 
relevancy, and is, furthermore, employed by both traditionalist and revolutionary 
governments in the Middle East. Islam, in Gellner’s conception, is observable in two 
guises: 1) a popular, street-Islam variety; and 2) a high, ulema-endorsed literate 
tradition:	  
‘Its sober and restrained Unitarianism, its moralism and abstention from 
spiritual opportunism, manipulativeness and propitiation, in brief, its 
‘protestant’ traits, give it an affinity with the modern world.’139 
Nonetheless, Gellner also points out that this affinity between modernism and Islam did 
not save Muslim lands from the impact of potentially extremist nationalism:	  
 ‘The call for culturally homogenous communities, endowed with a state-
sustained and endorsed culture, in other words nationalism, has been felt 
in the Middle East and North Africa as powerfully as elsewhere.’140 
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He then underlines the similarities between Islamic fundamentalism and modern 
nationalism as follows:	  
‘The mechanisms which underlie Muslim fundamentalism, of an 
identification with an anonymous Umma, are similar to those which 
underlie modern nationalism: men leaving, or deprived of places in a 
local social structure, are attracted by identification with a community 
defined by a shared High Culture.’141 
Similarly, Milton-Edwards argues that it would not be wrong to confuse 
the concept of nation or watan in the Middle East with the Muslim notion 
of community (umma). Here, she gives the example of the Jordanian 
monarchy, which in its attempt to form a nation-state refers to a people or 
community as Bani Hashim (sons of Hashim) or Hashemites. 142 
Moreover, she adds, ‘In Islamic fundamentalism we can observe a mix of 
ethnicity, nationalism, and sectarian rivalry.’143 Therefore, an analysis of 
nationalism in the Middle East must also refer to the religious (Islamic) 
background of the community being studied. 
O’Leary underlines Gellner’s explicit consideration of the relationship between Islam 
and nationalism. However, he adds that this combination still remains an unhappy one. 
On a number of levels, the understanding of Islam, which Gellner elaborates in order to 
propose that the religion is conducive for modernisation, is just as applicable to the 
analysis he applies to the broader development of ‘nationalism’:	  
‘The traits which allegedly make Islam secularisation-resistant are then 
invoked to claim that Islam can, and may well trump nationalism as a 
legitimating formula, in a way that Christianity can no longer do in the 
West. Indeed, Gellner claims that fundamentalism is presently victorious 
over nationalism ... Gellner applies his arguments almost wholly to 
Arabic lands.’ 
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According to Gellner, Islam as a political force can very much play the role of national 
identity and a unifying bond in much the same way as Nationalism has done in the 
European context in the 19th and 20th centuries. As O’Leary’s analysis of Gellner 
highlights Islam is resistant to secularism unlike Christianity and is therefore in its 
current fundamentalist guise is able to contest national boundaries as witnessed in 
Middle East today.	  
O’Leary also adds that it is not evident that ‘fundamentalist Islam has trumped 
nationalism in South-East Asia, South Asia, or indeed the Middle East’144 Similarly:  
‘... Gellner himself appeared to suggest that Islam, unlike the other world 
religions, might be capable of performing modernisation’s necessary 
support functions – thereby making nationalism inessential for the 
breakthrough to modernisation.’145 
Nonetheless, O’Leary claims that:	  
‘Gellner underplayed the role of power-politics in explaining which 
cultures become nations, and the possibility that nation-builders explicitly 
see the functional relationship between nationalism and modernity.’146 
Gellner’s Conditions of Liberty argues that Islam may take ‘the place of nationalism in 
large parts of the modern world’. Here, Gellner stresses that the Muslim faith contains 
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within itself a formal literary corpus, emphasising learning and strict orthodoxy, which 
can be and is employed by those protagonists who want to liberalise and advance their 
countries:	  
‘This means that Islamic societies can evade ... the awful choice between 
populism and westernisation: remaining true to their better selves allows 
them to enter the modern world. It is this that lends Islam, in Gellner’s 
view, its secularisation-resistant quality, making it a major force to be 
reckoned with in the modern world.’147 
Furthermore:	  
‘Arab nationalism gives way to Islamic integrism, just as the demise of 
Soviet Marxism opens the way for virulent nationalisms. The search for a 
categorical identity, to answer the call to difference, and be the bearer of 
the sought-for dignity, can take many forms.’148 
This section has therefore established that Islamism, as an already established 
categorical identity, assists the process of nation formation in Middle Eastern countries. 
This will be developed in the next section, which will analyse closely the definition of 
Arab Nationalism.	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VI. Definition of Arab Nationalism  
Arab nationalism is the recognition by the Arabs of their full social existence. This is a 
consciousness, which is both internal and external objective knowledge, and refers to 
the image of the Arab community as a spiritual and living complex. 	  
Language. The Arabic language significantly strengthens the consciousness of unity 
and can engender a nationalist connection in two ways. First, language is a channel of 
communication that allows people to exchange ideas, so that sentiments and 
inclinations become close to one another. In this way, language serves as a strong link 
which makes the community share in disappointments and aspirations, enables it to 
safeguard its past and its triumphs, allows it to commit to writing its social, political and 
literary history so that coming generations may be familiar with it, and steers the umma 
towards a bright future. Second, language is a national tradition that solidifies good 
relations among all members of a group so that they feel as if they are one family. If 
someone hears another language being spoken, he feels the speaker to be different to 
him, and might even go so far as to hate the speaker because of this supposed 
difference. 	  
Interest. Interest, when it is bound up with ideals and hopes, is a powerful factor that 
can unify desperate people. Since interests are shared within the fatherland, the 
religions, which in history were believed to safeguard interests, have no use now except 
for ethics and conduct. Common interests within the common Arab fatherland impose 
unity, despite diversity of religious conviction.	  
History. This issue is of great significance in creating a unified and concentrated feeling 
because it is the record of events, whether happy or sad, which have occurred 
successively to the Arab nation. When a group of people go back to their history, their 
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sentiments and concepts return to certain fixed points. The common happiness and 
upsets of the past create the memories of a shared life to which every Arab returns, 
unified in thought and feeling. History also safeguards the traditions of the Arab nation, 
its goals, and its aspirations. 
Customs. The similarity of customs comes from racial, historical, and geographical 
unity, and there is no doubt that the fact of seeing somebody behaving in the same way 
as you do will bring you nearer to him. 149	  
 
VII. Prominent thinkers on Arab nationalism 
Sati al Husri was the most important ideologue of Arab Nationalism. Throughout his 
many books on the subject, Husri never lost sight of the ultimate aim of the ideology he 
so passionately disseminated: the political unity of the Arab people. Husri writes:	  
‘People who speak the unitary language have one heart and a common 
passion. As such, they constitute one nation, and so they have to have a 
unified state.’150 
Elsewhere, he says that the most content of countries is one where political and national 
frontiers are one and the same.151 Husri thought that the Arab countries were artificial 
creations of the European colonial powers. These were motivated by their colonial 
strategic interests, and broke up what was basically a natural, cultural polity with an 
incontestable right to political independence. An intended consequence of this 
                                                
149 Haim,Sylvia G.Haim, Arab Nationalism An Anthology University of California press 1962 ed.pp 121-
127 
150  Adeed Dawisha, Arab nationalism in the Twentieth  century, Princton university press 2005 p.2 
151 Abu Khaldun Sati ‘ al Husri. Ara’wa Ahadith fi-alQawmiya al Arabiya (Views and discussions on 
Arab nationalism) Beirut: Dar al Ilm lil al Malayeen,1964, p. 23 
87 
 
deliberate dissolution was to keep the Arab peoples politically weak. In one of his 
books, Husri says he is continually asked how it was that the Arabs lost the 1948-1949 
wars over Palestine when they were seven countries and Israel was only one. His 
answer is very clear and forthright: the Arabs lost the war precisely because they were 
seven countries.152	  
The conclusion is equally clear: to avoid losing wars in the future, the Jordanians have 
to unite with other Arab states. The Arab Legion of Jordan was the only Arab force that 
performed well in the 1948-1949 war.	  
As a concept, ‘Arab nationalism’ has tended to be used in the literature of Middle 
Eastern politics and history interchangeably with other terms such as Arabism, Pan-
Arabism, and even occasionally Arab radicalism, thus blending the sentiment of 
cultural nearness with the desire for political unity.153 To say one is Jordanian should 
mean something different from saying one is a Jordanian nationalist; similarly, ‘Arab’ 
is not synonymous with ‘Arab nationalist’. The term ‘Arab’ conveys one’s cultural 
heritage, expressed in this thesis as the term Jordanian, whereas the ‘Arab nationalist’ 
or ‘Jordanian nationalist’ imbues this cultural oneness with the added ingredient of 
political recognition.	  
Humphreys, in a very insightful and careful study of Middle Eastern history, follows a 
similar path of conceptual overlapping.154 In a chapter titled The Strange Career of Pan-
Arabism, he delineates the growth and decline of the Arab nationalist movement. Here 
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again, though, Humphreys sees little need for a definitional distinction among the terms 
‘Arab nationalism’, ‘Arabism’ and ‘Pan-Arabism’, and as such he employs the three 
terms interchangeably.155 In one section, he concludes his analysis of the diminishing 
fortunes of the Arab nationalist movement in the period after disengagement by asking: 
‘Where is Pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism in any form?’ 	  
Michel Aflaq’s views on nationalism and revolution were instrumental in the 
development of Arab nationalism in the twentieth century. Aflaq feared that Arab 
nationalism might fall to the level of mere intellectual knowledge and verbal discussion, 
and therefore lose affective power. He believed nationalism is founded on blood, a 
spiritual quality taken from history or a common culture, and that it did not banish 
religion or take its place.156 
Aflaq and the genesis of the Bath party especially in Syria and Iraq had an instrumental 
influence on the development on socialism and nationalism in Arab countries. Whereas 
in Syria and Iraq monarchies were toppled in the name of nationalism, in Jordan 
Aflaq’s ideas did not spoon revolution against the monarchy.	  
 
VIII. A conceptual discussion of nationalism in Jordan  
Given the political connection, which has closely linked Jordan with historical 
Palestine, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has a central place within the context of 
national identity formation in the Middle East. Since the country was created in 1921 as 
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a British mandate, Jordan has been seen by many scholars as the most artificial of all 
states in the Middle East. For instance, Illya Harik maintains that the Arab countries are 
old societies and also old states, but argues that Jordan is an exception to this rule.157 	  
At present, a common sense of Jordanian national identity has not fully evolved, and 
one of the main points of this thesis will be to explore the on-going reformulation of 
such an identity. This is a continuous building process, especially after the 
disengagement of 1988 and the Jordanian monarchy’s promulgation of the Jordan First 
policy. Further, in Jordan there has been no cohesive national narrative. Following 
Gellner’s argument mentioned earlier, such narrative can be secured from two sources: 
either by building unity or by national liberation from colonial rule.158 
Jordan has attempted to create a national narrative by sharing common myths and 
rituals. In this regard, Jordanian nation building in the post-disengagement period is 
associated with developing a territorial watani identity. It is for this reason that, in the 
post-disengagement period, harnessing Jordanian watani loyalties is crucial in dealing 
with the internal tension between Palestinians and Jordanians, and the non-resolution of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
However, despite what has been written here, creating a Jordanian national identity has 
not been a straightforward project, especially in the more recent years of the post-
disengagement period, given the demographic facts on the ground, regional 
uncertainties, and the civil war in Syria. In Kramer’s view, one of the basic hurdles for 
a coherent Jordanian national identity comes from the impact of ethnicity and tribalism 
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on political conduct and social structuring in the country.159 	  
The characteristics of the new Middle Eastern order constructed in the Arab world in 
the period post-1979 are twofold: more pragmatic in terms of the survival of monarchy, 
and less ideological because of the awakening of Pan-Arab nationalist aims. The most 
important goal of all Middle Eastern countries is the securing of their self-interests in 
the newly constructed regional state system. Therefore, Jordan’s East Bank First 
Programme in the aftermath of Black September created between the Jordanian armed 
forces and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, and the newly introduced ‘Jordan 
First Arab Second Manifesto’, are similar, and show a trend towards strengthening the 
objectives of the Arab states. 	  
In the post-disengagement period, the ‘Jordan First’ manifesto, rather than promoting 
an ideological Qawmiya sense of national belonging, is more attached, geographically, 
to the concept of wataniya. ‘Jordanians will come first’ is the basic element of the 
national campaign today in Jordan, resurrecting the statist promotion of ‘Jordanian land 
for Jordanians’ and the parallel ‘Palestine for Palestinians’ in order to strengthen 
Jordan’s separate political unity and nationhood vis-à-vis Palestinian national identity. 
160 	  
The movement from Qawmiya to wataniya can partly help to explain Jordan’s peace 
agreement with Israel in 1994 after disengagement. Jordan’s example shows that 
national goals and identities are not necessarily preordained; instead they are given 
shape and distinguished by the public and historical landscape in which they are rooted. 
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If the old argument and norms were still relevant to the Arab state system, Jordan’s 
stand during the Gulf War, its disengagement from the West Bank and its finalising of 
the peace treaty with Israel could not have happened so readily and so reassuringly.	  
During this period, each Middle Eastern country has wanted to separate itself and its 
particular identity from the others, while to some degree remaining conscious of the 
Arab nations’ overall achievements. In this regard, the Jordanian example has been a 
little less straightforward because of the lack of cohesion among Jordanian-Jordanians 
and Palestinian-Jordanians.161 
Largely because Jordanian national identity has been seen as identical to loyalty to the 
king and the Hashemite monarchy, the arrival of the large Palestinian community in the 
aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war was injurious to Jordan’s development of a 
national identity. For the scholar Joseph Nevo, ‘there was no way of preserving the 
dominance of the East Bank if genuine integration were allowed’ by the Hashemite 
family. 
Significantly, the identity disagreement between Trans-Jordanians and Palestinian 
people was further complicated with the formation of the PLO and the enhancement of 
Palestinian national identity. This subject will be further explored in Chapter Three. 
The growing rift between Jordanians and Palestinians found expression in political 
geography with the late King Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank in 1988. 
Since 1988, those of Palestinian background do not consider themselves as full citizens 
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like those of the East Bank, but rather as residents in somebody else’s homeland.162	  
The dissatisfaction among the Palestinians garnered support for the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its political counterpart the Islamic Front in Jordan. During the course 
of my fieldwork, I found that the imbalance of representation of Palestinian citizens in 
Jordanian politics is the major reason for their anger. Therefore, since 1988 Jordan has 
tried to strengthen its geographical national identity in order to win over and restrict the 
internal opposition movement, as seen in the recent unrest of the ‘Arab Spring’. 
In this second section of the chapter we shall be looking at three Areas of nationalism 
and ethnicity in the Middle East. The first section explores the Ethnic Factor in Middle 
Eastern Politics. The second section explores Ethnicity, Majority, and Minority in the 
Middle East and lastly we shall explore the role of politics and ethnicity in the Middle 
Eastern state. 
 
IX. The ethnic factor in Middle Eastern politics 
In tracing the profound changes that have taken place in the ethnic politics of the 
Middle East and in the literature on this subject during the past sixty years, it may be 
useful first to distinguish between three principal phases of history. 
Phase one: World War I brought the end of a traditional order during the four previous 
centuries; most of the region was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire 
was a Muslim state successor to the tradition of great Muslim empires and membership 
in its ruling class was open to Sunni Muslims who followed the Ottoman way to 
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perpetuate Ottoman-Turkish culture. 
In this polity, informed by religious affiliation and solidarity, ethnic identity played a 
marginal role. Well into the nineteenth century, the term Arab and Turk designated in 
most cases nomads –-Bedouins or Turkoman – in contrast with the sedentary 
population. It was then only and even more so during the decade preceding World War 
1 that ethnic solidarity and differences became an important factor in the political life of 
the Ottoman state. Proto-nationalisms made an appearance on the Middle Eastern stage, 
such case were Turkish, Arab and Iranian identities. 
This becomes more apparent when the nineteenth century antecedents of Arab 
Nationalism are examined in a historical context. Nationalism as an identifiable 
political creed and ideology becomes more manifest and pronounced in the immediate 
post world one years, with the establishment of the state system of Middle East .A 
secular streak and an Arab ethnic resentment of Turkish pre-eminence can be discerned 
among the old proponents of Arab nationalism, but soon thereafter Arab nationalism 
acquired a distinct Sunni Muslim quality.163 
Phase two: In the interwar period the destruction of the Ottoman empire and the 
settlement by the victorious powers that laid the foundations of a new state system in 
the region were all important developments in the incubation of a national identity in 
the region which was to comprise Trans-Jordan. At an early stage, Turkey and Iran 
appeared to be on their way to becoming nation-states, though later events were to show 
how difficult it was to fashion Turkish or Iranian territorial nationalisms. Middle 
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Eastern Nationalisms no longer making Islam the first reference point now had to 
contend with the problems of ethnic minority politics. 
For a number of reasons, problems of ethnicity played a crucial and prominent role in 
this process. The sway held by the doctrine of Arab nationalism pitted the Arab Sunni 
establishment against the other communities, and the policies of Great Britain and 
France, by design or unintended consequences tended to exacerbate intercommunal 
relations.164 
The preceding analysis has shown that the foundations of Jordanian nationalisms were 
laid in the immediate post war period when the European powers created the state 
system in the nearer Middle East. Jordanian national identity as such took some years to 
evolve however the primary bases for distinct national identities in the Middle East 
such as Palestinian, Lebanese Syrian and Jordanian were all demarcated by victorious 
British and French in the interwar period. Arab notable families especially those who 
were educated in the west and Christian minorities were some of the leading proponents 
of western styled nationalism as distinct from the old dying ideology of Ottomanism. 
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XI. Politics of ethnicity and the Middle Eastern state 
Considered as societies… new states are abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection 
based on primordial attachments’.165 The political arena of the Middle East is an 
extraordinary example of this statement by Edward Shils. If the central problem in 
contemporary Middle Eastern politics today is the building and maintenance of 
legitimate territorial states then Joseph Rothschild’s book states: ‘Though several new 
issues have arisen in the twentieth century, ethnic nationalism – or politicized ethnicity 
– remains the world’s major ideological legitimator and delegitimator of states, regimes 
and governments.’ Moreover Rothschild argues that all around the world, ‘politicized 
ethnic assertiveness is… a valid but not exhaustive explanation of the contemporary 
state’s renewed crises of legitimacy’.166 
The legitimating power of ethnic politics has a profound pull on ethnic nationalism of 
the Middle East; in the case of Jordan this is very apparent. When analysing national 
identity in the post disengagement period, ethnic politics and the differentiation 
between Arabs and Jews and Bedouin and sedentary are all-important in the analysis on 
national identity.  
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The basis of ethno politics appears to be what Clifford Geertz terms ‘primordial 
attachments’. By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the given or 
more specifically as culture is unsurprisingly involved in such matters, the presumed 
givens of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly but beyond 
them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community 
speaking a particular language or even a dialect of a language and following particular 
social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom etc. are seem to have an 
ineffable and at times over powering, coerciveness in and of themselves.167 
Ethnic identity in Jordanian national consciousness is a very important feature to 
understand and fully comprehend. Any examination of National identity in Jordan must 
take into account the above discussion by noted scholars in the field. Only by 
undertaking such analysis the thesis be able to shed more light on the lived reality and 
on-going development of identity politics in a state that is in a condition of flux, such as 
Jordan today. 
Thus a coupling of weak states and strong primordial sentiments would be a debilitating 
liability in an attempt to maintain a legitimate political community, yet in many parts of 
the Middle East this is the case. 
One may ask what does ethno politics mean, beyond the politicization of primordialism, 
the answer to the above question is not clear, but the notion of primordialism is 
sufficiently powerful to capture the substance and essence of the phenomenon: 
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‘Politicised ethnicity, ethno-politics, ethno- nationalism, ethno-
secessionism and so on are all terms used… in analysing what happens 
when such entities bring their social, cultural, and economic interests, 
grievances, claims, anxieties, and aspirations into the political area- the 
intrastate and /or the interstate arena.  
Nor would it be helpful or even possible, to separate out the idea of ethnic 
consciousness, solidarity and assertiveness from religious, linguistic, 
racial and so-called primordial foci of consciousness, solidarity and 
assertiveness …suffice it to the state… that the terms ethnicity and 
ethnic… are used generally to refer to the political activities 
Of complex collective groups whose membership is largely determined 
by real or putative ancestral inherited ties, and who perceive these ties as 
systemically affecting their place and fate in the political and socio-
economic structure and state society.’168 
Geertz describes six possible foci of primordialism, which are not mutually exclusive: 
assumed blood ties, race language, region, religion and custom. All six points are 
pertinent to the analysis of Jordanian nationalism. Blood ties are all important to the 
Hashemite dynasty in tracing the lineage of the dynasty back to Sheriff Hussein of 
Mecca. The line of the prophet gives the monarchy legitimacy in the Arab world. Race 
and language are two important elements of Jordanian identity. One of the important 
elements of national identity is the understanding of the Arab identity as distinct from 
Jewish and Turkish identities. The Arab language also plays a key role in the 
delineation of identity politics in Jordan: Arabic is one of the bedrocks of Jordanian 
national identity. The area comprising the Jordanian state lies between the River Jordan 
and the frontiers of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. This region has historically been seen as 
constituting the hinterland of the coastal area of Palestine. The religious element of 
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national identity of Jordan focuses upon the religion of Islam and its connection with 
Arabism. Islam is a very important component of national identity in Jordan. The 
historical customs of the Bedouins and tribes are an important anchor of the rootedness 
of identity politics in Jordan. All these six factors working in tandem as Geertz 
highlights are important ingredients in the conception of identity politics in Jordan in 
the 21st century.169 
Beyond the general identification of primordial foci, Geertz is much more focused with 
the construction of some basic typology ‘of the concrete patterns of primordial diversity 
that are found within the various states’ (the Middle East obviously included)170. A 
simple typology yields five categories or patterns in Geertz’s terminology. The first 
pattern is a single and dominant and usually (though not inevitably) larger group set 
over a strong and chronically troublesome minority (example in the Middle East 
Jordan). The majority in Jordan would include the Bedouin and tribal elements; the 
minority would historically constitute the Palestinian and Christian communities. The 
second pattern is one central group, geographically or politically and several medium-
large and at least somewhat opposed peripheral groups (for example, Morocco and 
Iran). The third pattern is a bipolar pattern of two nearly evenly balanced groups 
(Sunni’s and Shi’ites in Iraq; Christians and Muslims in Lebanon)171. 
Thus we have in the Middle East: majority vs. minority, central groups vs. peripheral 
groups and a complex case of evenly matched groups. All three groups tend to 
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exacerbate political conflict over the assets of the state. The two patterns missing in the 
Middle East seemed to be designed to diffuse such political struggles to a certain 
extent.172 This majority v Minority and central groups versus peripheral groups is also 
applicable to the case of Jordan therefore Jordan shares certain characteristics with 
respect to identity politics with its neighbouring countries.  
 
Conclusion	  
To conclude, this research must take into consideration the argument that Gellner’s 
Eurocentric perspective, which limits his utility when considering non-European cases, 
taints his overall analysis. However, for one to presume that his theory is utterly 
irrelevant is to misconceive the valuable and material methodology that Gellner 
provides in painting a picture of how nationalism is derived. Gellner’s theory is still 
applicable to states outside Europe, as can be seen in the nationalisms, which have 
taken hold in many Middle Eastern and Arabic countries such as Jordan. As this chapter 
shows, the argument can also be endorsed by Gellner’s own writings regarding the 
relationship between nationalism and religion in the Middle East. Thus, it is legitimate 
to call Gellner’s theory relevant to a case study on Jordanian nationalism, and the 
arguments in this project will be developed in favour of, and/or in contrast to, Gellner’s 
modernist approach so as to provide a comprehensive answer to the main question 
regarding the development of Jordanian nationalism in the period since disengagement 
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in 1988.173	  
In fact, despite the ethnic and political discrepancies between Western and Eastern 
societies, modernism, rather than primordialism or ethno-symbolism, is the most valid 
theory for the examination of nation formation in the Middle East. This is because, 
unlike the other theories, modernism defines nationalism in countries such as Jordan as 
a result of colonialism, political struggle, and social and bureaucratic transformation, 
and thereby manages to capture the dynamics underlying the generation of new national 
identity. Most of these criteria are equally significant for the history of nationalism in 
the Western world. However, this does not mean that other theories (especially ethno-
symbolism) are completely irrelevant. Indeed, ethno-symbolism may prove very useful 
in approaching aspects of Jordanian nationalism such as the ethnic past of the 
Palestinians and other minorities, including Bedouins, who live in Jordan. 	  
This chapter has explored theories applicable to the development of nationalism in the 
Middle East, and has highlighted key developments in Jordanian national identity in the 
period after disengagement. In this respect, the chapter offers a conceptual framework 
for the study that is to follow. The research methodology and research questions that 
will provide beneficial insights into nationalism have also been addressed, and will be 
explored in more detail in later chapters.	  
This analysis has discussed the development of the concept of Jordan First in depth by 
clarifying the meaning of state power and the regime’s survival strategies. It presumes 
that a new meaning of the concept of Jordan First as a national slogan is considered to 
be one of the main factors that has weakened traditional powers, and is a new beginning 
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for the political liberalisation process. The underlying assumption is that individuals 
will begin to define themselves according to their personal achievements. Therefore, 
Jordan First as the regime’s national slogan is an instrument of modernisation that 
heightens popular demand for the principle of personal achievement.174	  
To summarise this chapter, the analysis has demonstrated over four sections that the 
development of national identity with respect to the Hashemite discourse has 
engendered a clearly defined and coherent understanding of Jordanian national identity. 
First with respect to the tribes of Jordan, the analysis demonstrated how tribal and 
Bedouin identity are integral to any modern concept of Jordanianess. Although 
increasingly less relevant, the tribal makeup of Jordan for the foreseeable future will 
remain an important undercurrent of national identity. In relation to the armed forces, 
the analysis has demonstrated that from the conception of the state of Jordan through to 
its present history, the martial qualities represented by the armed forces are an integral 
and important component of modern Jordanian identity. The Palestinian analysis in this 
chapter has shown this important population of the country is a cohesive and a counter 
force when it comes to national identity formation. In short, where the segments are not 
well integrated in Jordan, in socio-economic terms, there is a greater likelihood that 
they will espouse a more pronounced Palestinian identity. With respect to Jordan First, 
this was a response by the monarchy to counter opposing views, but it is too early to 
determine whether the regime has been wholly successful in inculcating a strong sense 
of Jordanian identity in view of the effects on the country by the current Syrian 
situation, which is a scenario that is still unfolding.    	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Literature review 
The purpose of the following literature review is to critique the books written on Jordan 
and to review the books on nationalism on the Middle East. The review we look to 
highlight the connections between the various studies on Jordan. In this process the 
review will identify the gaps in the literature that this thesis will look to cover. A review 
will be undertaken of all the major scholars who are writing on Jordanian history and 
politics. The review will highlight the most important theories on Nationalism in the 
Middle East. 
This literature review will be divided into a number of different sections, each section 
will look at an important facet of Jordanian history and Politics. Within each of the 
literature review sub sections, a number of different books and articles will be reviewed 
. In total the literature review has examined more than ten books and articles. It is 
important to emphasize here that the literature review itself is thematically organised. 
(i) From colonialism to Arab nationalism 
In his book, Massad analyses the political thought of Antonio Gramsci; who himself in his 
analysis of national identity highlights what he terms ‘three historical moments’.175 The three 
moments are numbered thus: 1) the colonial moment; 2) the anti-colonial moment; and 3) the 
expansion and contraction of the nation. This mode of analysis can be applied to the political 
history of Jordan where the ‘first moment’ that is termed the colonial moment is when the British 
established a state framework on a colonial piece of territory and inaugurated a state structure 
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where it had not existed before. 176 The ‘second moment’ when applied to Jordan is that of the 
anti-colonial moment; in relation to Jordan this is the moment when the struggle against colonial 
rule becomes more generalised and leads to the establishment of a national independent state. 
This is also the moment when the administrative British structure is adopted by the Jordanians to 
set-up their own independent national state, the date in this case is May 1946.177 The ‘third 
moment’ is that of the expansion and contraction of the Jordanian nation; in our case study I refer 
specifically to the territorial and demographic expansion and contraction of the Jordanian state 
through annexation and the loss of territory. In terms of ‘expansion’ this is when in the Nakba of 
1948, the Jordanian state took over administrative responsibility of the West Bank and the 
attendant Palestinian citizens. In terms of the contraction of the Jordanian nation, this took place 
when the West Bank was lost to a victorious Israeli state in the 1967 six-day war.178  
Massad in his book examines how modern Jordanian national identity was developed and 
articulated. The author examines two important institutions in Jordan, the law courts and The 
armed forces. Massad employs these two to craft a unique and very accurate analysis of the 
growth of national Identity in Jordan in the British colonial period and in the time after the 
Second World War. This book will be a key element in the current study, as the researcher will 
look to build on the analysis advanced by Massad by examining the post disengagement period 
after 1988. 
Anderson’s analysis shows convincingly how after the fall of Faisal’s government in Damascus 
to the French Army many of his colleagues and early Arab nationalists flocked to Amman for 
refuge. In effect bringing with them the ideology of Arab nationalism, formulated specifically 
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first, in Paris, and later, in Damascus. One could therefore argue that the seeds of Jordanian 
nationalism are to be found in the fall of Damascus to the French and the subsequent arrival of 
Arab nationalists to Amman and what was then termed Southern Syria.179 In Anderson’s words 
Amman became ‘the capital for the propagation of Arab nationalism’.180 Building on this 
analysis, Abdullah’s meeting with Churchill in March 1921 in effect dealt an important blow to 
the ideology of pan-Arab nationalism as the young prince agreed not on a unified Arab kingdom; 
not on a greater Syrian state; but to propagate nationalism in a small province titled Transjordan 
and centred on the oasis town of Amman. This analysis by Anderson is very forceful and 
insightful.181 Anderson shows convincingly how this historical junction Jordanian, British and 
Middle eastern Realities joined together to meet the mutual interest of all parties. Specifically 
Anderson shows that a crucial opportunity to promote Arab Nationalism through the 
establishment through the united Arab Kingdom was lost because of the Interest was lost because 
of regional Arab state Interest.182 
Anderson also examines the Jordanian National Movement, active from the 1920s through to the 
1950s, and its attendant successes and failures. The author’s analysis suggests that the JNM 
promised too much and failed to live up to its expectations. Arab nationalism as an ideology 
could not provide ‘electricity’ and employ the ‘urban poor’. The Hashemites on other hand 
remained adamant and constant in their claim that they were the true representatives of Jordanian 
identity and destiny; as Anderson writes: ‘In a basic way, the Hashemite regime had come to 
‘fulfil the normalizing mission of the modern state’ as the population granted it legitimacy’.183 
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Building on this line of analysis Anderson writes of the struggle for the future national identity of 
Jordan between the monarchy and the Jordanian National Movement. The JNM sought 
identification with pan-Arabism, particularly the Egypt of Jamal Abdul Nasser; a leftist political 
orientation; union, even, with Syria and Egypt and a democratic and representative form of 
government. The monarchy on the other hand sought entrenchment of the status quo; leadership 
of the Hashemite dynasty; a closer working relationship with Washington and moving the country 
gradually to any form of open representative government. As Anderson highlights the future of 
Jordan socially, politically and economically was not yet definitively decided even as late as the 
late 1950s.184 The king and the Hashemites were adept at portraying their conflict with the JNM 
as an international sabotage mission by the Soviet Union to infiltrate the small country. The 
Hashemites evidently felt threatened by a resurgent and a revolutionary Arab nationalist spirit and 
sought to de-legitimise it by playing the ‘communist card’. These events proved instrumental in 
consolidating the Jordanian state identity in favour of a cautious and guarded Arab identity rooted 
in monarchical rule.185 Keeping with our review of literature on Middle Eastern nationalism, the 
thesis will now examine the work of Robinson. Francis Robinson has written extensively on 
Middle Eastern politics and history. 
In his discussion of Islam and nationalism, Robinson suggest there is a tendency amongst 
Muslims of the Middle East to organise their politics on the basis of their religion. Where people 
of the Islamic faith are in a majority, movements take the form of Islamic political parties such as 
the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt or the Jama’it Islami of South Asia, whose goal has been to 
insure that government and community run as far as possible along what they understand to be 
religious lines. Where Muslims make up a small percentage of the population, there often arises 
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the demand that Muslims should be organised as a distinct political community, either as a 
separate country or a country within a country.186 
Lynch notes in his introductory chapter that King Abdullah I accepted the creation of Transjordan 
as a short-term necessity for realising his larger ambitions to be at the head of an independent 
greater Arab kingdom.187 Lynch advances his analysis by highlighting that Emir Abdullah in 
pursuit of his aims contributed greatly in defining and giving content to the ideology of Arabism. 
Lynch in fact makes an important distinction by coining the phrase ‘Hashemite Arabism’ as 
opposed to ‘nationalist Arabism’. 188  Lynch discusses an open secret when he examines 
Abdullah’s close relationship with the Zionist forces, even going so far as suggesting that 
Abdullah’s and the Zionist interests may have converged in forestalling the emergence of a 
Palestinian polity.189 While acknowledging that there is continuing scholarly debate over the 
precise agreements made between the Zionists and Abdullah, Lynch seems to imply that 
Abdullah’s regional ambitions were partly satisfied with the incorporation of the West Bank with 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the post 1948 period. Building on this line of analysis he 
makes the important point that over the course of the 1950s Jamal Abdul Nasser’s variety of 
Arabism, ironically, came to be viewed as a threat to Amman’s reading of Arabism. This is 
highlighted in the following quote:  
‘Nasser’s Arabism portrayed Jordan as a particularly illegitimate division of the 
Arab world, a buffer state for British interests and a guarantor of Israeli security 
rather than an authentic Arab state.’190 
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In the book the Origins of Arab nationalisms, the contributors offer the most recent revisionist 
literature on the rise of the Arab nationalism that developed after the fall of the Ottoman empire 
at the end of the First World War. The distinguished set of authors forward a comprehensively 
broad understanding of the Middle East at the turn of the twentieth century, accommodating a 
comparison of narratives in a number of national context from Syria and Egypt to the Hejaz, 
Libya, Iraq and finally Jordan.  
Mary Wilson analyses the crucial period of the Arab revolt and the birth of Modern Jordan. She 
demonstrates that ‘Arabism was not espoused by the Hashemites until it became of particular use 
to them’.  She maintains that only after the Hashemite forces crossed the frontiers of the Hejaz 
and advanced towards Syria did the family begin to employ the ideology of Arabism against the 
Ottoman Empire. Wilson compares the approach of Amir Abdullah, whose ambition was the 
hijaz, with that of his brother Faisal, the leader of the Arab revolt, Who took to heart the idea of 
Arabism as the vehicle for his attraction to the educated rulers of Syria, where his own focus is 
directed.191 
Adeed Dawisha, in his article Requiem for Arab Nationalism, argues that the demise of Arab 
nationalism coincided with and was prompted by Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Arab Israeli conflict. 
The Heyday of Arab nationalism was the 1950s and 1960s and with the death of Jamal Abdul-
Nasser nationalism suffered an irreversible blow. Adeed maintains that there is a new Arabism 
with the proliferation with social media and the transnational networks that the Arab elites build 
at a regional and international level. However he maintains that this is a sentimental sop to the 
fervour and enthusiasm of the Arabism of old. He maintains that now there is a complacency and 
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a resignation to the tumultuous events in the Arab world. Interesting Jordan is now promoting a 
renewed nationalist discourse with the Jordan first policy of King Abdullah and this is what the 
thesis will seek to examine.192  
(ii) Tribes and Bedouin 
Massad when looking at the interface between the Hashemites and the Palestinian refugees after 
1948 writes in particular about the 1928 Law of Nationality. Massad refers to the 1949 
addendum, which affirmed the rights of all Palestinian nationals and gave them automatic 
Jordanian nationality and made them in theory equal subjects of the Jordanian state.193 According 
to Massad the term ‘Arab’ was first used in the 1952 Jordanian constitution in defining the state’s 
supranational identity. This constitutional identification of the state as ‘Arab’ was partly in 
response to the rising tide of Arab nationalism witnessed in the Middle East in this era. In relation 
to my PhD thesis this continuing defining and re-defining of Jordanian nationalism tells me of the 
evolutionary and gradual formation of a specifically Jordanian nationalism.194 According to 
Massad the nomadic Bedouins constituted almost half of the Trans-Jordanian population in 1922; 
this observation tells one of the importance of the relations between the Hashemites and the local 
tribal population.195 It is interesting to note that in a country where the inhabitants had tribal and 
family links that crossed the ‘invented’, and arbitrarily imposed, national boundaries the 
definition of national identity had to be very carefully regionalised; meaning it had to take 
cognisance of local allegiances and loyalties. This was especially the case with the Bedouins who 
had little respect for the boundaries of the new Jordanian state.196 Over a period of time an 
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economic policy planned and executed by the Jordanian state helped gradually to re-construct the 
Bedouin economy, overtime transforming it into one reliant increasingly on the state for subsidies 
and monetary aid. At one point, as Massad highlights, leading a Bedouin lifestyle was considered 
an anti-state activity and those Bedouins who resisted state led sedentarization policies were 
imposed with penalties.197 
Anderson demonstrates that the immediate problems facing the new state of Transjordan after the 
First World War were twofold. Firstly, subduing the unruly tribes; and secondly, extending 
governmental power. In this respect, as cited by Anderson, R. Taylor asks a pertinent question: 
‘By virtue of Jordan’s status as a country, the rise of nationalism was inevitable. But what form 
was such nationalism to take?’198 The ambitious King Abdullah had to convince the subjects of 
the new state that the country had the right to exist and in order to do this he had to connect the 
Hashemite dynasty to the fortunes of the infant country. According to Anderson the 1920s and 
the 1930s witnessed the successful completion of the first goal; namely anchoring the state in the 
people’s consciousness. In connection with this point it is interesting to note that the people of 
Jordan came to accept the political existence of the country, partly because of largesse provided 
by the state. 
Finally Anderson demonstrates how after the disbanding of the JNM in 1957 the Jordanian state 
progressively appropriated the Arab awakening of the nineteenth century, the Arab revolt, the 
ideology of Arab nationalism and the battle for Palestine into the Jordanian national identity 
narrative. In this respect what is instructive, as highlighted by Anderson, is the opening of a 
number of museums in the country to, to quote: ‘display Jordan’s cultural heritage, as defined by 
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the Hashemite state’.199 In connection with the above traditional Jordanian costumes appeared in 
museums and television shows over the course of the 1970s and 1980s to unify various groups 
and tribes into one cohesive and overarching national identity.200 Jordan’s Folklore Museum and 
Jordan’s Museum of Popular Traditions, both, display costumes of Jordan’s different tribal and 
religious groups. By presenting these ‘instruments, clothes and activities’, the dynasty is 
deliberately showing them to be intrinsic components of the Hashemite-Jordanian contemporary 
identity. The indigenous traditions and the statecraft of the Hashemite polity are therefore 
carefully fused together.201 Building on this analysis Anderson show’s convincingly how the 
Jordanian state also co-opted the Bedouin, tribal element in service of the state’s wider legitimacy 
project. The Hashemite king appears in Bedouin costume in thousands of pictures carefully 
posted in different areas of the country and tourist literature is careful to extol and dignify 
Bedouin tradition and custom. It appears the tribal past is deliberately highlighted as a key 
component of the contemporary Jordanian national identity. As Anderson writes: 
‘... The clothing and customs of the Bedouin have been co-opted by the 
Hashemite state as part of its program to fill out the national narrative and give it 
grounding in the Jordanian experience.’202 
Anderson has demonstrated how the Jordanian state progressively legitimised its staying power in 
the minds of people through a careful and calculated manipulation of history, politics, tribes and 
nationalist sentiment.  
At the beginning of the 20th Century Jordan, like much of the Middle East, was a loose collection 
of tribes. By the time of its independence in 1946 it had the most firmly embedded state 
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structures in the Arab world. Drawing on previously untapped sources, Yoav Alon examines how 
the disparate clan networks of Jordan were integrated into the Hashemite monarchy, with the help 
of the British colonial administrators203Looking at the growth of key state institutions from a 
grassroots perspective, Alon shows how they co-opted the structures of tribal society, and 
produced a distinctive hybrid between modern statehood and tribal confederacy that still 
characterizes Jordan to this day. Alon’s innovative approach to the origins of modern Jordan 
provides fresh insights not only into Jordan itself but also into colonialism, modernity and the 
development of the state in the Middle East.204 
Linda Layne in her article, Tribalism: national representations of tribal life in Jordan, uses 
Bhaktis idea of conversation to show how two different Jordanian understandings of tribalism are 
influenced and moulded by other narratives including regional political ones to give an example 
Israel’s idea of Jordan is Palestine and the international understanding of ‘folk culture’ and ‘ 
traditions’ and heritage and she analysis the concepts of modernity, nationhood, and political 
development. All of the above issues are analysed in demonstrating how understanding of tribal 
life in Jordan in particular national representation of it has developed up to the period of 
disengagement in 1988.205 
Richard Antoun in his article examines civil society, the development of tribes and recent 
changes in Jordan, he undertakes his study in an anthropological framework. The article examines 
what is a civil society and whether one exists in the Middle East. It revises earlier assessments to 
demonstrate that institution of co-operation and trust do exist in Jordan despite the claim that civil 
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society is weak. Antoun analysis the role of tribes and tribalism in Jordan in the post 
disengagement period. He also examines notions of honour and the tribal process in Jordan. 
Towards the end of the Article Antoun considers the Impact of recent changes on civil society in 
Jordan today.206 
(iii) The military 
In this section of the literature review, the thesis will examine books and articles written the 
military and its role in the development in the nationalism identity in Jordan after the 
disengagement period. 
 Yoav Alon in his book the making of Jordan analysis the military role in the post independence 
years in inculcating a stronger sense of national identity amongst a new generation of military 
officers in Jordan. In terms of the consolidation of the Jordanian state identity through the 
military, as Massad highlights the Arabising of the army was a key moment in the late 1950s as, 
significantly, a new generation of leaders saw the army as an instrument of national 
unification.207 The leadership of the army wished to integrate the National Guard, the decision 
making body of the military, into the forces as well as achieve the integration of the East Bankers 
and the West Bankers. In contrast to the goals of Jordanian nationalism in the 1940’s, being 
ridding the country of the British, the nationalism of the 1950s of the younger generation of 
officers was centred on unifying the young state and Arabising the military, taking their lead after 
the rhetoric and nationalist policies of the Free Officers in Egypt.208 In relation to the more recent 
history of Jordan and the role of the military and the formation of a state identity Massad writes 
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that after the civil war of 1970 the government in Amman launched a new campaign of military 
recruitment deliberately excluding Palestinians. Massad notes that partly as a result of this 
Bedouin chauvinism increased in the army.209 It seems that after the catastrophic events of the 
early 1970s Jordanian national identity became more sharply delineated by highlighting the 
Bedouin element to the detriment of the Palestinian in the rank and file of the army. Massad also 
makes an interesting point by highlighting the army’s role in the national culture over the 1970s 
and 1980s; the army had a greater presence in the state controlled media and its work was 
disseminated through the medium of the television and radio to the Jordanian people as a whole. 
One could argue this was deliberate social engineering to ensure loyalty was directed via the 
army to the state; the sole arbiter and focus for all national allegiance. 
In this sections having looked at Palestinians and Jordanians and the literatures on these topics it 
is now important to see that any discussion of National identity in Jordan the role played by the 
late King Hussein in terms of his personality and demeanour is fundamental to the discussion of 
Jordanian national identity in the pre-disengagement period. Even if King Hussein is not present 
in Jordan today, many Jordanians and Arabs consider his legacy to Jordan to be so great that he 
features prominently in any debates and in any visual representation of the Jordanian monarchy 
today. 
The title of Avi Shlaim’s extensive and well written biography of Jordan's late King Hussein 
(1935-1999) makes no secret of its author's view. Nevertheless, Shlaim’s book gives us a better 
understanding of a major politician. Having seen his grandfather murdered for his efforts at 
agreement with Israel, Hussein was crowned at the age of 17 and led his country through decades 
of tense Arab-Israeli relations. Shlaim’s representation of Hussein as a thwarted peacemaker – 
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and an alleviating force in the Middle East – is demonstrated with a range of interesting material, 
including intelligence briefings, academic accounts and eyewitness reports, as well as interviews 
with the king himself.210 
(iv) From Palestinians to Jordanians 
In this section of the literature review, the thesis will examine literature on the war of 1948, the 
dispossession of the Palestinians and in subsequent years how a Palestinian identity morphed into 
a Jordanian identity particularly in the years when the West Bank was under the Administration 
of the Jordanian government. 
The population of Jordan increased substantially after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 with 
the return to Jordan of approximately 200,000 to 300,000 Palestinians who returned from the 
Gulf countries; having either been expelled or choosing to make the journey to Jordan after 
experiencing difficulties with the host communities in the Gulf. This sudden demographic 
expansion had a major impact on life in the new Jordan taking shape in the post-Cold War era. In 
short the Palestinians, in comparison to the native Jordanians, were more urban, more educated 
and, significantly, more experienced in political participation. This arrival of additional 
Palestinians changed dramatically the debates surrounding what it meant to be a modern 
Jordanian and the discourse on nationalism and national identity in the country. In relation to the 
contemporary national identity and the Hashemite regime the dynasty was always more 
sympathetic to a Transjordanian nationalism over a specifically Palestinian one for reasons 
examined in this thesis.211 In terms of overcoming the difficulties of the events of the early 1970s 
the Jordanian monarch, King Hussein, embarked on a new national project that was termed the 
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National Union. In terms of hard facts this was the only permitted legal political organisation in 
the country and it indirectly ensured that all other parties remained, for all intents and purposes, 
practically outlawed.212 In his address to the people of the country, when inaugurating the 
National Union, the King spoke proudly of ‘one Jordanian family’. The above has been recounted 
to show how Jordan embarked on a new nationalist era, which was to prove fundamental in 
forming the contemporary national identity of the country.  
This union king Hussein argued would aid the Jordanians to realise the objectives of ‘ al-
Hurriyah,al-Wihdah, Wa al-Hayat-al-Afdal’ or ‘ liberty, unity and the better life.’ The king also 
offered the media and the citizens of Jordan the unions principle points which he maintained 
where the result of frequent discussions with the candidates of the people. The national union 
charter had a separate guidelines for Jordanian Bedouins and women. The king sought to tie the 
women of the county constituting half the population and the Bedouin tribal population that was a 
significant support base for his rule into a more encompassing and inclusive national identity. In 
inaugurating the national union at this important juncture of Jordanian history the king sought to 
define the roles and responsibilities of the different strata of the Jordanian population. In 
promulgating a new national identity the king was mindful of including the women and the 
Bedouins in this progressive agenda.213 
 When speaking at the formal announcement of the National Union the king insisted that the N.U. 
was not a political party rather he thought of it as: 
‘ … A general framework which organises life and human beings in our beloved 
country, it is a immense crucible which melts all our energies, with all the 
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differences and verities, in order to make of its outcome the Jordanian miracle 
which will open for us the road to victory.’214 
In the volatile environment and time of the early 1970s when in 1967 Jordan lost the West Bank 
in the six day war and after the death of Jamal Abdel Nassir, the memory of black September also 
being very raw King Hussein tried to articulate in the above speech the importance of the various 
Jordanian subjects sublimating and downplaying the more parochial identities in favour of a 
primary focus on the love and the future of the Jordanian country. In short king Hussein wanted 
to emphasize a loyalty to the Jordanian nation over any centrifugal forces. 
Massad also supports this line of thought in his key book that is a primary reference for my thesis, 
the making of National identity in Jordan. 
Massad shows convincingly in his a book how the Jordanian state manipulated people’s 
sensibilities and allegiances and engineered a successful bid to bring into being a coherent and 
strictly delineated Jordanian national identity premised on a pronounced and carefully articulated 
national ideology.215 
Betty Anderson in her book nationalist voices in Jordan: the street and the state analyses the 
different contending factions that make up the Jordanian state. There are different groups of 
competing interests in Jordan who each articulate a different nationalist voice and Anderson in 
her study. notes that after the catastrophic defeat of 1948 the Palestinians had to reconcile 
themselves to Jordanian rule in east Jerusalem and the West Bank. Palestinians had now to live 
under Hashemite dynastic rule from effectively 1948 to 1967; they never, however, gave up their 
claim to sovereign nationhood, choosing now to continue their struggle within the framework of 
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the Hashemite kingdom and under the banner of Arab nationalism.216 This no doubt provided the 
Hashemites with a new set of difficulties having only very recently brought the indigenous 
Jordanians in line and made them amenable to dynastic rule from Amman; the addition of the 
Palestinian component greatly complicated the national project. 
In terms of the interface between the Hashemites and the Palestinian refugees Lynch observes 
that after the catastrophic defeat of 1967 and the loss of the West Bank to Israel, Palestinian 
identity became more sharply focused and articulated in a nationalist vein; to the extent that the 
Palestinian resistance movement came to be a seen as a threat to the survival of the Jordanian 
state.217 After the events of Black September, when the Kingdom of Jordan fought a civil war 
with the PLO and defeated it and subsequently evicted it to Lebanon, three important points 
emerged as far as Jordan was concerned which are highlighted poignantly by Lynch: 1) Jordan 
established its identity as Jordan first and foremost with the Palestinian question being accorded a 
secondary position; 2) the neighbouring Arab states accepted this action (i.e. Black September) 
because the state system proved in the long term more enduring and strategic over any support for 
a revolutionary Palestinian agenda; and 3) the whole conception of Arabism post Black 
September took a conservative bent and this ultimately played in the favour of the Hashemite 
ideological game plan218.  
When analysing the strengthening of Jordanian national identity in the 1950s, Lynch highlights 
that with the annexation of the West Bank in 1950 the Hashemite dynasty had to construct a 
competing narrative to that of the sharply defined Palestinian national identity. In some ways the 
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incorporation of the West Bank with the Jordanian state proper, the Hashemite dynasty was 
compelled to consolidate a specifically Hashemite Jordanian national identity, vis –a-vis a 
Palestinian one.219 Building on this line of analysis Lynch notes that over the course of the 1950s 
and 1960s Amman tried to elaborate a unitary national identity inclusive of both Trans-Jordanians 
and Palestinians. The rationale behind this reasoning was that the wider pan-Arabist goals were 
paramount over more singularly defined national constituent identities; namely Trans-Jordanian 
and Palestinian. This position, however, became untenable because of two factors: 1) the loss of 
the West Bank to Israel in 1967; and 2) the recognition of the PLO as the sole and legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people by the larger Arab world.220 In summary, the Hashemite 
dynasty’s attempt to consolidate a Jordanian state identity that incorporated the Palestinian 
constituent failed because of reasons beyond its immediate control from the late 1950s onwards, 
however it did not stop them from continuing with such policies – as evident in the West Bank 
with the historic decision of 1988. 
Finally Lynch highlights that the contemporary national identity in Jordan has reconciled itself 
with the existence of a separate Palestinian state to be headed up by the PLO. Note the Hashemite 
dynasty no longer lays an exclusive claim on the representation of the Palestinian cause and 
accepts in principle a Palestinian state based in the West Bank and Occupied Territories. In terms 
of the peace treaty with Israel in 1994 although the state elite in Jordan would like this to be a 
new component of the new national identity, matters remain unresolved because of the continuing 
failure to achieve a durable and just peace between Israelis and Palestinians.221 Further in the 
book Lynch discusses the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Jordan; the key difference between the two being that 
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contemporary national identity in Jordan clearly and categorically denies any claim to the West 
Bank whereas the old Jordanian national narrative did not preclude the possibility of including 
the West Bank as a part of the Jordanian state. 
Al Oudat and Alshboul in their article write that the disengagement from the West Bank in 1988 
marked a new course in the formation of the contemporary national identity in Jordan. As the 
authors write: 
‘This development helped produce a Jordanian nation that conformed 
more Closely to the modern, Western model of nation by clarifying and 
confirming the Jordanian self and the Palestinian other.’222 
The resolution to this claim did away with any ambiguity harboured by those inside or outside 
Jordan as to the assertion that Jordan is Palestine. With this single act the Hashemites proclaimed 
confidently that Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine. This, the authors argue, is a key belief 
of the contemporary Jordanian national identity.223 The notion of Jordan First emerges so the 
article argues after the events of September 1970; the phrase employed at the time was ‘East 
Bankers First’. Thereafter the army, the monarchy and the tribal leaders working in concert 
delineated the concept of Jordan First. This has further been elaborated, as the authors highlight, 
by the pragmatists in Jordan today who go so far as to argue that Jordan is strictly for Jordanians 
and Palestinians are not strictly Jordanians. 224 
Adnan Abo Odeh in his book Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom analyses how 
the complex relationship between Transjordanians and Palestinians influenced not only Jordan 
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itself but also the Whole Middle East Peace process. At different times in its history the 
Hashemite monarchy has sought to accommodate, welcome, take a side or work with Palestinians 
and the PLO and the repercussions of these endeavours has been felt throughout the Middle East. 
Jordan has signed a peace treaty with Israel and the Palestinian population makes up more than 
half of the Jordanian population however the dynamic relationship between the Hashemites, 
Jordanian and their Palestinian subjects still brings to the fore powerful emotions at home and can 
sent repercussions through the West Bank and Israel. Abo Odeh in his book examines this 
relationship from its origins in the inter war period to the more recent attempts to deal with 
competing national identities in Jordan225 
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Methodological section 
The project adopts qualitative methods of data collecting and tries to reach the 
abovementioned conclusions by way of the use and comparison of these findings with 
the historical and political facts. In order to test the main hypothesis, the project 
requires qualitative data regarding the changes in the dominant political discourse in 
Jordan and its impacts on the discourse of Jordanian nationalism, and political and 
social events and conflicts since disengagement in 1988.    
This is necessary to grasp the overall pattern of historical change and to test if there is 
any correlation between these variables. The methodological framework informs the 
foundation to the thesis. The methodology also acts as a framework for the multiple 
ethical consideration which came up during the fieldwork research in Jordan. 
Something that needs to categorically stated in this section is that a conscious decision 
to adopt an empirical method for the research work. The methodological framework 
proved particularly pertinent in the analysis of the evolution and sustenance of new and 
old identities in Jordan post disengagement.   
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Data collection involved participant observation and qualitative interviews conducted 
over four months in the summer of 2013 in Amman. The demography of the twenty 
respondents was diverse, this was a deliberate decision on the part of the researcher to 
get a more holistic and representative sample of Jordanian society, both aged and the 
youth. Lengthy and in-depth interviews with government ministers present such as H.E 
Mr Tahir Al Masry who was the leader of the Jordanian Parliament and past such as Mr 
Adnan Abo Odeh who was the foreign minister under King Hussein and H.E Marouf al 
Bakheit who served as the Prime minister in King Abdullah’s II reign. These interviews 
provided invaluable insight into the world view and opinions of the People of Influence 
in Jordan. The honesty of the respondents was thanked and respected and where people 
requested to remain anonymous this was also followed through. One last point the 
researcher would like to make is that ethical issues was given full consideration in the 
compilation and drafting of the thesis.  
 In addition to the above historical archives in the university of Jordan was visited to 
gather insights on famous speeches which was made by the Late king Hussein during 
various events in the disengagement period and also during the historical agreement 
between the Jordanians and the Israeli which took place in 1994. It was important that 
the researchers adds these speeches as it gives the reader an insight of the decisions 
which was made at that time by the late King Hussein and also informs his citizens  
reasons behind his decision behind the disengagement of the West Bank from Jordan in 
1988 and also the benefits of the historic  Wadi Araba  agreement between the 
Jordanian government and the Israelis in 1994.  
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After careful consideration and discussion with the supervisor, the empirical method for 
data collection was chosen. The overarching purpose of the methodological research 
was the investigation and examination of the evolution and sustenance of new and old 
identities in pre- and post disengagement periods in Jordan. In the data collection phase 
of the fieldwork, the participant observation methodology was chosen. Interviews were 
conducted in Jordan over the six months of the spring/summer 2013. The majority of 
the fieldwork was conducted in the capital city of Amman. 
The demography of the thirty respondents chosen for fieldwork research was diverse. 
Ten were from the low-income strategy strata; ten were from the middle-income group; 
and ten were from the elite Jordanian status. In discussion with my supervisor a reduced 
number of interviewees was deemed prudent. This would allow for lengthy and in depth 
interviews. My goal , given the political sensitive situation in Jordan, was to build trust 
with the respondents, I wanted an insight to their milieu and their prospective on 
national identities. The interviews were also useful to gather insights on the case studies 
which is explored in the thesis.  
The interviews included employees in Jordanian embassy in the United Kingdom and 
the Foreign Service in Jordan, newspaper columnists, publishing house editors, former 
Jordanian senators and Prime ministers, academic directors of educational institutions 
in Jordan and finally business company presidents.  
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Chapter Two: Hashemite and Jordanian National Discourse since 
1988	  
 
I. Hashemite discourse and tribes 
Introduction 
Amongst scholars today, there is little agreement about the accepted definition of tribes 
and tribalism. This is because tribal organisation in the near east varies across the 
region. Tapper has put forward an interesting definition of tribes as: 
‘A localised group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of 
organisation, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct 
of customs, dialect or language, and origins.’226 
Tribes keep their social unity through ‘a myth of common ancestry’. Tribes and 
tribalism can also be best understood through their varied socio-political relationships: 
the interactions between the tribe and the government, between the tribe and other 
tribes and amongst tribal members themselves. Historically, tribes are explained in 
terms to their opposition to the government, their continually changing alliances with 
other tribal groups and the variability of the leadership mechanisms within their ranks. 
Leadership within the tribe has a patrimonial ethos: the tribal leaders kept their position 
only as long as they maintained the loyalty of their subordinates. Their position and 
purpose was safe primarily by maintaining a continuous flow of goods and services to 
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junior members. If the tribal leader did not fulfil his duties, he was no longer seen as fit 
to lead and was replaced by a tribal leader who could better secure the interests of his 
tribal colleagues.227 
Tribal origin, tribal identity and tribalism are concepts that have been, and continue to 
be, a major point of discussion in Jordan. The discussion has been held at various 
levels, the intra-tribal, inter-tribal, tribal-state and intra-state. Taken on a national stage, 
the discussion links up to regional political discourse and to concepts such as 
‘modernity’, ‘nationhood’ and ‘political development’.228  
In contemporary Jordan, tribalism has taken on a wide range of meanings. In its broad 
sense, it is one of the ‘organisational principles in a dynamic and complex political 
environment’. Tribalism has been further described as a ‘persistent social and political 
force bringing people together for different purposes, and doing so in the context of 
many different, competing or alternative principles of alignment’.229 
Jordanian critics of tribalism bring forth the argument that the existence and 
predominance of primordial tribal ties pose a threat to the nation state. They maintain 
that tribalism empowers a small group to control and manipulate the state to serve their 
own needs. However, Jordanians who support the tribalist identity highlight the cultural 
coherence and consensus provided by tribalism that helps towards establishing a sense 
and demonstration of national identity. A national identity asserts itself actively by 
stressing what one is, as opposed to a passive juxtaposition to others, for example, that 
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one is not Palestinian, Syrian, etc.230 The notion of tribal identity in Jordan is very much 
to the fore, has strong historical antecedents and is a notable feature of the political 
landscape. The Hashemite monarchy draws on the support of the tribes to win 
legitimacy from the people who are native and indigenous to the East Bank of the 
country. Since 1988, tribal national identity has been in decline because of the 
ascendency of other political reforms of identifications, such as Jordan First and a 
transnational Arab-Muslim identity. The demands of protesters on the streets of 
Amman and other cities are not for greater tribal identification, but for the 
empowerment of disenfranchised and voiceless groups that want political freedom. 
(i) Tribes and state formation in the Middle East 
 The focus on tribes and state in a Middle Eastern context is important for two reasons: 
first, for long periods of history, large parts of the Middle East were not effectively 
dominated by the imperial states that ruled the region. Although tribes played a 
significant role in the creation of Islamic empires such as the Umayyad, Abbasid, 
Fatimid, Ottoman, Safavid and Qajar states, they also populated and dominated at 
various points vast areas of the Middle East that did not come under effective Islamic 
imperial authority; such areas included the Iranian and Turkish plateaus, the Syrian 
desert, the Arabian Peninsula,the upper Nile and the deserts, mountains, and plateaus of 
North Africa.231 
Discussions of state formation in the Middle East, however, poses certain difficulties 
that are not easily resolved. To begin with, the term state is associated with modern 
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European conceptions and institutions that do not necessarily correspond to Middle 
Eastern realities, even in the late twentieth century. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner 
have written that the state implies a sovereign authority, a sovereignty based upon both 
consent and coercion. The state is associated with a particular bounded territory, over 
which it exercises a monopoly of coercive authority. Legitimacy implies myths and 
symbols, which provide a kind of ideological rationalisation and justification for this 
monopoly of coercive authority.232 
In the Middle East, the monarchs, military officers and other elites that have come to 
power in the twentieth century have faced varying degrees of difficulties in building 
exclusive monopolies of coercive authority and control because they have been 
unsuccessful in developing the forms of popular legitimacy necessary to support their 
rule. As a consequence of this, they have faced opposition and resistance from a variety 
of social and political forces that include tribes. This case can also be said to apply to 
the history of Jordan, especially the early period.233  
At the same time, however, the very process of state formation across the Middle East 
and North Africa during the last century has led to the voluntary or forced breakup of 
traditional forms of tribal authorities and the erosion of the old tribal loyalties: the result 
has been the emergence of new groupings and movements that retain certain tribal 
characteristics but that are also heavily conditioned and shaped by other factors, 
including class, ethnicity and even nationalism.234 
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(ii) Sub-societal divisions in the Middle East: tribal, ethnic or sectarian 
In this section, I examine the role played by tribes, tribal identity and tribal custom in 
the development of national identity in Jordan. Tribal politics is key to understanding 
Jordan more than any other country in the Near East today. Tribal politics and tribal 
patriarchy are influential factors in dynastic politics in Jordan. 
The term tribe has been used to describe many different kinds of groups or social 
formations, and a single, all-encompassing definition is virtually impossible to produce. 
Tapper’s article in the introductory section in Khory and Kostiner’s book on tribes and 
state formation in the Middle East underscores the problem of definition by explaining 
not only the myriad ways the term has been used, but also the ways anthropologists and 
historians have misused it. He has suggested that this is the best way to examine tribes 
at their different levels of organisation ‘from camp to confederation’ and by the 
different kinds of processes that affect them at each level. He offers some helpful hints 
in that regard: 
‘Tribe may be used loosely of a localised group in which the kinship is 
the dominant idiom of organisation and whose members consider 
themselves culturally distinct tribes are usually politically unified, though 
not necessarily under a central leader… Such tribes also form part of 
larger, usually regional, political structures of the state… The more 
explicit term confederacy or confederation should be used for a local 
group of tribes that is heterogeneous in terms of culture, presumed origins 
and perhaps class composition…’235  
As this brief section has demonstrated, tribal identity, tribal politics and tribal stakes in 
Jordan’s future are all dependent upon conceptions of national identity that both 
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incorporate tribal allegiance and tribal dependence.	  
(iii) Tribes and the state in the Middle East 
In the Middle East, groups referred to as tribes have never in historical terms been 
isolated groups of primitives remote from contact with states or their agents; rather, 
tribes and states have maintained each other in a single system, though one of inherent 
instability. Lampton remarks on the situation in Iran, but which applies generally to 
much of the Middle East: 
‘Control of the tribal element has been and is one of the perennial 
problems of government … All except the strongest governments have 
delegated responsibility in the tribal areas to the tribal chiefs. One aspect 
of Persian history is that of a struggle which has continued in a modified 
form down to the present day. Various Persian dynasties have come to 
power on tribal support...’236 
The tribal problem and the role of tribes and their leaders as actors and agents in Middle 
Eastern history have been the subject of various detailed studies. If the rulers of the 
Middle East have been preoccupied by a tribal problem, however the tribes could be 
said to have a perennial state problem. No tribe has ever, at least in recent centuries, 
been totally unaffected by any state, and an important theme in the literature is this state 
problem, that is, the role of states in creating, transforming or destroying tribal 
institutions and structures. A focus on the role of tribes in the Middle East needs to be 
complemented by awareness of the role of states in tribe formation and deformation.237	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(iv) Who are the tribes of Jordan? 
All the Jordanians of East Bank origin who are ethnically Arab and either Muslim or 
Christian are part of a tribe, be it a tribe that is historically settled, semi-nomadic or 
Bedouin.238 
Looking at Jordan today, particularly the post-disengagement period since 1988, it can 
be seen that the following tribes inhabit the Jordanian desert: in the north, the Beni 
Khalid (most of this large tribe live in Syria; however, it also extends from Palestine to 
Kuwait); other tribes include the al-Sardiyyah and the tribe of al-Sirhan; the warrior ‘isa 
and the Ahl-al-Jabal, al Rualla. In central Jordan, one finds the Beni Sakhar. In the 
south of Jordan, we can find the Huwaytat. These are the rivals of the Beni Sakhar 
tribes in Jordan; the indifferent Hajayah. In central Jordan, we find the tribal clan of al 
Belqawiyahs and the Beni Attiyah tribe. The two remaining semi-nomadic tribes can be 
find in the north and south of Jordan, the Beni Hassan and Beni Hamidah clans 
respectively.239 
 There are four semi-nomadic tribes, or rather tribal confederations, for not all the clans 
of these tribal alliances are originally related by blood, but rather have coalesced and 
they have officially adopted each other for reasons of mutual defence and friendship: in 
the north of Jordan, there is the Beni Hasan, a huge tribe comprising 12 main clans, 
whose population is numbered at over 200,000 in central Jordan, and the Abbadis, a 
traditional ally of the Bani sakhir tribes, number over 100,000, who they live in dozens 
of villages spread across greater Amman. Then there is the Belqwiyyahs, which 
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includes tribes such as the Adwan, Ajarmeh and the Hadid, and is even larger than the 
Beni Hasan tribe, numbering over 250,000. Before the ascent of the Beni Sakhir clan, it 
was the premier tribal power in Jordan. Finally, the Beni Hamidah tribe numbers about 
150,000 and lives between Madaba and Karak and in a few villages around the al 
Tafileh.240 
The concept of tribalism today plays a new role in Jordanian society as it has been 
politicised in the current debates, which are concerned with the nature of Jordanian 
society. To explain the nature of these debates, it should be noted that a substantial 
proportion of the contemporary population of Jordan is of Palestinian origin. Up until 
very recently, the majority of the Jordanian population were ardent supporters of the 
struggle for the Palestinian cause. The situation changed after the events of Black 
September (1970) and Jordanians of trans-Jordanian origin turned against the 
Palestinians during the 1970s, because they believed them to be unwilling to recognise 
their debt to the country that had welcomed them.  
Transjordanians regularly accuse Palestinians of disloyalty towards the king. The tribal 
discourse is now deployed in the context of ‘Jordanian-Palestinian’ tension within 
Jordanian society.241 When Palestinians are accused of being disloyal to the Jordanian 
state and monarchy, it is because the perception is that they do not acknowledge the 
tribal dimension of state and society. Palestinians, although Arab, have a less 
pronounced understanding of tribal routes, since their society is more urbane and 
literate. How this plays out in terms of national identity is that while the East Bankers 
may want to highlight tribal ties, the Palestinian majority is less inclined to adopt line of 
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thought. Over the passage of time, with the Palestinian element increasing, it is only 
natural that the tribal identity of Jordan will correspondingly decrease. 
The distinction between Jordanians and Palestinians is characterised by contrasting the 
nomadic traditions of the former with the peasant and the urban traditions of the latter. 
To add more to this discussion, the terms ‘asha’ari (tribal), watani (patriotic) and 
urduni (Jordanian) have progressively acquired equivalence between them. To be tribal, 
to claim tribal characteristics, to support tribalism thus becomes a way of claiming 
Jordanian authenticity, but at the same time, it also becomes a way of anchoring this 
authenticity in a tribal epoch, which, along with this myth dimension, extends beyond 
the event and semi-tribal way in which the Jordanian state was created.242 Although the 
analysis has maintained that tribal identity is in decline, it can equally be argued that 
when decisiveness takes a hold of Jordanian society, there is an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
mindset. People of east Jordanian origin will be pre-disposed to highlighting tribal 
authenticity by claiming tribal ancestry and indirectly paying allegiance to the origins 
and genesis of the Jordanian state. 
Tribes have always been connected with the monarchy in Jordanian society. This 
connection stems from the key role of the tribes in supporting the Hashemite monarchy. 
The Bedouin tribes are identified with the Hashemites because the king’s social 
legitimacy derives from traditional claims of kinship, religion and historical 
performance. The loyalty of a tribesman stems from a desire to defend the honour of the 
family, tribe and king, and not from some abstract notion of Jordanian patriotism.243 
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This aspect of modern Jordanian identity should not be overlooked despite the Arab 
world becoming more globalised and interconnected, and with the current Arab spring 
and notions of freedom and democracy becoming more prevalent through social media. 
Despite the above been interpreted as progressive tendencies, it would be foolish to 
claim the demise of tribalism. As this thesis will demonstrate in its conclusion, tribalism 
is a very important aspect of modern Jordanian political identity. 
After Jordan gained its independence in 1946, the Jordanian state became merely an 
extension of the assumed identity and character of the king. During his rule, King 
Hussein worked in the direction of trying to create a sense of Jordanian history and 
nationality as a nation state. In addition to the above, the present regime has recognised 
the importance of transcending tribalism, parochialism and communalism in order to 
format a coherent national identity. More recently, the Jordanian regime  has appeared 
to be withdrawing its support from the last vestiges of tribal identification. This 
substantiates the claim made at the beginning of the chapter that tribalism as an identity 
marker is progressively declining, and is of less importance as a component of a 
national identity in the new Jordan. 
The Bedouin (tribes) have enjoyed a strong political and socio-cultural role. Politically, 
the regime gained control over the tribes and relied on their loyalty and support. Socio-
culturally, the east Jordanian tribes often idealised different aspects of Bedouin life and 
practices from which the Jordanian social pattern is derived. 
The creation of the institutions of a modern state depended mainly on the support of the 
tribes and the expansion of the army. State building proceeded as a personalised 
monarchy in which the loyalty was to the king, not the state. This explains the tribal 
mentality in which loyalty is centred on a personality, as opposed to formal institutions. 
Such tribal alliances in Jordan’s political structure also has created a degree of 
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uncertainty, and whether these tribal partnerships create stabilising institutions has 
recently been open to debate.244 This debate centres on the discussion on whether 
tribalism is able deliver a strong binding component of national identity, or whether it 
actually debilitates the formation of a strong cohesive national identity project. 
The tribes have always been supported and sponsored by the state in what has been a 
symbolic and symbiotic relationship. The Jordanian monarch has depended on tribal 
support during difficult times. Since the founding of the Hashemite kingdom, the 
Bedouin have constituted one of the king’s most loyal constituencies. In addition, the 
tribal dominance of the Jordanian army has contributed to the survival of the regime 
and has ensured its stability.245 To sum up, tribalism as a force of national identity can 
be a contributing factor to stability and longevity of the regime, but can equally be a 
divisive concept vis-à-vis the Palestinian majority. In this section, the analysis has 
demonstrated that while tribalism is a double-edged sword, the monarchy utilises the 
tribal linkages with society to strengthen its hold on power and win legitimacy. 
Since the 1920s, which saw the last instances of Bedouin disaffection with the 
Hashemite regime, the Bedouin and the regime have co-existed peacefully and 
collaboratively, and have depended on each other in vital matters in regime survival, as 
well as in promoting Bedouin socio-economic and cultural interests.246 
The state’s initial effort to keep the Bedouin apart from the national body politic and its 
subsequent attempts to integrate them into it have now combined to produce a new 
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strategy. King Hussein’s commitment to identifying Jordanian culture as tribal relied on 
these two strategies to accomplish its goal – namely to render the country tribalised or 
even ‘Bedouinized’ through settling the Bedouin. The Bedouin are seen as the carriers 
of Jordan’s true and authentic culture and tradition. The Bedouinization process of the 
country and its Hadari (Hadari is the designation of the predominately nomadic 
population of Jordan.) A population is based on the state’s reconfiguration of what 
tribal culture is. The process of settling the Bedouin was marked by the state’s process 
of redefining their culture for them, while continuing to identify it (the culture) as 
Bedouin, and it set the new framework as the norm of the society by identifying it as a 
true Jordanian national culture.247 
The above analysis has shown that the Hashemite discourse gradually co-opted the 
tribal past of the country. With respect to the development of Jordanian nationalism in 
the post 1988 period, tribalism has proved to be an important cementing block in 
binding the disparate groups of the country together. My work has shown Bedouin and 
tribal culture to be central to the development of a Jordanian identity. Although the 
country today is perhaps mostly Palestinian in its makeup, the traditional predominance 
and loyalty of East Bankers to the monarchy has been a stabilising and important factor 
in the longevity of the Hashemite regime. 
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Conclusion 
This study of Jordan demonstrates that countries cannot be created out of thin air and 
that even the most patently obvious arbitrary nation must employ existing cultural 
references to construct their nations. Jordanian national identity in the post 
disengagement period contains three important features – Arabism, Islam and the tribes. 
These were all present in some form in the area that became Transjordan before the 
creation of the modern Jordanian state. These elements were combined together and 
transformed into modern nationalism when the state of Transjordan came into being in 
the 1920s and 1930s. Many years later, these three elements, Arabism, Islam and the 
tribes have come to fruition with a fully-fledged national identity post 1988, with the 
tribal element playing the most important role. 
In the years leading up to the disengagement of 1988, the topic of tribalism came up for 
intensive discussion when the Jordanian parliament proposed abolishing the tribal law, 
which was introduced by Glubb Pasha in 1930s. After a lot of public discussion, during 
which the tribes were accused of being ‘backward’, king Hussein came to their 
defence.248 In doing this, he very cleverly brought together the tribes, Arab identity and 
Islam in an overarching Jordanian national identity. 
I would like to repeat to you what I told a meeting of tribal heads recently that: ‘I am al 
Hussein from Hashim and Quraysh, the noblest Arab tribe of Mecca, which was 
honoured by god and into which was born the Arab Prophet Mohammad.’ Therefore, 
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whatever harms our tribes in Jordan is considered harmful to us, as this has been the 
case all along, and it will continue to be so forever.249 
 In terms of the discussion of the thesis, which is the development of Jordanian 
nationalism in the post-disengagement period, the most important elements of Jordanian 
national identity – the tribes with a Hashemite religious justification and Arab national 
identity – these were all evident in the person of King Hussein himself as commander-
in-chief of the Jordanian armed forces. It is noteworthy that this speech was given 
before a meeting of Jordanian tribal leaders, highlighting the traditional means by 
which the Jordanian king still keeps a hold on his power and gains legitimacy amongst 
his people. 
Although the tribal element of modern Jordanian national identity has come to be the 
most important aspect of it, King Abdullah II, the present monarch, has tried to play 
down some of the more blatant displays of tribal support. For instance, he called on 
tribal elders to stop placing large advertisements in the newspapers to celebrate the 
kingdom and emphasise their obedience on the occasion of the king’s birthday.250 King 
Abdullah has focused on bringing foreign investment into Jordan and integrating it into 
the global economic market through a free trade agreement with Washington. Despite 
all of these measures, Jordanian national identity, and its tribal bias, is still very relevant 
because national identity is connected to governmental power. Jordanian national 
identity since 1988 has become stronger and even more durable. This is because, as my 
thesis maintains, it has affectively absorbed the local tribes, Arab nationalism and Islam 
in order to justify an increasingly robust and permanent territorial Jordanian state. In 
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spite of its traditional underpinnings, Jordan now boasts a fully-fledged national 
identity, with almost seven million Transjordanians believing in the raison d’être of 
their country. 
 
2. The Army and the Hashemite discourse 
Introduction 
The Jordanian army – the Arab Legion – is intimately associated with and tied to the 
monarch and not to the state.251 The army in Jordan has been utilised by the king in a 
variety of functions. The Jordanian army has also served as a solidifying element and an 
inspiration for a national identity, being one of the few country-wide Jordanian 
organisations whose units took on board all strata of the native-born populations.  
The armed forces most significant national purpose was the integration of the nomads 
into the developing Jordanian state and society. Since the enrolment of the nomads in 
the armed forces committed them to a remunerated economy, they became financially 
dependent on the government. More and the more of the nomads developed a sense of 
attachment to the idea of Jordan, were introduced to the state structures and became an 
important constituent of social support for the government. This was at variance with 
the role usually taken by the Bedouin in most other Middle Eastern countries. A 
Jordanian private of Bedouin origin declared: ‘I never knew Jordan existed before I 
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joined the army.’252 
References to the Jordanian Armed Forces were often made in the statements of the late 
King Hussein and also by the current King Abdullah II. The references were not made 
as often as those made to Jerusalem and the West Bank; however, both are utilised with 
similar lines of reasoning: offering two pillars of independence in the form of country-
wide symbols of identification: one is religious, the other is of this world. If the holy 
city of Jerusalem is a source of motivation and reason for armed struggle, then the 
armed forces are the country’s connection with history, the carrier of armed struggle 
and the unaffected secure base in which the country is built.253 The armed forces are, in 
a very real way, Jordan itself, since the kingdom began with the Arab revolt against the 
Ottoman rule of 1915 and so did the armed forces.254 
Following the departure of the British forces in 1958, King Hussein reasserted his 
personal authority over the Jordanian armed forces. In addition, members of the royal 
family held key positions in the Bedouin-based national army. The military helped 
build a cohesive nation, just as the Hashemites had built the nation on the force and 
loyalty of the Arab revolt and loyal Bedouin soldiers.255 The army is central to the 
Hashemite discourse on the national identity of Jordan. The current king and his 
predecessor styled themselves as commanders of the army, as well as monarchs of the 
kingdom. The monarchy has intimately associated itself with the fortunes of the armed 
forces; this has been a deliberate exercise to depict the king as a super monarch, who 
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exhibits leadership and martial qualities in equal measure. In Jordanian culture and 
history, a leader who is demonstrably strong of mind and body and demonstrates 
leadership virtues will win the support of the subject population. The monarchy is very 
cognisant of cultivating this image of the association between the ruling family and the 
armed forces of the country. All this is in a bid to strengthen national solidarity and 
exhibit the virtues of a tribal sheikh who has supreme oversight. 
From King Hussein’s point of view, and this also applies to the current king with his 
own military background, the Jordanian Arab Legion has played almost a mystical part 
at the heart and soul of the Jordanian nation. The late King Hussein often portrayed it as 
the natural linear successor to the Arab army that had fought at his great grandfather’s 
behest in the great Arab revolt of 1916. This rhetoric and myth creation reflected an 
important plank in the platform of legitimacy invoked by the Hashemites as rulers of 
modern Jordan.256 
After the end of the civil war of 1970, the Jordanian army was able to recuperate as a 
unified force with an unwavering commitment to defending the monarchy, a 
commitment that prevailed even under the nationalist officers in the mid-1950s. The 
government launched a major campaign of army recruitment after the civil war that 
targeted Transjordanians, but left out Palestinian Jordanians. Recruitment was to all 
branches of the Jordanian military.257 The recruitment of East Bankers into the armed 
forces was a deliberate ploy to cultivate support and strengthen the connection with the 
native indigenous inhabitants of Jordan. This carefully thought-through policy was 
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undertaken by the monarchy in order to strengthen its national basis and safeguard itself 
against the possibility of any Palestinian sentiment being harboured in the armed forces. 
After the civil war of 1970, the ruling elite was very mindful of not having any 
repetition of these calamitous events. By side lining the Palestinian population in the 
recruitment of the armed forces, the state was engineering a policy of selective 
enfranchisement. In the short term, it secured the support of the native East Bankers, 
but in the long term, it was to lead to the sense of exclusion and powerlessness on the 
part of the burgeoning Palestinian population. The armed forces are an integral part of 
national identity formation in Jordan today. A cohesive national identity is built on the 
cohesive incorporation of the armed forces and its projection as a Transjordanian 
institution. 
Ever since its inception, the Arab Legion has played an important role in giving 
strength to the sense of a national Jordanian identity. Amongst its members, and 
through them to the rest of the society, the Arab legion helped to establish the rules of 
the game for the Jordanian nation state. The military was a central vehicle for the 
advancement of a new culture that was nationally defined and governed by the laws of 
the nation state. From music to clothes to food to the very tribalist values that the 
Jordanian culture came to represent, the role of the Jordanian army has been a central 
instrument in the formation of a national identity. This army served both to unify and to 
divide the people, commensurate with different strategies used by those who controlled 
it.258 As this analysis has demonstrated, the army permeated every nook and cranny of 
Jordanian life, such as playing a part in the musical tradition and the  national dress of 
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the country and influencing its cuisine and its people. An example of the above is the 
bagpipe tradition that originated in the army and that the British bequeathed to Jordan. 
The red kuffiya is associated with native Jordanians (whereas the white is associated 
with Palestinians and their struggle), and the mansaf is the local food co-opted by the 
military as a marker of social differentiation. 
Strongly identifying the Armed Forces with the Hashemite Kingdom, Arab nationalism 
and Islam became a continuous phrase in Hussein’s public statements. In many 
instances, he spoke of the army being the symbolic head of Jordan and its defence 
forces, neatly aligning all the factors of Jordanian national identity.259  
However the King included in this division the assertion that Jordan’s armed forces 
serve the entire Arab people, asserting that their most important instruction is the 
defence of Arab freedom, Arab honour and Arab historical society.260 
All of these different manifestations tie in very cleverly with the late king’s public 
statements on the idea of Israel as a competitor, since it is the army that safeguards for 
the Arab nation the longest border with the Jewish State. These references to Israel 
were no longer made after the 1994 peace treaty, but the army continues to be 
understood by the current monarch, King Abdullah II as a manifestation of nationalism, 
national identity and Jordanian independence. 
Change has been occurring in the army from 1988 onwards. Army personnel are now 
much better educated, and conscription has transformed the composition of the younger 
officer corps. Whereas older officers remain Bedouin in outlook, the younger officers 
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are urbanites.261 By building this social constituency in the enlarging towns and cities of 
Jordan, the army is building in the long term a loyal base of support amongst new 
generations of urban Jordanians. As a consequence of this, Jordanian national identity 
and its distinctively armed dimension have been inculcated into a new generation of 
armed officers. 
Concomitant with the many changes and developments in the country’s political life is 
that the very name of the army underwent a transformation. The Arab army was 
renamed in 1944; the name of its head as the chief of the Jordanian Arab Army was 
changed in 1947 to the chief of general staff of the Jordanian Arab Army.262 
Since the late 1980s, the army of Jordan has been undergoing increasing 
professionalisation, and, in tandem with this, it is slowly beginning to lose its exclusive 
Bedouin character. As the authors Jureidini and McLaurin have highlighted, the late 
King Hussein’s ‘political legitimacy is accepted increasingly [in the military] for East 
Bank interests – the safeguarding of the interests of historical Transjordan and the 
Transjordanians. Economic issues are more important to tribesmen, including those in 
the army, while the role of the Hashemite kingdom is of less importance.’263 
These tendencies and patterns of progress only increased over the course of the 1980s 
and into the 1990s. In 1980, for instance, the monarchy granted special places at 
Jordan’s institutions of higher education (which are urgently sought after by the 
children of ordinary families who cannot get admission because of restricted 
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availability) and full bursaries to the children of army personnel whose parents served 
for more than a decade in the country’s military forces.264 Furthermore, the financial 
role of the armed forces became more significant with the introduction of discounts, 
shops and commissaries for the sole use of military personnel. Indeed, as in the 1930s, 
the military’s economic role is primarily one of maintaining the loyalty of its members. 
Now the thesis will examine the size, state and role of the Jordanian Armed forces in 
the society. According to the constitution of Jordan, the king and the council of 
ministers are responsible for both the internal and external security of the country. The 
chain of command between the armed forces and the state flows through the council. 
The King appoints the council itself and the final decision-making rests with him.265 
Abdullah II is considered the supreme commander of the armed forces. The chief of 
staff is nominated by the prime minister, and is accountable to him only.266 Therefore, 
the king’s power over all defence matters is wide-ranging. The armed forces’ budget is 
passed by parliament; however, the members of the legislature are not allowed to 
scrutinise how any sum is to be spent. 
This dependency on foreign aid helps the armed forces to remain independent of any 
constitutionally mandated oversight.267 As the foregoing paragraph has illustrated, the 
size, state and the role of the armed forces is fundamental to the governance and 
security of Jordan today. As demonstrated, the king has a very important and a 
strengthened role with wide-ranging powers to oversee the operation of the armed 
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forces. The foreign aid that is channelled to the Jordanian armed forces allows this 
institution to exercise a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis other state organs. 
After examining the make-up of the Jordanian armed forces, the chapter will now 
analyse the role that the institution has played in identity formation in recent years. 
Jordan abolished the compulsory draft to the armed forces in 1992, four years after 
disengagement and since then, it has functioned as an all-volunteer army. After the 
king’s purge from the armed forces of politicised members and those whose loyalty was 
suspect, namely the Palestinians, recruitment for the military focused on the East Bank 
tribes and the Bedouins.268 
The Jordanian ruling family has adopted a specific strategy to maintain a mostly East 
Bank military to consolidate power and directly allocate patronage benefits through the 
state to royalist citizens. The loyalty of the armed forces to their monarch is not 
however fully secured; for the time being, however, it is safe to assume matters are in 
hand. 
The Jordanian armed forces also serve an internal role of maintaining Jordanian 
identity, particularly in relation to Palestinians who are seen to have dubious loyalty.269 
The military exists first to be loyal to the king, embodying the tangibility of Jordanian 
national identity. This fits in with the concept of a nation-building monarchy in which 
the king serves the important role of lynch pin above a multitude of tribal and regional 
identities. In short, the ruling family serves as a thread that holds a divided country 
together and projects a unitary Jordanian national identity. 
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The above analysis has demonstrated that the monarchy has been mindful of cultivating 
continued support for the regime amongst the traditional bastion of the armed forces. 
The development of the national identity of Jordan since 1988 is therefore inextricably 
linked with the intimate and mutually dependent relationship that the royal family has 
with the country’s armed forces. The analysis in this section has also demonstrated that 
the armed forces are an integral part of national identity formation and that their 
subservience to the monarchy has meant that the military tradition is synonymous with 
what it means to be a proud, upright Jordanian in the 21st century. The discourse of the 
Hashemite monarchy deliberately and in a methodical fashion employs a martial 
tradition to highlight the close bonds between the armed forces and what it means to be 
Jordanian, and it has made an impact on areas as diverse as food, clothing and social 
custom. While there is a close intimate bond between the armed forces and the East 
Bankers, the role of the Palestinian population in contemporary Jordan is a dimension 
that should not be overlooked, and this leads to the next section of this chapter. 
Conclusion 
To summarise, the armed forces have been and still are the main support base of the 
monarchy. In the expanded army, the most senior units and command structures remain 
predominantly tribal, and in situations of danger, these are entrusted to the close circle 
of the Hashemite family, with the King himself personally maintaining close ties to the 
elite infantry. Elsewhere in the armed forces, political dependence and steadfastness to 
the monarchy still make up the most important criteria. The king personally makes sure 
that promotions are used to celebrate and continue those ties of kinship. A very 
important feature of the superior tribal units is that their support comes from their 
business and personal interests; however, their effort in maintaining the Hashemite 
kingdom stems from their strongly held traditions and beliefs. There is a national 
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dedication in the armed forces that supersedes mere monetary expedience. The role of 
the Jordanian armed forces in the evolution and subsequent development of Jordanian 
national identity is critical. The armed forces has since disengagement been a crucial 
binding force that upholds an unswerving loyalty to tribal politics, the Arab nation and 
the Muslim faith of the majority population. In short, the armed forces continue to be a 
key constituent element in the formation of the modern Jordanian national identity. 
 
3. The Palestinians and the Hashemite discourse 
Introduction 
The view of the monarchy is that the country developed in Jordan is a homogenous 
entity in which Jordanians and Palestinians made up one united family, a family that 
shared a common religion, language and culture. The conflicts of the 1960s, 1970s and 
early 1980s between the two communities are no longer talked about and all are seen as 
equal citizens. The fact that most of its citizens are in fact of Palestinian origin was 
therefore not relevant to the monarchy. King Hussein used early Islamic terminology to 
explain the characteristics of the two communities and also the nature of their 
relationship: the Palestinians are the modern version of the muhajirun and the 
Jordanians are seen as the equivalent of the Ansar. Both are believed in Jordan today to 
have of equal significance to for consolidation of the modern Jordanian national 
identity.270 
In Jordan, as in other countries, national as well as sub-national identities are in a state 
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of continuous adjustment, if not reconstruction. Therefore, answers to the questions of 
‘who is a Jordanian?’ and ‘who is a Palestinian?’ or ‘what constitutes Jordanianess or 
Palestinianess?’ are different today from what they would have been five or ten years 
ago. 
The presence of Palestinians in Jordan, who today probably comprise more than half 
the Jordanian population, dates to the 1948-1949 war, when more than 700,000 
Palestinians were expelled or fled from their homes.271 This is a controversy that has 
not been settled despite the passage of time. Israel insists the Palestinians left of their 
accord and voluntarily, and even maintain that the Arab armies compelled the 
Palestinians to vacate their land.272 On the other hand, the Palestinians maintained they 
were forcibly evicted from their historical homeland at the point of a gun. The atrocity 
committed at Deir Yassin by the Zionist forces is cite as an example of pre-meditated 
‘ethnic cleansing’. Some 700,000 went directly to the East Bank of the River Jordan, 
which at the time had an estimated, largely indigenous, Transjordanian population of 
about 45,000 people.273 In the 1950s, following the enactment of a series of preparatory 
administrative measures, Jordan’s King Abdullah I annexed part of central Palestine 
that is now known as the West Bank, which had not fallen to Israeli forces during the 
war of 1948. King Abdullah’s extension of Jordanian citizenship to all West Bank 
citizens (440,000 indigenous and 280,000 refugees from the areas that became Israel), 
as well as to the 70,000 who went directly to the East Bank, laid the formal political 
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basis for the unity of the two banks.274 The unification of the two banks of the River 
Jordan meant that the boundaries of interwar Jordan were enlarged to encompass a 
substantial population from the West Bank and the historical British mandate of 
Palestine. King Abdullah and the Jordanian elite now had to contend with a composite 
nationalism that embraced both the Bedouin and tribal elements of the East Bank, with 
the distinctively separate and unique Palestinian identity based on the population of 
Jerusalem and the West Bank. Henceforth, any Jordanian national identity would have 
to pay due recognition to the Palestinian component of a transformed and enlarged 
Jordan. 
Since their mass arrival in 1948, there have been a number of important distinctions 
made between Palestinians in Jordan, which have evolved and intensified over the 
years. What underlies Palestinian identity in general is attachment to village or town of 
origin, a sense of loss of homeland and of gross injustice at the hands of the 
international community and the centrality of the notion of return. The constituent parts 
listed here go to make up the chief characteristics of the worldwide Palestinian 
diaspora. The notable elements here are a) that the key defining historical cataclysm 
was the Nakba of 1948, which was the key defining moment of dispossession, b) a 
sense of a community bound together by a grievous injustice and bonds that tie the 
community together in the shape of religion, ethnicity, language and land, and c) the 
notion of a homeland, imagined or real, a notion of a return to the homeland (i.e. the 
right of return, which the Palestinians are still hopeful of today), and a notion that this 
homeland is to reconstituted and maintained by the Palestinian diaspora who live in 
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exile worldwide. 
The analysis cannot be applied to the Palestinian population in Jordan. In this respect, 
there are three groups. The first group is the refugee camp dwellers who are 1948 or 
1967 refugees. The sense of Palestinianess is stronger amongst members of this group, 
and this sense of being Palestinian as opposed to being Jordanian was kept alive until 
the late king Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank in July 1988. This first 
group of Palestinian identity was defined in part in opposition or in hostility to a 
Jordanian identity, although it should be noted that years of residence also made Jordan 
a home, but not necessarily the homeland. 
A second group comprises the Palestinian middle class of small merchants and lower-
level government employees. The sense of identity is strong, but as a group that has 
achieved certain economic success and integration, hostility to a Jordanian identity has 
been less pronounced, except for those who played some role in the Palestinian 
liberation movement. This second group has achieved a satisfactory level of socio-
economic entitlement and a residual sense of attachment to Jordan as their adopted 
country and place of settlement, but it still aspires to a reconstituted independent 
Palestine. A sense of Palestinian identity is re-awakened during instances of invasion, 
unrest and flashpoints across the border. In summary, although Palestinian identity is 
latent and there is some attachment to Jordan as home, this group is nevertheless still 
aware of its distinctiveness and unique national characteristics. 
A third group comprises those Palestinians who have achieved notable success in 
business. Following the fighting in 1970-1971, this Palestinian bourgeoisie appears to 
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have accepted political quiescence in exchange for the regime’s provision of a stable 
atmosphere conducive to making money.275 This group is the one that is perhaps least 
susceptible to an emotional attachment to Palestine, since it is the one that is most 
successively integrated although not assimilated to the Jordanian state. Another way of 
looking at this is to note that this group would be the one most adversely affected by 
any radical chance in the status quo. This group has the most to lose should the conflict 
with Israel remerge again. So, due to the socio-economic benefits this group has 
accrued, it is the one that has reconciled itself most fully to a Jordanian national identity 
in the political sense; however, in a cultural sense, this group has also maintained a 
Palestinian identity. 
During the 1990s, a lively debate over citizenship and national identity emerged in 
Jordan. The debate focused on how national identity determines the degree of 
citizenship of Jordan’s two national groups: Transjordanians and Palestinian 
Jordanians. Transjordanians are descendants of the initial inhabitants of Jordan, as it 
was constituted at its creation in 1921. Palestinian Jordanians are the descendants of 
Palestinian Arabs who fled or were expelled from the parts of Palestine that became 
Israel, and those who simply remained on the West Bank after it was captured and 
annexed by Jordan in 1948. 
The physical location in May 1948 of either east or west of the River Jordan marks the 
critical distinction between these two groups. However, since the war, through both 
internal and regional developments, these separate national identities have acquired 
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lasting meaning.276 
Like other multinational countries, Jordan struggles to adjudicate between the 
competing demands of national identity and the universal equality embodied in the 
modern concept of citizenship. In this struggle, two conceptions of Jordanian national 
identity underpin two opposing understandings of Jordanian citizenship. The dominant 
voice in this debate is that of Transjordanian nationalists, who assert the primacy of 
national identity and citizenship that Jordan is for Transjordanians. Palestinian 
Jordanians may be part of the national community only by suppressing all signs of 
public Palestinian identity. This nationalist formulation of the relationship between 
citizenship and national identity is increasingly countered by a pluralist vision, which 
claims that the political community is defined not by national identity, but by other 
bonds of solidarity, such as citizenship in the state. This second viewpoint puts forward 
a more flexible vision of Jordanian identity that includes Jordanians of all origins. This 
inclusive conception of citizenship is emerging through debates about the relationship 
between Jordanian citizenship and national identity, and is imagined explicitly by 
pluralists as a way for Jordan to address its identity divide.277 
Despite this consensus on international identity, the national identity of Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin remains the most disruptive question in Jordanian politics. 
Among the many issues that have been explicitly cast in communal terms are the 
privatisation of the state, electoral districts and electoral law, and press reporting. All 
these issues are overshadowed by the fear of resettlement. If the peace process is to end 
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with the final resettling of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, there would no longer be any 
justification for their exclusion from the centre of Jordan’s political life, and the current 
distribution of power would be indefensible. 
The rejection of resettlement encompasses both Transjordanians, who fear for their 
domestic power, and Palestinians, who fear for their right of return. This does not mean 
that all Palestinians would return, but rather they all demand the right of return.278 King 
Abdullah II has stated forcefully that even as Jordan strongly demands the right of 
return, no Jordanian national would be stripped of Jordanian citizenship because of the 
peace process. Nationalists in the Hashemite kingdom viewed this scenario as 
threatening to the Jordanian identity of the state. 
The peace process seems to suggest the permanent integration of substantial numbers of 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan. All these factors point to an increased role for the 
Palestinian elite in the ruling coalition and a decreasing reliance on the Trans-Jordanian 
tribes. The future of Jordan’s identity with regard to Palestinian-origin citizens remains 
the subject of intense political conflict. The Hashemite discourse on identity in the 
1990s repeatedly called for full citizenship and the participation of all Jordanian 
citizens, which would imply a greater role for the Palestinian elite.279 
 The above analysis of the Hashemite monarchy and the Palestinian people who reside 
in Jordan has shown that over the course of time, especially since formal 
disengagement since 1988, Palestinian attachment to the Jordanian state has somewhat 
increased. This might be partly explained by Jordan renouncing its claim of the West 
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Bank, and also the burgeoning position of the Palestinian middle class that is prospering 
in Jordan. 
Conclusion 
It is reasonable to assume that if a Palestinian nation were to be established, it would 
have a special relationship with Jordan; however, the Jordanian national identity would 
continue to be the dominant one. The Palestinians in Jordan, despite being in the 
numerical majority, would have to accept this identity and to be reminded of their 
Palestinian roots. The only possible solution for this might be the time factor. Even 
today, the majority of Palestinians in Jordan were born in Jordan and not in Palestine. 
Some of them have parents and grandparents who are also natives of Jordan. Given the 
unfolding Arab spring, the next few years may further blur the differences and decrease 
inter communal mistrust. My personal understanding from my fieldwork is that a tacit 
understanding will develop between the two communities in which Palestinians will 
take charge of business affairs and native Jordanians will dominate the political 
institutions of the country.280 
Despite these findings, the Palestinian narrative remains an important symbol in the 
modern politics of Jordan, and its relationship with Jordanian national identity will be 
discussed further in the following chapter. 
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4. Jordan First and the Hashemite discourse. 
In October 2002, the government launched the Jordan First campaign. The campaign 
was intended to strengthen the foundations of a pragmatic, democratic state to 
emphasise the pre-eminence of Jordan’s interests above all other considerations and to 
spread a culture of respect, tolerance and integrity and fortify the concepts of 
parliamentary democracy, the supremacy of the law, public freedom, accountability, 
transparency and equal opportunities.281 The real intention was to encourage Jordanian 
national sentiment and therefore unity by re-focusing public attention on domestic 
issues at a time when it was diverted by the crises over Iraq to the east and Palestine to 
the west.282  Jordan First was not merely a slogan raised or an objective uttered, but was 
presented rather as the strong link and efficacious bond that enwraps all Jordanian 
patriots, who see in their belonging to their homeland a gateway to their loyalty to their 
nation. The document called for a strengthening of democracy, personal liberties and 
press freedoms to achieve social justice, especially by reducing poverty and 
unemployment. It recommended reforms to improve the efficiency of the courts and 
reiterated the National Charter’s call for the establishment of a constitutional court.283 
The Jordan First campaign was the first initiative under King Abdullah II that had 
attempted to articulate a comprehensive vision of economic and political reform, 
although it leaned more strongly towards economic issues. Initiated by the king, the 
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initiative included the formation of a national committee to deal with different 
economic and social issues.284 The section on political reforms debated five issues, 
which were a) the possibility of establishing a constitutional court; b) drafting a new 
political parties law with the aim of ending the state of fragmentation among political 
parties by encouraging mergers between them; c) introducing a parliamentary quota for 
women; d) enacting anti-corruption measures; and lastly e) setting rules to cover 
relations between professional organisations and the state and society in general.285 
Commentators described the slogan ‘Jordan First’ as a political vision that was an 
attempt to balance an uncompromising security with an agenda of policies cognisant of 
realities on the ground, namely image building and economic improvements. Jordan 
was sandwiched between two international conflicts that threatened to have 
repercussions within the Hashemite kingdom: one was the continuing Israeli occupation 
of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, and the second was the change of regime 
in Iraq. Jordan wanted to distance itself from the effects of regional turbulence by 
stressing the centrality of its national interests via the notion of Jordan First and used a 
formula of virtual disengagement from regional affairs to concentrate on the national 
interest.286 Jordan First as a state policy was intended to put the interest of the country 
first and foremost, the intention being that any competing national identities as a minor 
reference to the Palestinian identity should all be subsumed under its overarching 
agenda.  
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An in-depth discussion of Jordan First is particularly pertinent to a discussion of the 
development of national identity in Jordan in the post 1988 period, forming the key 
defining area of study for this thesis. When looking at the development of national 
identity in Jordan, it can be seen that the Jordan First project was an initiative by the 
monarchy and the government to make their interests central to the future political 
development of the country and the surrounding region. The Jordanian government 
wanted to form a cohesive and loyal national identity by promoting a policy initiative 
that put Jordanian national interests, including geostrategic and socio economic 
interests, above all other concerns.287 
Jordan First was used as a pretext in the national interest to crack down on popular 
manifestations of dissent, and was intended primarily to rally a sceptical public behind 
government policies on both Iraq and Palestine and to call on the Jordanian public to 
put aside their differences and unite around a common national identity. One Jordanian 
political analyst explains that the king’s objectives were clear: the king wanted a stable 
internal situation, national unity, socio-economic development, to tackle poverty and 
unemployment, and to promote peace and national security.288 
The most significant manifestation of the Jordan First campaign was the nationwide 
public relations campaign, with the logo appearing in national newspapers, and on 
billposters, label pins and bumper stickers. Other loyalties among the citizens of the 
Hashemite state were effectively to be subordinated to the Hashemite primacy. Inward 
looking, the campaign established patriotic jingoistic credentials in a state with an 
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already permanent Palestinian majority.289 The more attuned segments of the 
Palestinian majority saw through this attempt of the monarchy to side line Palestinian 
consciousness. The Palestinian intelligentsia may have interpreted this initiative as a 
rather feeble attempt to impose a unitary and one-dimensional identity onto a composite 
and heterogeneous nation-state.  
The aim of the Jordan First campaign was not only to provide initiatives for the king to 
provide stronger bilateral relations, but also to repair the gap between Jordan and its 
main partners. Remarkably, in the era of the late King Hussein, liberalisation was the 
main concern at a time of domestic, regional and international crises. Even the security 
concerns in the regional and international spheres did not change the course of the 
domestic political liberalisation process. King Abdullah has emphasised the balance 
between the domestic and international constraints, which has increased the need to 
reinforce the domestic implications of the regime’s own slogan, Jordan First.290 
The need for a national campaign increases when domestic opposition continues to 
challenge the regime’s decisions in both its domestic and foreign policies. To reduce 
the level of unpopular dissatisfaction, the regime promoted the national Jordan First 
campaign as a patriotic act to justify their decisions. The idea was that no Jordanian 
would oppose this campaign without appearing unpatriotic. The Jordan First campaign 
corresponded with the regime’s dominating consensus that Jordanians belong only to 
Jordan and their loyalty should only be to the Hashemite monarchy. It was aimed to 
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silence anyone who wanted to oppose the regime’s policies.291 
The regime’s security strategy under the Jordan First campaign did not bring stability, 
but encouraged more voices to oppose the policy together with more radical opposition 
movements. It also reflected the severe economic, social and political situation of the 
country, and led the regime to implement an International Monetary Fund programme, 
which made clear the vulnerability of the domestic and economic policies of the regime 
and its poor decision-making in the political economic sphere. 
The Jordan First initiative has been used by the monarchy to silence any opposing 
forces that seek to chart a different future for the country, for example, those parties in 
Jordan that are Baathist orientated, socialist orientated or Islamist orientated that have 
had to deal with the Jordan First programme diplomatically. On one occasion, King 
Abdullah II went on record to announce:  
‘The programmes, objectives, membership and financing of every party 
operating in Jordanian territory ought to be purely Jordanian ...  In recent 
decades, Jordan has given priority to Arab interests and not to its national 
interests... We have a right to be concerned first for our own people, as 
every country in the world does, which is where our ‘Jordan First’ slogan 
comes from’.292 
The notion of Jordan First has been described as a new basis for a comprehensive 
national effort to rediscover and reinvent the principles and values for which Jordan 
stands. This initiative vigorously aims to create a new relationship between the state 
and its citizens by setting parameters for a successful process of democratisation and 
the establishment of a free and independent public voice as essential steps towards 
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strengthening the national consensus. In this sense, Jordan First refers to the problems 
of the domestic and foreign policy of the Jordanian regime. While the slogan 
recommends a strong national consensus approach, it is used to emphasise and to direct 
attention to the foreign influences within Jordanian domestic politics. King Abdullah 
has criticised the weakness of the relationship between the people and formal 
institutions, especially the international ties of many Jordanian parties and their 
programmes that should be purely Jordanian, having as their first priority the national 
interest.293 
Conclusion 
This analysis has discussed the development of the concept of Jordan First in depth by 
clarifying the meaning of state power and the regime’s survival strategies. It presumes 
that a new meaning of the concept of Jordan First as a national slogan is considered to 
be one of the main factors that has weakened traditional powers, and is a new beginning 
for the political liberalisation process. The underlying assumption is that individuals 
will begin to define themselves according to their personal achievements. Therefore, 
Jordan First as the regime’s national slogan is an instrument of modernisation that 
heightens popular demand for the principle of personal achievement.294 
To summarise this chapter, the analysis has demonstrated over four sections that the 
development of national identity with respect to the Hashemite discourse has 
engendered a clearly defined and coherent understanding of Jordanian national identity. 
First, with respect to the tribes of Jordan, the analysis demonstrated how tribal and 
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Bedouin identity are integral to any modern concept of ‘Jordanianess’. Although 
increasingly less relevant, the tribal makeup of Jordan for the foreseeable future will 
remain an important undercurrent of national identity. In relation to the armed forces, 
the analysis has demonstrated that from the conception of the state of Jordan through to 
its present history, the martial qualities represented by the armed forces are an integral 
and important component of the state’s identity. The Palestinian analysis in this chapter 
has shown that this important population of the country is a cohesive and a counter 
force when it comes to national identity formation. In short, where the segments are not 
well integrated in Jordan in socio-economic terms, there is a greater likelihood that they 
will espouse a more pronounced Palestinian identity. With respect to Jordan First, this 
was a response by the monarchy to counter opposing views, but it is too early to 
determine whether the regime has been wholly successful in inculcating a strong sense 
of Jordanian identity in view of the effects on the country of the current Syrian 
situation, which is a scenario that is still unfolding.     
In the following chapter some of the key issues identified in this chapter will be picked 
up and elaborated on in more depth. Specifically a detailed analysis will be undertaken 
of Jordanian-Palestinian relations and how they have impacted on the development of 
Jordanian national identity in the post disengagement period. When looking at the 
evolution of Jordanian identity in the modern period, a political analysis of the two 
nations is paramount for the thesis to make some original contribution to the field of 
international relations.	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Chapter Three: Jordanian-Palestinian relations and their impact on 
identity formation in Jordan 	  
 
Introduction 
In recent years, Jordanian-Palestinian relations have received a great deal of academic 
attention – particularly in reference to literature in Middle Eastern Studies. Relations 
between the two countries came to a head after the Israeli state and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) signed the first Oslo Accord in 1993. Following this, it 
was hoped that the continuation of the peace process between the Israeli state and the 
PLO would lead to the formation of an independent Palestinian nation, one that is also 
separate and distinct from Jordan. Jordanian-Palestinian relations, however, still present 
a non-mediated subject in Jordanian politics. With these developments in the 1990s, the 
people of Jordan realised the need to re-negotiate relations between the two peoples. 
This chapter will evaluate the relations between Jordanians and Palestinians and the 
impact that these have had on the formation of the Jordanian national identity, in 
particular during the period of post-disengagement. The first section of the main body 
of the present chapter will explore relations between Jordanians and Palestinians from 
1937 to 1948. The second section will explore the dynamics of these relations from 
1948 to 1967. The third section will analyse the relationship between Jordanians and 
Palestinians following the cataclysmic six-day war in 1967 until the Jordanian 
disengagement from the West Bank in 1988. The final section will discuss how 
relations between the two countries continue to frame and reframe the development of a 
contested Jordanian national identity in the contemporary period. The aim of this 
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chapter is to show in general terms how Jordanian identity is carefully intertwined with 
the increasingly assertive Palestinian identity. Due to the assertion of a distinct 
Palestinian identity, Jordanian national identity has been seen to harden. 
 
I. Jordan’s involvement and struggle for Palestine 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the mandated territory of Palestine were 
governed under the same British mandate. They were often treated by the British 
government as one undifferentiated colonial region, consisting of two banks divided by 
the river Jordan. The role of the emir in Palestine was put on a pedestal when the Peel 
Commission in 1937 put forward the idea of joining the Arab part of Palestine with 
Transjordan. This proposal was the first attempt to involve Transjordan as a separate 
entity in resolving the Palestine-Israel conflict. 
After the partition plan, the British regime sought to put together a system of security 
alliances independently with each of the influential Arab countries. Under the new 
arrangement, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan were seen as completely independent and self-
governing states. The British government sought to secure its strategic goals through 
expansion of King Abdullah bin Al Hussein of Jordan’s kingdom to include parts of the 
Palestinian Mandate.295 
Emir Abdullah’s interest in Palestinian affairs can be examined as two distinct periods 
before and after 1937. During the years of King Abdullah’s passivity towards Palestine, 
his involvement was only solicited occasionally through Britain’s support for the 
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British policy but rarely by the Arab leadership. During this period, the group in 
Palestine that most assiduously built and maintained relations with Abdullah was the 
Jewish leadership. This was not because Jewish leaders thought Abdullah was 
influential in Palestine itself but rather because they helped to open up Transjordan to 
Jewish settlement or as an outlet for displaced Arabs of Palestine.296  
These contacts, initiated by the Jewish agency, culminated when King Abdullah I 
concluded a deal with the Jews. However, the 1936-1939 Palestinian rebellion changed 
the situation dramatically in two ways. First, the Palestinian leadership began to lose its 
position as the chief mediator between the British government and the Palestinian Arab 
community. The strike and rebellion threatened to undermine the social hierarchy of 
Palestine, from which the nationalist elite had derived its original position of leadership. 
In a sense, the appeals of the Palestinian leadership to other Arab leaders to intervene in 
Palestinian affairs at this time can be seen as an effort to shore up a tottering social 
structure. On the other hand, Britain had lost confidence in the Palestinian nationalist 
elite as a mode of leadership through which Britain could ensure its own interests were 
promoted.297 
The second way in which the Palestinian rebellion changed the circumstances in 
Palestine in Abdullah’s favour was that it revealed the extent and depth of Arab 
opposition in Palestine and forced Britain to rethink its policy on Palestine.  
The results of this rethinking were twofold: First, Britain came to the conclusion that 
the terms of the British mandate in Palestine could not be carried out within a unitary 
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state. Second, Britain needed to find a new intermediary in Palestine to replace the local 
nationalist elite. Britain turned to Emir Abdullah to govern Palestine, which was also an 
ally of Britain. 
The British Royal Commission’s 1937 report advocated the partition of Palestine 
between the Arabs and Jews, and suggested that Emir Abdullah rule the Arab part. 
Abdullah jumped at the chance and accepted the role. He was the only Arab leader to 
publicly support the partition of Palestine, for which he was roundly castigated 
throughout the Arab world.298 The Jewish Agency that had so assiduously cultivated 
Abdullah during the 1930s sought him out again soon after the end of the Second World 
War. Two meetings were held with the Jewish Agency in King Abdullah’s residence in 
Shuna Valley in the Jordan Valley in August 1946. Rather than an act of betrayal, 
Abdullah would have regarded holding a dialogue with the third of the three main 
protagonists on the ground as nothing new and eminently sensible.299 The secrecy of the 
meeting, however, indicates that he knew that others would view it differently. It was 
unfortunate that Abdullah’s sense of his own manifest destiny should have become the 
benchmark of Arab honour and principle. 
The Shuna meetings went very much as the representatives of the Yishuv had expected. 
Both parties agreed in principle on the issue of territorial partition. Abdullah would 
preside over the Arab territory, which would be incorporated into his new established 
kingdom, preferably without conflict. Cementing the convergence of the interests of 
Abdullah and the Yishuv was their mutual antipathy towards the Mufti of Jerusalem, 
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Hajj Amin al Husseini, with whom both had become implacable enemies over the 
course of the preceding two decades.300 
If partition was Abdullah’s preferred policy and was fully in keeping with his 
Hashemite dynastic ideology of expansion and incorporation, his public diplomacy in 
the aftermath of the Shuna meetings was considerably less clear-cut. Hemmed in by the 
Arab consensus articulated and standardised by the recently established Arab League, 
and concerned about the propaganda of Arab nationalists in Palestine, Abdullah felt it 
expedient to formally deny the principle of partition. 
The Palestinians, as their battle with Jewish organisations continued, became unable to 
defend their homeland before 1948, and Arabs were forced to become refugees and 
leave the lands of their ancestors. King Abdullah tried his best to reach agreement with 
the Jews by using his own diplomatic channels; he tried to bring peace to the region and 
take the Arabs’ demands into consideration.301 Furthermore, he offered the Jews 
proposals that would constitute the basis to reaching a lasting peace settlement. The 
main idea of these proposals can be summarised in the following four points: 
1) Palestine would remain undivided, with limited freedom for the areas where the 
Jews were in a majority; 
2) This arrangement would be affective for one calendar year, after which time the 
country would become a part of Transjordan;  
3) There would be one assembly in which the Jewish people would be given 
approximately fifty percent of the seats; 
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4) There would be one cabinet in which the Jews would be represented, although 
there was no mention of the precise percentage.302 
At the 1939 London Conference of Jews and Arabs, Abdullah instructed his 
representative, Prime Minister Samir Al Rifai, not to break ranks with the other Arab 
participants. While welcoming the visit of the United Nations Special Committee to 
Palestine, despite its boycott of the Arabs in Palestine, Abdullah was again coy on the 
issue of partition.303 
The massacre of a substantial number of unarmed villagers at Deir Yassin on 9 April 
1948 by the extremist Jewish group, Irgun Zvi Leumi, greatly aided Abdullah’s 
position. First, the outrage sparked an outflow of refugees and prompted increasingly 
impassioned appeals for him to intervene on behalf of the Arab population of Palestine. 
For Abdullah, the desperation of those on the ground meant that he was no longer the 
sole supporter as far as Palestine was concerned. Second, it made military inaction 
among the neighbouring government to Palestine much less tenable and, hence, 
hastened the emergence of a full-blown inter-state armed conflict.304 
The first stage of the conflict lasted for one month, with 35,000 Jewish regular soldiers 
and conscripts, and around 21,500 Arabs troops, taking to the field. Abdullah’s forces 
were well organised, well led and experienced. The Arab Legion moved into Palestine 
to take up positions in Jenin, Nablus and Ramallah, but was immediately faced with a 
dilemma posed by the Jewish forces’ move on Jerusalem. 
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Having set out an explanation of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the chapter will now 
explore the unification of the West Bank, which was referred to earlier in a previous 
chapter but will now be taken up again in greater detail. In the preceding paragraphs, I 
analysed events from 1937 to 1948. This analysis has shown that there was a very close 
relationship between King Abdullah I of Jordan and the Zionist leadership in British 
administered Palestine. Some scholars have even gone so far as to assert that there was 
collusion across the River Jordan between Arabs and Jews. It seems the aspirations of 
the Palestinian people for independence and statehood were sacrificed ‘at the altar’ of 
the Abdullah-Zionist alliance. In terms of the development of Jordanian nationalism 
post-1988, the analysis of the early history demonstrates a very intimate and close 
connection between the evolution of Jordan as a state and the Palestinian tragedy. No 
matter how much Jordan may today support the existence of an independent and 
sovereign Palestinian state, it is very difficult to deny that the country’s early leadership 
colluded with the Zionist leadership to forestall the emergence of an independent 
Palestinian state. For Jordanian nationalism to fully evolve, it must either accept the 
existence of a parallel Palestinian nationalism or co-opt elements of the Palestinian 
narrative if it is not to offend its own Palestinian citizens. 
The fraught relations between Abdullah bin Hussein and the Zionist movement hold a 
very unique place in the long and difficult history of Palestine. The two nationalist 
movements were in competition with one another for the possession of Palestine during 
the first half of the twentieth century. Hajj Amin al Husseini led the Palestinian people 
and Chaim Weizmann led the Jewish people, followed by David Ben-Gurion. Whereas 
the majority of the Arab countries supported the Palestine Arabs in their conflict with 
the Jewish state, Jordan’s King Abdullah pursued a policy of working with the Zionist 
enemy. The Zionists aimed to obtain the support of the monarchs of the Arab states for 
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the Zionist state of Israel or to get them to at least deny their support for the Palestinian 
people. The general consensus of the Arab rulers, however, was for Palestine to remain 
within Arab hands and for the Jewish encroachment to cease. 
Israeli foreign policy since 1948 has shown certain favour for the Hashemite kings of 
Jordan. After the assassination of King Abdullah I and the dashing of the hopes that the 
Egyptian revolution of 1952 would restore peace, the Hashemite option gradually came 
to an end with Israeli foreign policy. When Israel went to war in 1967 with the 
neighbouring states of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, even as the conflict was being 
conducted, both sides looked for an early peace settlement. After the war ended, the 
Israelis invited King Hussein – King Abdullah’s grandson – to look at options for an 
agreement. The ruling Labour party in Israel preferred the Jordanian option, which was 
for a peace settlement based on a territorial compromise, rather than a settlement with 
the Palestinians of the West Bank. Over the next decade, King Hussein met in secret 
with various senior Israeli figures, including Abba Ebon, Moshe Dayan, Yigal Alon, 
Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres.305 King Hussein met with Golda Meir ten times 
during her premiership. At all of these meetings, King Hussein told the Israelis that he 
was happy to have normal, peaceful relations with them provided that all of the territory 
that Israel had obtained over the course of the war was returned to Jordan. When the 
Likud ministers, led by Menachem Begin, rose to power in the late 1970s, there was no 
longer a basis for talking as they thought of Jordan as a Palestinian state and insisted on 
keeping the whole of the West Bank as an integral part of the state of Israel.306 
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II. Jordanian-Palestinian relations after the Nakba and until the Six-Day 
War 
At the end of 1948, realising that the West Bank was being held and controlled by 
Jordanian troops so that the Jordanian king could seize the territory, the Arab League 
moved to undermine this effort. The league established an all-Palestinian government in 
the Gaza strip, which was to be headed by the mufti of Jerusalem, the idea being that 
this body would be the legitimate representative government for all Palestinians. King 
Abdullah moved quickly to sabotage this move by organising a Palestinian legislature 
of his own supporters – this meeting was held in Amman on 1 October 1948. This 
congress did not accept the Gaza government and beseeched the king to take Arab 
Palestine under his wing and accord it security.307 
The unification of the East and West Banks took place in the 1950s. The West Bank 
was placed under the military rule from 17 May 1948 until 2 November 1949.308 
In the 1950s, the first election was held in both the East and West Banks; after the 
election took place, members of both the East Bank and West Bank parliaments met 
together with a Jordanian assembly and made an announcement, an excerpt of which is 
given below: 
1. To confirm the unification of both the East and West Bank in one state called 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and having King Abdullah I elected as King 
and ruled by a constitutional representative assembly, where all citizens are 
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treated equally. 
 
2. When the unification took place, the military and security institutions were fully 
Transjordanian. 
3. To affirm the safeguarding of all Arab rights in Palestine, and the defence of all 
rights by all means without prejudice to the final settlement of a just cause. 
4. To refer this resolution to King Abdullah I for approval. 
5. This resolution shall be confirmed when King Abdullah I endorses it.309 
Following the unification of the West Bank with the East Bank, Jordan proposed to 
bring into being a Transjordanian identity incorporating East Bankers and West 
Bankers, and Palestinian and tribal Bedouin elements into one unifying state. The 
purpose of this exercise and how it affected the development of Jordanian nationalism 
needs to be carefully understood. 
As far as King Hussein and Jordan were concerned, matters were deliberately 
engineered to dilute the specific and distinct Palestinian national identity, since this was 
viewed in conservative quarters as a direct threat to a specifically Jordanian discourse 
and the paramount position of the Hashemite monarchy. Jordan benefited from an 
expansion of the territory under its control but it distrusted the Palestinian narrative 
rooted in the West Bank. For the Jordanian national discourse, it was imperative that 
the Palestinian identity be subsumed under a larger and more overarching Jordanian 
national identity.  
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Another important challenge, as far as Jordanian identity is concerned, that the county 
had to confront after unification was how to lessen the differences between the two 
peoples that had two separate identities so as to bring them together under a single flag. 
Jordanians and Palestinians had different views of each other, needing time to accept 
each other in order to peacefully live together in one society. Palestinians tended to see 
Jordan as an occupying power, maintaining that Jordan, like the other Arab countries, 
had failed to come to their aid.310 In contrast, Jordanians saw Palestinians as more 
educated and Western-leaning. They believed that the Arab Legion had fought in 
Palestine to defend the Palestinians because they had refused to fight for themselves.311 
Many Palestinians and Arab refugees in Jordan in particular, propelled by the Arab 
leaders, blamed the Jordanian king for their defeat by the Zionists. As a result of this, 
the refugees held the king responsible for their misery. Lastly, however, some 
Palestinians viewed the king as the protector of their homes and towns in the West 
Bank. 
To summarise, the annexation of the West Bank and its incorporation into Jordan 
subsumed a specifically Palestinian expression of identity into the interests of a more 
overarching and inclusive Transjordanian narrative. Until 1988 and disengagement, the 
official position in Jordan was that the West Bank was an integral part of an enlarged 
and all-inclusive Jordanian national state. 
As a result of the Arab states coming together in a federation, and also because of them 
not being able to reclaim Palestine, a large number of Palestinians in Jordan looked 
closely at the distinct policy of not only integration but assimilation as well. One 
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Palestinian refugee by the name of Yasser Arafat never believed Arab unity was the 
road to the liberation of Palestine. He was convinced of the opposite – where liberation 
of Palestine would lead to Arab unity.312 
The path to the liberation of Palestine, as Arafat understood it, was the mobilisation and 
armed struggle of the Palestinians themselves. Arafat’s idea of Palestinian self-help and 
of a specifically Palestinian identity posed a threat to King Hussein’s Jordanian national 
identity.313 The monarch, with his Palestinian majority, would not adopt a Palestinian 
identity but was determined to maintain Jordanian national identity. Egypt took 
everybody by surprise when, in 1963, it proposed the establishment of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation. The responsibility for organising the PLO was put into the 
hands of Ahmad Al Shuqairi. The setting up of the PLO under nominal Egyptian 
supervision was seen as a challenge to Jordan’s sovereignty over its Palestinian citizens. 
For King Hussein, any challenge to the regime’s slogan of ‘one Jordanian family 
composed of Trans-Jordanians and Palestinians’ was seen as a direct challenge to the 
rule of King Hussein in Jordan and to the development of a specifically Jordanian 
national identity.314  
When Arafat and the Al Fatah party began to carry out infiltration raids from Jordanian 
territories into Israeli grounds, this complicated Hussein’s relationship with his 
Palestinian subjects. King Hussein feared that Palestinian operations from his territory 
would lead to Israeli reprisal operations against his kingdom. On the other hand, 
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Hussein had to be careful not to antagonise Palestinian public opinion in his kingdom 
by restricting the activity of the PLO. In the final analysis, the danger of the Israeli 
reprisals seemed greater. Hussein was stuck between a rock and a hard place and 
decided to clamp down on Fatah.315 
In terms of the analysis of the above and the development of Jordanian nationalism in 
the modern period with reference to the issue of Palestine, this tortured relationship 
with the PLO did not bode well for the evolution of a clearly defined and widely 
accepted Jordanian national identity. With Fatah’s activity being seen as a direct threat 
to the integrity of Jordan, the monarchy was obliged to both placate Palestinian opinion 
and appear to defend Palestinian interests at a regional level. Jordanian nationalism 
ultimately had to stand proud in serving Jordanian interests primarily, part of which was 
to look after its Palestinian residents and stand shoulder to shoulder with Palestinians in 
their struggle. Jordanian nationalism also had to be cognisant of specifically Jordanian 
geo-strategic interests, which dictated that the struggle with Israel should not jeopardise 
the wellbeing of Jordan and its citizens.  
The Palestinian relationship has always been difficult. In many ways, the relationship 
can be categorised as being a sour one. The Hashemite kingdom of Jordan took over the 
West Bank of Palestine during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and formally annexed it in 
1951. This annexation was contrary to the wishes of the Palestinians and was not 
recognised by the international community. King Abdullah I, the grandfather of King 
Hussein, dreamt of being a monarch over a large kingdom consisting of Jordan, 
Palestine and Syria. While the financially better West Bank became a part of Jordan, 
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the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian administration. These two areas were occupied by 
Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. 
Between 1948 and 1967, the Palestinians were not treated well by Jordan. While those 
on the East Bank of the River Jordan experienced some prosperity, the West Bank 
Palestinians suffered. After the armistice line was agreed between the frontline Arab 
countries and Israel in 1949, the Palestinians had to accept much hardship. To the 
surprise of many, the Jordanian authorities worked in a way that helped Israel. It is to 
be noted that during this period, a number of Arab countries looked upon the 
Palestinians with some anxiety. 
Jordan has been more afraid of the Palestinians than any other Arab group, since it has a 
600-km border with Israel. Palestinians make up 60 per cent of the Jordanian 
population. According to a 1980 statistical document, there were 1,148,334 Palestinians 
at that time. Jordan tried to hold on to its pre-1967 leadership in the West Bank – the 
traditional leadership system was maintained in order to avoid any radical change in the 
area. The status quo, however, changed with the covert formation of Yasser Arafat’s al 
Fatah movement between 1958 and 1964. The Palestine Arab Congress in Jerusalem 
was held under the oversight of Jordan and Egypt and the official PLO was established 
in 1964. This was an endeavour on the part of these Arab countries to contend with the 
Israeli project to divert the water of the Jordan River.316 
Al Fatah began its resistance war in January 1965: three important events helped the 
expansion of the Palestinian movement in Jordan. The first event was the Samu raid in 
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1966 as soon as the guerrillas became active from Jordanian territory against Israel; the 
latter attacked the Palestinian base in Israel in November 1966. The Palestinians and 
Jordanians came together to represent the Palestinian resistance fighters. This action led 
to demands to arm the fighters properly. The continuing guerrilla attacks on Israel was 
one of the reasons for the Israeli attack in 1967.317 
The second event was the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war, which resulted in 
an increase in Palestinian guerrilla activity from Jordan. As the Arab armies retreated, 
the Palestinian fighters seized the left-over arms and began their guerrilla campaign. 
The Palestinian guerrilla then launched a guerrilla war. 
The third event was the attack by the Israelis on the Palestinian base: a famous battle 
called the Karamah battle was fought between the Palestinians and the Israeli armed 
forces. The poorly armed resistance fighters not only fought back well against the 
sophisticated Israeli army but also captured their tanks. Seeing the victory of the 
resistance movement against the Israelis, King Hussein was photographed on one of the 
captured tanks with the guerrillas saying ‘Jordanians and Fedayeen are brothers’.318 
As the preceding account has demonstrated, in the period from the first half of the 
twentieth century until the Six-Day War of 1967, Palestinians in Jordan were treated 
poorly. As my discussion of the pre-1948 situation has demonstrated, and, as Avi 
Shlaim has convincingly argued, King Abdullah actively sought to prevent the 
emergence of a specific geopolitical entity in the West Bank; this double-dealing by the 
monarch did not win him confidence or trust among his Palestinian subjects.  
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This troubled relationship between the two neighbouring countries, which originated at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, demonstrates the inherent contradictions and 
dichotomy between the nationalities, which triggered such identity crises and marred 
relations between Jordanians and Palestinians in the Hashemite kingdom. Since 
disengagement in 1988, the difficulty of reconciling Jordanians and Palestinians within 
one national identity has meant perplexing contortions for the original Jordanian 
national identity. 
The events of the early twentieth century are remembered by successive generations of 
Jordanians and Palestinians. History informs national identity today in Jordan and is a 
narrative that feeds into the ongoing debate on who is Jordanian. 
 
III. Jordanian-Palestinian relations from the Six Day War until the 1985 
Agreement 
The June war of 1967 changed the character of the Arab-Israeli conflict more than 
commentators at the time thought it would. When the war was over, Israel controlled all 
of the land of historical Palestine in addition to the Syrian Golan Heights and Egypt’s 
Sinai Peninsula. Jordan was the country that suffered most, having lost the West Bank; 
Egypt and Syria were not necessarily broken in half like Jordan. During a visit to a 
number of Arab countries towards the end of 1967, King Hussein maintained that Egypt 
and Syria would be compensated for their losses while the loss of the West Bank 
jeopardised Jordan’s very existence.319 
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King Hussein felt an urgent obligation to restore the West Bank to Arab control and, in 
particular, Jordanian control. Jordan was under a great deal of pressure to reach a 
settlement with Israel in order to win back the West Bank. The 1967 war and the 
immediate creation of the Arab League of Nations did not remove the old divisions and 
disagreements between the Arab countries. These differences were exacerbated by 
further splits between those Arab states, which saw armed resistance as the only way to 
restore the occupied territories and forever remove the disgrace suffered by the Arabs at 
the hands of the Israelis and those who sought a diplomatic solution.320 
Meanwhile, on one side, the Israelis insisted on having Jordan as a negotiating partner 
and rejected the creation of a future Palestinian state comprised of the West Bank and 
Gaza. On the other, the majority of Arab countries insisted on the inclusion of the PLO 
in the peace talks and in determining the future status of the West Bank and Gaza, 
where they demanded the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. 
The PLO strategy helped to postpone the immediate clash with Jordan. Until the early 
1970s, the PLO had not spelt out its final position towards the Jordanian-Palestinian 
partnership. But the head of the PLO, Ahmad Shukairi, saw the eventual break-off from 
the territory of Jordan as a central PLO objective.321 Breaking away remained the 
undeclared view of a number of Palestinian groups and that of the PLO throughout its 
first ten years, reinforced by the PLO’s grand strategy of liberating all of Palestine.322  
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This action plan allowed Jordan and the PLO to co-exist as it was at least theoretically 
possible for the two roles to be compatible: Jordan’s responsibility was limited to the 
West Bank and to sectors of its Palestinian population, while the PLO pushed for a 
more general objective – the liberation of historical Palestine. This Palestinian goal of 
all or nothing with Israel provided Jordan with the practical basis on which to retain its 
union with the West Bank. The act of unity of 1950 between Jordan and the West Bank 
categorically stated that the Palestinians should be allowed to exercise their national 
self-determination once Palestine was restored to Arab control. But the Jordanian-PLO 
honeymoon period was soon to disintegrate under the pressure of competing interests. 
In the 1970s, King Hussein tried to dilute the Palestinian identity by suggesting that the 
West Bankers could be ‘part and parcel’ of the Jordanian state and society. Jordan tried 
to maintain its control over the West Bank through placing its teachers in the education 
system and through the religious leaders employed by Jordan in the Awqaf 
administration.323 
While this was taking place, the PLO succeeded in gaining both regional and 
international recognition, at least to the extent of reviving a Palestinian nationalism as 
opposed to a Jordanian national identity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The West 
Bank, in particular, did not wholly endorse the Jordanian military rule but publicly 
supported the PLO.  
Over the course of the 1970s, the Palestinian movement managed to rally the Arab and 
Muslim worlds behind the PLO and its claim to exclusively negotiate over the future of 
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the West Bank and Gaza. In October 1974 in Morocco, the PLO was recognised by the 
Arab countries as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian struggle. 
Within the Jordanian government, these developments generated a group favouring 
separation from the West Bank, and the members of this lobby believed that it would be 
possible to demand that Palestinians living in the East Bank give up their ‘dual identity’ 
if they wished to remain full citizens of Jordan.324 This proposal of disengaging from 
the West Bank would be adopted by Hussein twelve years later.  
The king would make his decision of renunciation in 1988, only after being convinced 
that the West Bank was lost. 
Across the Atlantic in the United States at this point in time, President Carter began to 
use terms such as ‘homeland’ for the Palestinians, but he failed to mention any 
Jordanian connection with the West Bank, and he talked of Palestinian rights wherever 
they lived, implying those living in Jordan as well. 
After the defeat of the 1967 war and the loss of East Jerusalem and the West Bank to 
Israel, the PLO came to be seen as the sole representative of the Palestinian cause, and, 
with the Arab states defeated, the Palestinians came to recognise that their salvation lay 
not in the United Arab war front, but with the struggle for statehood resting firmly in 
the hands of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Although the monarchy and the 
government in Jordan were not pleased with the greater prominence of the PLO, King 
Hussein had to concede that within Jordan and the Jordanian claims over the West 
Bank, there resided a distinct and categorical Palestinian voice. The sum of all of this 
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and its relevancy to this thesis lies in the analysis that the formation of a Jordanian 
national identity was beholden to a resurgent Palestinian identity. Hussein and Amman 
had to decide early on whether they should to try to co-opt and smother the Palestinian 
voice or look at a tentative Palestinian narrative separate from the unfolding and 
possibly unravelling Jordanian national identity in the 1970s. This vexed question was 
to bedevil Jordan’s national identity, even more so given that the country east of the 
River Jordan had a substantial Palestinian diaspora in residence. 
Towards the end of the 1970s, King Hussein entered into reconciliation with the PLO 
after severing these ties in the wake of ‘Black September’ in the early 1970s. Hussein 
publically announced his recognition of Palestinian rights to self-determination and his 
opposition to the Camp David Accord. This was followed in the spring of 1981 by a 
statement issued by Adnan Abo Odeh, Jordan’s Minister of Information, that ‘King 
Hussein has said on numerous occasions that Jordan will not act as a substitute for the 
PLO but rather as a source of support for it.’325 
At the same time that Hussein was leading his country with better relations with the 
PLO, he also tried but failed to undermine the PLO’s position in the West Bank. 
Throughout the 1970s, Hussein was very worried about Israel’s design plans vis-à-vis 
the West Bank. When Egypt and Israel wanted to invite Hussein to the Camp David 
Accord to discuss Palestinian autonomy, Hussein realised this for what it was. In short, 
the Israeli version of autonomy was alarmingly close to annexation, and the king 
referred to this situation more than once as being very dangerous for Jordan. There was 
a danger that this line of events could lead to the transfer of the Palestinians to the East 
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Bank, and to demands to return this region to Palestine.  
Hussein became more active in West Bank affairs after the Israeli invasion of 1982. 
Many commentators saw his support of the PLO war effort in Lebanon as a move 
aimed at placating the Palestinian radicals in Jordan.326 
The analysis will now move to the Reagan Peace Plan of 1982. On the day that the last 
PLO fighter left Beirut, President Reagan revived the Jordanian option by proposing 
self-government for Gaza and the West Bank in a federation with Jordan. As expected, 
Jordan reacted favourably. 
On 1 April 1983, the PLO accepted a solution based on a Jordanian-Palestinian 
federation. The PLO executive committee, however, did not accept the plan that 
implied the recognition of Israel’s and Jordan’s right  to the West Bank.  
In the end, the dialogue between the PLO and the Jordanian government broke down 
because of internal opposition within the PLO. For some of the PLO factions, 
reconciliation with Jordan was almost as difficult as accepting the existence of the 
Jewish state. The mistrust between the Palestinians and Jordanians was ultimately 
stronger than the will to change.327  
The outbreak of the intifada in December 1987 hastened King Hussein’s decision to 
renounce his connection with the West Bank. Crown Prince Hassan and others had 
already made up their minds to do so in the mid-1970s. The inevitable speech came in 
July 1988 when Hussein relinquished any ostensible link with the West Bank. In the 
final analysis, only history will tell whether this was a dramatic change in government 
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policy or just another change of heart on the part of a very pragmatic monarch. 
Temporarily distancing himself from the explosive intifada was, in the minds of many 
commentators, a very sensible move on the part of the autocrat. 
The preceding analysis has shown that between 1967 and 1985, the Palestinian-
Jordanian relationship fluctuated immensely. On the Palestinian side, the 1967 defeat 
meant that the Palestinians would have to fight for their independence, which meant a 
more sharply delineated Palestinian identity was necessary to offset any Jordanian-
Palestinian partnership or scheme for federation. On the Jordanian side, despite wanting 
a greater sphere of influence for Jordan encompassing the West Bank, there now had to 
be recognition on the part of King Hussein that a Palestinian identity would forever 
remain strong. Coming to terms with the Palestinian identity and the notion of a 
Palestinian state centred on the West Bank and the Gaza strip with Jerusalem as the 
capital of a future Palestinian state meant that Jordanian national identity had to take a 
diametrically opposed stance of a Jordanian identity rooted in the East Bank, marked 
off distinctly from the Palestinian struggle for independence.  
 
IV.The Agreement between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat 
King Hussein did his best to reach a political solution with Israel under international 
auspices, based on the principle of the exchange of land for peace, as embodied in UN 
Resolution 242, after the Six-Day War. However, the king’s efforts were thwarted by 
the rise of the PLO and its internationally recognised position as the sole representative 
of the Palestinian people. During the 1970s, the main body of the PLO, led by Fatah’s 
Arafat, had in fact directed the political process by emphasising diplomacy rather than 
military tactics. Such a trend facilitated its recognition by the international community 
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for representing the Palestinian population. Sadly, however, the PLO’s goals were 
frustrated by the Israelis in their refusal to talk to the Palestinians.328  
The relations between the two nations were critical for the definition of the Jordanian 
identity that both demarcated itself from a more acutely defined Palestinian identity and 
at the same time sponsored the Palestinian cause as a pan-Arab initiative in which 
Jordan’s role was both instrumental and key.  
The Amman Accord between Hussein and Arafat included the following foundations 
and principles: 
1 - Land for peace, as stated in the United Nation’s agreements, including the 
Security Council resolutions. 
2 - The right to self-determination. The people of Jordan and Palestine moved 
forward to realise the above within the framework of the pan-Arab system that 
was supposed to have been established between the two countries. 
3 - Talks within the framework of an international gathering under the auspices 
of the United Nations; this consisted of five permanent members of the Security 
Council and all of the different groups who were part of the conflict, including 
the PLO.329 
In its principles and fundamental terms, the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement embodied, 
from the king’s point of view, the rules and principles that govern the relations between 
the two peoples in terms of the equality of their rights and their duties in facing their 
single joint destiny.  
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Its importance was manifested in the Arab move regarding a peaceful settlement based 
on the principles of Arab peace, and in the wide impact it had on the international 
awareness of the cause of peace, paving the way for the participation of the PLO in the 
International Peace Conference, represented by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.  
The US condition for opening dialogue with the PLO required the latter to declare its 
recognition of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and to be ready to enter 
negotiations in order to achieve peace with the Israeli government within the 
International Conference and to condemn terrorism. On this basis, the organisation 
could be involved in the peaceful settlement efforts and was invited to attend the 
conference as part of the joint delegation.  
On January 25, 1986, Palestinian President Yasser Arafat arrived in Amman at the head 
of a delegation from the Palestinian leadership, and held four extended meetings with 
the Jordanian side, three of which were chaired by King Hussein, during which they 
discussed the US pledge of inviting the PLO to the conference and the PLO’s position 
regarding the pledge.  
However, after all the efforts by Jordan to involve the organisation in the peace process, 
the PLO leadership refused to accept resolution 242 and called for the amendment of 
the proposed wording of the resolution, and the addition of a statement that refers to the 
open recognition by the US of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including 
their right to self-determination within the confederate union between Jordan and 
Palestine. 
On February 5, 1986, the American side put forward a new version that included the 
approval of an international agreement on the basis of resolution 242, and the 
safeguarding of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Jordan informed Arafat 
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about the American recommendations with regard to the wider peace process, and this 
was thus considered to be progress in the US policy to push towards peace. However, 
the PLO was dissatisfied as it viewed the US recognition as not covering the 
Palestinians’ right to self-determination.  
Arafat left Amman on February 7, persisting in his position and the reasons which led 
him to refuse to accept the international decision, putting an end to the Jordanian-
Palestinian dialogue and the suspension of the coordination.330 
On July 7, 1986, the Jordanian government closed all of the PLO’s offices. On April 10, 
1987, the Palestinian National Council cancelled the Amman Accord, which increased 
the anger of the Jordanian leadership and deepened its distrust of the organisation’s 
leadership. 
In November 1987, Arafat visited Jordan to attend the reconciliation and agreement 
conference; the king, however, was not there to meet him like he had met the other 
Arab leaders who came before him but instead sent Prime Minister Zeid Rifai to receive 
him. This incident made Arafat’s resentful and made him consider for a moment 
returning to where he had come from, but his advisers convinced him to ignore what 
had happened for fear of exacerbating the problems and further straining Jordanian-
Palestinian relations.331 
 This demonstrates that Jordan’s relationship with the Palestinians was somewhat 
strained during the events leading up to its disengagement in 1988. As my analysis of 
the negotiations has shown, Arafat and the leadership of the PLO did not like working 
                                                
330 ali al safadi, mushahadat men ahed al hussein al bani, Jordan Central Press, Amman, Jordan, 2013, 
p.124  
331 Abu al Shareef Bassam, Yasser Arafat Riyadh al rayyes lil kutub wa al nasher, Beirut, 2005, p.218.  
188 
 
under the terms and conditions proposed by King Hussein and his government at the 
time. 
The United States was instrumental in bringing the two sides together to resolve their 
differences. This section of the thesis has also demonstrated the intricate and complex 
politics that went into bringing the two sides together. For the larger purpose of the 
thesis, it was important to recount the preceding events in order to assess how they 
affected national identity in Jordan. For disengagement to happen in 1988, these 
preceding negotiations were important to ensure that King Hussein no longer had 
administrative control over the West Bank. In looking to disengage from the West 
Bank, King Hussein was saying to his people that the Jordanian identity was primarily 
rooted in the East Bank and was distinct from that of the Palestinians west of the River 
Jordan. 
 
V. Dismantling legal and administrative links with the West Bank 
The failure of the 1985 Amman Accord did not affect the relations between the two 
peoples for very long. Jordan continued to maintain its contacts and administrative 
support for the Palestinians in the West Bank. King Hussein tried his best to express his 
concerns and worries about the hardships of the Palestinian people living under Israeli 
occupation. Furthermore, he kept the Palestinian people updated on political 
developments regarding the Palestinian territory and people, and Jordan continued to 
try to solve the Palestinians’ deepest problems by attempting to secure Israeli 
withdrawal from the occupied territories. The king wanted to make clear to the 
Palestinians that they were the real negotiators in their fight for independence and to 
reassure them that Jordan would continue to support them. 
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Israel tried to exploit the Jordanian-PLO agreement by encouraging the Palestinians to 
leave the leadership of the PLO. In response to this, Jordan launched a five-year 
development plan to boost the financial position of the occupied territories, as well as 
decrease their dependency on the Israeli economy. The main purpose of this economic 
agreement was to give the Palestinians political manoeuvrability. Important Palestinian 
leaders such as Elias Freig and Al Shawwa pushed the Palestinian people to pay tribute 
to and express gratitude for Jordan’s leadership: 
‘We breathe through Jordan; it is our gate to the Arab world … the West 
Bank is totally dependent on Jordan economically, politically, 
geographically and psychologically.’332 
The most important development that undermined Jordan’s long-standing view of the 
West Bank as part of the Hashemite kingdom was the start of the intifada. According to 
my conversation with Adnan Abo Odeh, the late King Hussein’s political advisor, who 
is of Palestinian origin, the Palestinian retaliation was a watershed moment in Jordan’s 
relationship with the Palestinian people. It demonstrated that the Palestinians who were 
looking for self-determination understood his comments to clearly mean that the king 
favoured Palestinian independence.333 Building on this analysis, the intifada 
represented a huge swathe of Palestinian opinion living under Israeli occupation that 
shifted the focus of their activity away from the PLO to the occupied territories. This 
was also key to demonstrating that the intifada would play an important role in the 
debate over the future of Palestine. It upset Jordan that after a 20-year struggle between 
the Hashemites and the PLO as to who would represent the Palestinians in the occupied 
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territories, it was now clear that the Palestinians wanted to speak for themselves. 
Therefore, the centre of gravity of the Palestinian struggle for freedom, which before 
had moved between Damascus, Amman, Beirut and Tunis, now shifted to Gaza, Nablus 
and Jerusalem and to the hundreds of previously anonymous villages and refugee 
camps in the occupied territories. The intifada, although directed against the Israeli 
occupation, raised serious questions about the wisdom of Jordan’s continued political 
and financial investment in the West Bank.334 
The uprising of the Arab people in the occupied Palestinian territories against the Israeli 
occupation, which started at the beginning of 1988, was the biggest event around which 
the official Arab policies revolved, and a forum was set up to defend the legitimate 
national rights of the Palestinian people for freedom, independence and self-
determination.  
An emergency Arab summit to discuss the implications was held in Algeria on June 7, 
1988, to address the consequences of that event, which King Hussein, in his 
documentary statement at the conference, qualified as the most important historic event 
in the evolution of the Palestinian cause since 1948. The king considered his statement 
as the clearest possible pronouncement on the relationship between settler colonialism, 
which inverts the course of history as represented by the Zionist ideology that refuses 
withdrawal and self-determination in conformity with history and which is embodied by 
the Arabs of Palestine in their struggle against the occupying coloniser. 
King Hussein also described the uprising as being not only an event but also the 
ultimate beacon for the Palestinian struggle. It was even the shining light of the 
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Palestinian struggle. It was indeed the shining light in a series of consecutive events that 
forged the Palestinian cause over more than 70 years, making it what it is today. King 
Hussein also demonstrated that the state of Jordan, from its institution in 1921 to the 
present day, has accompanied the Palestinian cause and has interacted with and been 
influenced by it; this accompaniment helped to consolidate the unity between Jordan 
and the West Bank in April 1950.  
This accompaniment has gone through two periods: the first one being prior to the June 
1967 war, and the second being the post-war period.335 
King Hussein made clear that if, at the present time, the wishes of the representatives of 
the Palestinian people was to dissociate them from Jordan, the Jordanians would 
welcome their wish just as they respected it in 1950 when the representatives of the 
Palestinian people wished to unite with Jordan.  
However, this legitimate wish should not undermine the experience of unity between 
the two banks before the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. This is because Arab 
unity is not a concept solely owned by Jordanians and Palestinians but an aspiration that 
is nurtured by the Arab conscience throughout the Arab world; therefore, no one has the 
right to undermine this hope by depicting the unity of the two banks as a form of 
domination of one Arab state over another with a view of arbitrarily annexing it for the 
purposes of greed and gain. 
‘The relationship between Jordan and Palestine is not a national 
commitment that we share with the rest of our Arab brothers. It’s rather a 
special and privileged relationship. And this privilege and that exclusivity 
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is not something we have made up nor have created and worn arbitrarily. 
They are merely the result of objective interaction based on geographical 
proximity and the intermingling of the population; cultural interaction, 
economic integration and common historical experience.’336 
King Hussein further explained to the Arab leaders that Jordan had earlier warned of 
the sensitivity of the PLO’s leaders and their outlook for the leadership of Jordan as a 
competitor, and to dissipate that sensitivity, King Hussein took the initiative to propose 
a project for possible alternatives for the relations between Jordan and Palestine after 
the liberation of the occupied territories, based on the following three options: 
1- A return to integrative unity as was the case before the occupation by Israel 
of Palestinian lands. 
2- The establishment of a federal system under the name of ‘the United Arab 
Kingdom’, made up of two states, namely, Jordan and Palestine, each with its 
own regional parliament and government, and a joint parliament hosting the 
same number of members from both countries. 
3- The establishment of an independent Palestinian state.337  
From all that has been presented above, it appears that the Jordanian decision to 
dismantle the legal and administrative links with the West Bank was crystallised in the 
ideology of the Jordanian leadership several months before its adoption. This was not 
due to a personal wish that the Jordanian leadership had but was in response to the 
demands of the PLO and the Arab leaders who wanted to be rid of the burden of the 
Palestinian cause. All this lay at the feet of the PLO, despite the fact that those leaders 
were aware of the organisation’s inability to recover by itself the full Palestinian 
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territories or gain all of the legitimate national rights that the Palestinian people claim.  
The Jordanian decision was not a voluntary abandonment of its nationalism regarding 
the Palestinian cause and the rights of its people, but in line with the general 
Palestinian-Arab consensus adopted by more than one Arab summit, and which 
believed in stressing Palestinian identity in full, and in getting the Palestinians to bear 
the full responsibility of the future of the occupied lands. 
During preparations for the final decision at the local level, and through his continuous 
meetings with his people, King Hussein emphasised the constraints that Jordan 
announced on May 8, 1988:  
‘Jordan is an Arab nation that is not looking into the origin of any citizen, 
where they were born and where their parents come from. According to 
the Great Arab Revolution, whoever lives on this Jordanian land is one of 
us and we’re one of them; and I say to our brothers and sons of Palestine 
who live here, that this position does not contradict our commitment and 
their commitment towards Palestine; and we in Jordan, we are the heirs of 
the great Arab Revolution; and its principles and its objectives and its 
goal is Arab unity, without any regards of the origins of a person, whether 
they relate to this family, or their fathers or their grad-fathers. We are all 
Arabs, and they are all the sons of Jordan.’ 
King Hussein made it clear that the decision to dismantle the legal and administrative 
links with the West Bank, which he announced on July 31, 1988, would not affect the 
rights of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, and declared that:  
 ‘It should be clearly understood that the measures we are undertaking 
towards the West Bank are only linked to the occupied Palestinian land 
and its people, and not, in any way, the Jordanian citizens from 
Palestinian descent who live in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. They 
all enjoy full citizenship rights and they should abide by those rights and 
duties exactly as any other citizen, barring their origin ,they are part of 
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the Jordanian state to which they belong, and on the land of which they 
live and participate in its life and various activities.’338 
As the preceding text has made clear, King Hussein’s decision to disengage from the 
West Bank was preceded by careful deliberation and consideration of the impact of 
such a decision on Jordan’s relations with Jordanians of Palestinian descent. King 
Hussein was mindful in his disengagement pronouncement to stress that this action was 
being undertaken in the best interests of the Palestinian people and their right to self-
determination. By appearing to facilitate Palestinian statehood, King Hussein won the 
hearts and minds of the Palestinian people and the wider Arab community. The decision 
to disengage did have repercussions for the Jordanian identity, centred more exclusively 
on the West Bank. The act of disengagement said to Jordanians that their destiny now 
lay fully with the land east of the river Jordan. Jordanian national identity was therefore 
very clearly demarcated: one could be Palestinian and Jordanian in the sense of being of 
Palestinian descent but one’s immediate loyalty and sense of citizenship had to be 
directed towards the Hashemites and the Kingdom of Jordan. The remainder of this 
chapter will look at events  after 1988 and disengagement and examine how they had an 
impact on the continuation of Jordanian national identity in the contemporary period. 
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VI. Jordanian-Palestinian relations after the disengagement of 1988 
In 1988, King Hussein publically supported the concept of an independent Palestinian 
state. He emphasised the importance of the PLO in the search for peace. The king 
added: 
‘We have no designs, ambitions or goals other than deliberation of 
Palestinian territories and enabling the Palestinian people to determine 
their own destiny on their national soil and regain their legitimate 
national rights’.339 
When rioting broke out in Ma’an in the middle of 1989, it quickly spread to other towns 
and cities where there had always been support for the monarchical regime. The king 
chose not armed repression, but to give political liberalisation a try. 
Since disengagement in 1988, political and economic liberalisation has gone together 
hand-in-hand. Economic restructuring had sought to reduce the role of the state in the 
Jordanian economy, as well as cutting back government bureaucracy. Political 
liberalisation, on the other hand, had meant more respect for human rights and, 
consequently, a diminished role for the security apparatus. 
As a result of the changes in the political and economic spheres, the Jordanians felt 
threatened by the restructuring, from which it was believed the Palestinians would 
benefit. In tandem, political liberalisation gave new opportunities for freedom of 
expression.  
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In the domain of organised political activity, the splits that occurred within Jordanian 
parties appeared on a number of levels to be related to the internal communal divisions 
in Jordan between Jordanians and Palestinians. Even amongst the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which was the strongest force in parliament, there was reportedly a Jordanian-
Palestinian divide.340 
With the liberalisation of the political parties, questions were raised about the future 
trajectory of the PLO faction in the country. In the end, Jordanian concerns about PLO 
activity and the concern expressed by both communities over any overt Palestinian 
political activity contributed to the ‘Jordan is Palestine’ argument in Israel. Jordanian 
divisions in the resistance parties were opened, but Fatah did not establish a Jordanian 
branch.341 
During the first Gulf crisis, Palestinians and Jordanians marched together in protest 
demonstrations. However, the socio-economic fallout from the Gulf War widened 
divisions between the two communities. Inflation affected all of the communities in 
Jordan. The arrival of some 200,000 immigrants, who were mostly Palestinians from 
Kuwait, strained an already difficult situation. The result of all of these developments 
was that a number of Jordanians felt that they were losing their country to what were 
termed ‘outsiders’. It was feared that these Palestinians would gradually acquire more 
and more power. 
Over the course of the early nineties, there developed a much broader sense of 
Jordanianness, which had similarities to the ‘East Bank First’ movement, developed. 
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This emerging feeling crystallised in opposition to the role of Palestinians in Jordanian 
politics. One person who represented this view was the former secretary general of the 
public security department, Abdel Hadi Al Majali, who stated his position in the 
following terms: 
‘We need to distinguish between our Jordanian Brothers of Palestinian 
origin who belong to our joint political identity… and between those who 
are demanding a separate identity and a separate state… what is between 
us is not defined by national (Watani) unity but by relations in a pan-Arab 
(Qawmi) framework … the Palestinian who lives amongst us and wishes 
to maintain … his Palestinian political identity, has the right to live 
without discrimination … he does not have the right to work in the Jordan 
Political Institution.’342 
Some people within the Palestinian community acted as a counterpart to Jordanian 
nationalists like al Majali.343 These Palestinians viewed Jordanian citizenship with 
distain; however, given the uncertainty regarding the future of Palestine, they were not 
willing to give up their Jordanian citizenship. The involvement of these people in the 
affairs of Jordan, given their primary allegiances elsewhere, is one more source of 
Jordanian-Palestinian resentment. 
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VII. Jordanian-Palestinian relations in the peace process 
Alongside the economic and political changes, matters were complicated by Jordan’s 
involvement in the peace process. After the Madrid conference in 1991, the Jordanian 
negotiating team included Palestinian representatives. However, over time, as the 
Palestinians began to operate as a distinct delegation, reports of difficulties began to be 
increasingly voiced. 
King Hussein was not happy about being kept out of the sensitive Oslo negotiations. By 
the end of 1993, relations between the two sides had deteriorated to a significant extent, 
and in January 1994, in a speech to a group of military officers, the king issued a 
warning to the PLO.344 After this, whenever a member of the royal family complained 
of a lack of trust between the Jordanians and the Palestinians, tensions at the 
government level quickly found popular expression at the street level. 
The signing of the declaration of principles was a turning point in Jordanian-Palestinian 
relations. The prospect of an independent Palestinian state put the question of who 
would be citizens directly on the table for discussion. In Jordan, where the Palestinian 
community held citizenship, the issue of Palestinian national identity vis-à-vis a 
Jordanian national identity became a very real and moot point. 
That the issue of Jordanian-Palestinian inter-communal tensions was sometimes within 
the control of the Jordanian government has to be highlighted. Evidence gathered over a 
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number of years suggests that the Jordanian government had sometimes exploited 
Jordanian-Palestinian tensions to further its own geo-strategic interests. By the same 
token, however, the Jordanian government would reign in any expressions of communal 
tensions, which jeopardised relations between the two communities. Therefore, when 
tensions between the two communities reached unprecedented heights in the middle of 
1994, King Hussein spoke out angrily against those working to sow ‘seeds of discord in 
this country among its people’ and pledged that ‘any person who attempted to harm 
national unity will be my enemy until judgement day’.345 Newspaper coverage 
following the king’s threat revealed that any trouble-making articles and topics would 
henceforth be barred. 
The tensions between Jordanians and Palestinians increased even further when it 
became clear that Jordan was going to sign its own peace agreement with Israel. The 
Washington Declaration that was signed between King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin 
formally ended the state of conflict between Jordan and Israel. An article in the 
Washington Declaration that gave the Hashemites a privileged position in the running 
of the holy sites in Jerusalem greatly upset many Jordanian Palestinians.346 
On the specifically Jordanian side, worries about the peace process included anxieties 
that Jordan might be the final site for the permanent housing of Palestinians from 
Syrian and Lebanon; hence the phrase ‘Jordan is Palestine’ and the sentiment that, with 
the establishment of the a Palestinian confederation, Jordan would be eaten up by a 
Palestinian-controlled political system. 
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On the Palestinian side, the proclamation of the Oslo Accord generated shock, anxiety 
and displeasure with the PLO, in particular among the 1948 refugees, which led to 
increased sympathy for King Hussein. Support for the Jordanian monarchy remained 
strong, at least until the kingdom’s own peace agreement with Israel was publicised. 
Broadly speaking, dissatisfaction with the Jordanian-Israeli peace process had been 
increasing since the mid-1990s. Many people who were supportive of the peace process 
or had their doubts but remained silent now seemed to have embraced opposition to the 
peace process because of the lack of any real benefits. This dissatisfaction with the 
peace process was most evident in calls by professional groups to contest 
normalisation; there had been numerous instances where the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the socialists had held anti-normalisation protests. 
It seemed that growing Palestinian dissatisfaction with the peace process, coupled with 
Palestinians’ negative reaction to the growth of Jordanian nationalism, could work 
together to destabilise the government following the 1988 disengagement (Jordanising 
the Palestinians in Jordan). If the negotiations between Jordan and Israel further 
undermined Palestinian rights in Palestine, the old memories of Jordan’s pro-western 
and anti-pan-Arab orientation might once again have upset the Palestinians in Jordan 
and distanced them from political authority and the monarch; this was already 
becoming evident with Jordan’s unpopular peace treaty, with Israel being called ‘the 
king’s peace’.347 
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VIII. Confederation: theory versus practice 
(i) Definition of the Confederation and its importance 
In this section, I will analyse the possible confederation between Jordan and Palestine 
and the impact that this has had on the Jordanian national identity. After 1988 and 
disengagement, the leadership of the two states actively promoted the idea of a 
confederation between the people of the two areas. Should a confederation materialize 
in the not too distant future, then Jordanian national identity will likely comprise a 
larger Palestinian dimension. Currently, Jordan is a kingdom for the people of the East 
Bank, even if they are of Palestinian descent. It is a country rooted in the Hashemite, 
tribal and Bedouin traditions of the East Bankers. The Jordanian identity encompasses 
many different elements, and since 1988 it has distanced itself from historical Palestine. 
Should a confederation between the two political entities come to fruition, then the 
likelihood is that Jordanian national identity will be diluted and will be far more 
accepting of and encompass the Palestinian narrative and the strong Palestinian 
consciousness. 
The term ‘confederation’ refers to ‘contractual union, independence union or 
international unions’ and means an agreement ‘between two or more countries wherein 
each one country safeguards its right, at home and abroad, but establishes between them 
some sort of a link and a union in order to achieve specific purposes and principles 
which should be agreed upon in an agreement between these countries’. 
The whole process will be supervised by a joint body called the association or 
conference, and will include delegates from both of these peoples: the purpose of an 
independence union is to fulfil the desire of its constituent states to maintain their 
independence, as well as preventing wars between them, safeguarding their economic 
interests, and defending their economic and political interests at the international level. 
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An association or conference that represents a union could not be a state above the other 
member states. Each country must enjoy full domestic sovereignty and maintain its own 
international image. Each country also has the right to political representation along 
with other states, and to engage in treaties, provided that these are not contrary to the 
goals of the union or of those of its members.348 
(ii) Jordanian confederation with Palestine 
The official perspective of a Jordanian-Palestinian completion status continued to be 
that of a partnership between the two independent peoples, but only after Palestine had 
achieved statehood. As this two-state agreement became gradually accepted, Jordan 
exonerated more and more of its historical claim on the occupied West Bank. While 
Jordan provided an overarching cover for the Palestinians at the Spanish and American 
peace talks, the joint delegation eventually split itself into two separate committees with 
the most basic consultation. The Jordan leadership came to realise during and after the 
peace talks that to stake an uncompromising claim on the West Bank would jeopardise 
the long-term integrity and national sovereignty of the Jordanian state. The Jordanian 
monarch, and political and professional associations in Jordan wanted a Jordanian 
identity strictly demarcated from any mention of Palestinian statehood. Despite laying 
claim to the West Bank in the past, the protectors of Jordan did not want the Jordanian 
and Palestinian identities to now become confused. The idea of a confederation was 
seen to compromise the Jordanian identity and potentially to propose the idea that 
Jordan was Palestine; this will be discussed later in the section. 
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By the beginning of the 1990s, the people of Jordan across the political divide openly 
viewed confederation as tantamount to the dissolution of the Jordanian identity; 
Jordanian nationalists put forward the argument that any connection with the West 
Bank posed an unacceptable threat to the very life of Jordan as an independent state.349 
King Hussein demanded that the concept of joint rulership be removed from Jordanian 
political terminology, with two independent internationally recognised states bound by 
shared interests and treaty settlement emerging as the preferred solution. The Oslo 
Peace Process upset and disturbed the Jordanians, instigating strong concerns about 
Jordan’s future identity; however, the Oslo process strengthened the East Bank idea of 
Jordan by importantly moving toward the creation of a separate Palestinian identity 
located on the West Bank and a Jordanian identity situated in Jordan and the East 
Bank.350 
The realisation by the Jordanian ruling class that their country’s very future was 
compromised by talk of confederation deeply disturbed the nationalist sentiment in 
Jordan. Ironically, Jordanian identity was more strongly reinforced when there was talk 
in the Middle East of a peace settlement and Palestinian statehood. The analysis in my 
research has shown that talk of Palestinian statehood has consistently reinforced the 
idea of Jordanian distinctiveness and of Jordanian separateness. In fact, I am convinced 
that there is a direct correlation between the prominence of Palestinian nationalism and 
its provocative domino effect on Jordanian nationalism.  
After some difficulty, Jordan continued to highlight its support for an independent 
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Palestinian state but categorically declined to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. 
However, it sought to maintain some partnership and communication with the 
Palestinian government. Jordan’s peace agreement with Israel solely highlighted 
Jordan’s interest and again concretely separated this Jordan from Palestine. This new 
identity with Jordan’s geo-strategic interests has sometimes clashed with fixed external 
ideas about Jordan’s assumed unchanging identity and interests.351 
Jordan’s official government policy since the death of King Hussein has been to 
preserve its distinct identity and interests. Despite some initial doubts about whether 
King Abdullah II might renegotiate the relationship with the West Bank, he has 
confidently rejected any Jordanian part in the occupied territories. Whatever minor 
interest Jordan might have held in the West Bank, Abdullah has openly accepted the 
new identity of an East Bank Jordan separate from the West Bank. On every 
international platform, King Abdullah has highlighted that ‘there is no such word as 
confederation in my vocabulary’ and that Jordan ‘supports without reservation the 
creation of a Palestinian state’.352 The new government of King Abdullah has gone 
further than King Hussein did in Jerusalem regarding disengagement, with Jordan now 
having renounced any role in the administration of the holy site of Jerusalem. As the 
political commentator, Adnan Abo Odeh, stated, ‘Jerusalem is no longer an internal 
Jordanian affair’.353 
Jordanians across the political spectrum reject confederation but are divided on the best 
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future partnership with the West Bank. Inhabitants of Jordan of Palestinian origin have 
tended to support a closer economic relation, but their support for open borders between 
the two countries does not differ greatly from the interests of Jordan’s native business 
elite; indeed, many inhabitants of Palestinian origin agree with a number of Jordanian 
nationalists about the importance of sharply distinguishing between Jordan and 
Palestine to find a solution to any doubts about their identity and sense of loyalty. This 
change in identity conception and its significance in Jordan should help to establish the 
importance of identity in Jordan’s foreign relations with Palestine, Israel and the 
surrounding Arab countries. Before disengagement in 1988, Jordanians held very 
closely to the idea of a West Bank-inclusive identity and its state interests in the face of 
Arab opposition, Palestinian efforts, civil war and the changing realities on the ground. 
It was only with the beginning of the intifada in 1987, disengagement in 1988 and 
liberalisation after this period that there emerged new conditions for a significantly 
different Jordanian identity based primarily on severance from the West Bank.354 
(iii) The confederation’s most important goals, benefits and motivations 
A great deal of literature in political science – which deals with complementary 
relations – has summarised the benefits or reasons for a confederation into two points: 
Integration, according to international experts, is one of the most successful ways to 
reduce the chances of conflict and disagreement between countries that generally thrive 
upon it. The confederation (union for independence) is considered to be a transitional 
system which may evolve into a federation or fall back in the event of a separation 
between the parties, so that the members of the confederation can proceed to a more full 
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relationship in a federation, or revert to their original situation in the event of a 
separation.355  
(iv) The confederation option in the official Jordanian vision: Attitudes and concept 
Regarding a confederate relationship with the Palestinians, the official Jordanian 
position has been established and explained in the declarations of the late King Hussein 
and those of the current King Abdullah II, who has declared his adherence to the policy 
of his father several times. 
The official position of Jordan, whether during the 1980s or the 1990s, was always the 
same regarding accepting a confederate relationship following the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state, provided that both the Palestinian and the Jordanian 
peoples were in favour of it. That is, it relied on the principle of free choice for both 
peoples and that Jordan should not be the alternative nation. In one of his press 
interviews, King Abdullah II declared: 
‘The idea of a confederation between Jordan and Palestine was proposed 
to us years ago, and the answer at the time was that this issue should be 
determined by both the Jordanian and the Palestinian peoples, with their 
free will, and only when the Palestinian people obtain their legitimate 
rights on the national Palestinian land.’ 
The king said that nothing new had occurred that would make him or his administration 
change their position in that respect. 
‘For us, the confederation is a concept of unity between two fully 
independent countries, and on this basis, it can lead to the establishment 
of an independent Palestinian state after which the two peoples agree on a 
formula that will unite them both, and we will not accept it, under any 
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circumstances.356 
 
This means that the confederation should not be a means to put an end to or transcend 
Israel’s right in negotiating a final solution between the Palestinians and the Israelis, or 
be at the expense of building an independent Palestinian state. Also, following the Oslo 
Accords, the Jordanian position regarding the timing of the confederation lost much of 
its enthusiasm compared to that same enthusiasm in the 1980s – especially considering 
that the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation issues have still not been concluded. This may be 
because Jordan is not willing to commit itself in advance to any form of future 
relationship with the Palestinians, as such an obligation might lead to Jordanian 
concessions in favour of either the Palestinians or the Israelis, which may later prove to 
be unnecessary. 
None of the statements and declarations made by Jordanian officials have provided any 
details regarding the Jordanian concept of the confederation; they have only described a 
general framework. Therefore, in order to clarify some details of the Jordanian concept 
of the confederation, it is useful to use certain references and declarations that 
attempted to do that. One of these sources reports that Khaled Hassan, a Palestinian 
official, reported his negotiations with the Jordanian party regarding the Amman 1985 
Accord and said: ‘For history, it’s essential that I record the following meanings which 
His Majesty King Hussein and some of those who were present clarified, and the said 
meanings reflect what was verbally said and not what was recorded in writing.’ 
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Khalid Hassan continued to say that the Palestinian state would not only be a 
Palestinian choice, but also a choice for the Jordanian people. He went on to point out 
that there was a belief in Jordan that the Palestinian state could not be run from outside 
and that its governance should most definitely be led from within. 
The Palestinian official also said that from these two elements of persuasion, the 
Palestinians would agree to the confederation union through a referendum put to the 
peoples of both countries, the results of which would decide if the said confederation 
would materialise or not. Lastly, the official said that the Jordanian union meant 
concessions by each of the Kingdom of Jordan and the Palestinian state for joint full 
sovereignty, and that the political establishment in Jordan would be prepared to pay the 
price that would equal the recovery of the territories occupied since 1967, including 
Jerusalem.357 
(v) The confederation option in the official Palestinian vision: Attitudes and concept 
The official position of the Palestinians with regard to the Palestinian-Jordanian 
confederation and their understanding of this confederation was the calling for the 
establishment of a Jordanian confederation after the establishment of a Palestinian 
State. This was conducted through the decision of the Palestinian National Council, 
which endorsed this position. For example, among the resolutions of the Palestinian 
National Council, in its 16th session held in Algeria, were the following: 
- An emphasis on the special and privileged relationship between the Jordanian and the 
Palestinian peoples 
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- Observing the decisions of the National Council with regard to the relationship with 
Jordan, and starting from the fact that the PLO is the legitimate and sole representative 
of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and abroad; and the Palestinian 
National Council sees that this future relationship (Palestinian) be established with 
Jordan on the basis of a confederation between two independent countries.  
Also, declarations by some Palestinian officials confirm this Palestinian position and 
the special nature of the relationship between Jordan and Palestine. For example, in 
August 1992, one of the Palestinian officials declared that the Palestinian leadership 
had set up a Palestinian committee to study the upcoming Jordanian-Palestinian 
relations and to bring its visions to the executive committee of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization.358 
In general, both the official statements and the official political activity, following the 
Madrid and Oslo peace conferences (i.e. in the 1990s), show that the Palestinian 
position regarding the confederate relationship is more enthusiastic and urgent than the 
position of Jordan, which is more reserved and less enthusiastic, contrary to what the 
situation was in the 1980s when the Palestinian positions were less inclined towards 
confederacy.  
The possible reasons for this are that the Palestinian side, prior to the disengagement of 
Jordan from the West Bank in 1988 and the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords, 
was more in favour of what was known as the Palestinian fundamentals, and later, as 
the post-Oslo era. The regional and international role of Jordan with regard to the 
Palestinian cause was enhanced by any flexibility from the Palestinians towards the 
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resolution of the Palestinian issue. However, at some point after the dismantlement and 
the Madrid Conference, Jordan felt that the confederation was a ‘load of worries’ and a 
burden of the Palestinian and Israeli cause, which Jordan had to bear. 
Jordan realised that being used as a way-out in all of the Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations, and being blamed for the burdens and the negative results of these 
negotiations, would mean that any Jordanian agreement to a confederation would not 
match up with Jordanians’ expectations for the time being. On the other hand, the 
Palestinians would have to become more pragmatic regarding their cause. 
Therefore, the Palestinians set about acquiring many other international channels that 
they were unable to access in the 1980s, and which Jordan could provide to them. 
Palestinians fear of Jordanian dominance with international support shrank dramatically 
following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in part of the Palestinian 
territories, and what followed in terms of the strained relations with the international 
community, especially with the European countries.359 
As recent reporting from the area has clarified, Islamists in Jordan welcome the idea of 
a Jordanian confederation with Palestine whereas the nationalists in both countries do 
not support the idea. The Islamists are likely to be support joint sovereignty because of 
their belief that the Islamic brotherhood between two people overrides any distinct 
national identity among both Palestinians and Jordanians. For Islamists, the national 
identity of Jordan is firstly Islamic and only secondly Arab. The rationale here is that 
Jordan and Palestine would be stronger working together and that re-affirmation of their 
mutual Islamic bond would forge a closer union between Palestine and Jordan based on 
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religion. 
The Arab nationalists’ position in both countries is different from that of the Islamists. 
For the Arab nationalists, the Jordanian and Palestinian identities are rooted in non-
religious spheres, such as nationality, ethnicity, culture, language, dress and cuisine –
dimensions of identity that are more pronounced than religious aspects. Nationalists are 
also pragmatic and state-oriented in their concerns. For them, the national geo-strategic 
interests of their respective countries are better served by eschewing the confederation 
idea. Currently, in both countries, the nationalists’ position would appear to be stronger 
than that of the Islamists.360 
(vi) Scenarios for the future Jordanian-Palestinian relationship  
In this section, I will summarise four scenarios for Jordanian-Palestinian relations in the 
future. 
Scenario number one has been termed the drift scenario – this covers what will happen 
if the Jordanian and Palestinian leadership are in a reactive mode, responding to events 
and not heading them up. Both Jordanians and Palestinians engage in tactical 
manoeuvres, but neither of them is able to impose a broad game plan. In Palestine, the 
leaders could be concerned with consolidating power and moving further down the road 
to full independence before dealing with the question of their relations with Jordan. 
Other members of society, from the rulers to those in the streets, will focus more on the 
struggle for independence from Israel than on relations across the river. On the part of 
the Jordanians, there is a possibility that they may not determine any of the 
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developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and will therefore simply have to wait 
on the sidelines for an independent Palestine state. 
The outcome of such a state of ‘drift’ in Jordanian-Palestinian relations would be 
neither positive nor negative. Family, material and psychological ties, which bind the 
two people, will continue alongside mutual suspicion and friction.361 
The next scenario is termed the functional scenario. In this case, a hard-line Israeli 
government is assumed to take the initiative, conceding to the Palestinians no more than 
autonomy in the West Bank. However, neither the Palestinian nor the Jordanian 
leadership would accept such a result. If the Palestinians are slowly marginalised and 
the Jordanians find that they are filling the power vacuum, the result would be a 
functional division of man power between Palestinians and Jordanians. The end result 
of this scenario would lead to Palestinian nationalism that would retain its supporters on 
both sides of the River Jordan. Hamas, a Palestinian Islamic organisation, would gain 
strength, and a new generation of PLO foot soldiers would become more emboldened in 
the occupying territories. At the same time, Jordanian nationalists would not favour 
deeper Jordanian involvement in political and economic affairs across the River 
Jordan.362 
The next scenario is the separation scenario, which takes developments in a very 
different direction from the functional scenario. In actual fact, this may be driven by an 
aversion to the possibility of Jordanian involvement in the West Bank. It may also come 
about as a symptom of a drive for Palestinian independence from Israel. As envisaged 
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in my research, however, this scenario assumes a Palestinian leadership that wants to 
establish a political and economic system that is completely separate and different from 
that of Jordan. I believe that the PLO would go along with this and that Hamas would 
not oppose it if the scenario were to be presented as a quest for Palestinian nationhood. 
Likewise, public opinion in Jordan might not object to this if separation were presented 
in a similar vein.363 
The co-operation scenario represents a vision for Jordanian-Palestinian relations that 
would capitalise on the benefits to be gained from the two communities working 
together. This scenario would avoid the disadvantages of separation and the instability 
that is presented in the functional scenario. However, because there are mutual 
suspicions between Palestinians and Jordanians, the only way this could feasibly be 
overcome would be for co-operation to be based on independent Palestinian statehood 
as a necessary precondition. Those who have an interest in promoting separation would 
not be open to this scenario. The distrust between Jordanian and Palestinians would be a 
major stumbling block that could only be removed by a genuine desire for friendship 
between both communities.364 
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IX. Agreement between Jordan and Palestine over custodianship of 
Jerusalem’s holy places 
(i) Introduction 
On March 31, 2013, an agreement that came as a shock to many was signed between 
the Palestinians and the Jordanians, which confirmed Jordan’s guardianship of the 
Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. The Al Quds al Arabi newspaper highlighted that the 
agreement had been signed in complete secrecy in the presence of King Abdullah II, 
Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and also ministers of religious authorities in 
Jordan.365 
The agreement mentions that ‘His Majesty King Abdullah II, as the custodian of the 
Jerusalem holy sites, will exert all possible efforts to preserve the holy sites, especially 
the Haram al Sheriff (the al Aqsa mosque) … and to represent their interests’. The 
agreement highlights that King Abdullah is responsible for maintaining respect for the 
holy places, guaranteeing Muslims freedom of movement to and from the sites, 
ensuring their repair, and representing their interests on the international stage.366  
In its historical context, the Hashemite dynasty in Jordan has been the guardian of the 
holy places in Jerusalem since the early 20th century. Even after the Six-Day War and 
Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem, Jordan continued to play a religious part in 
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Jerusalem’s holy places via the East Jerusalem endowment, which it oversees.  
In 1988, Jordan formally separated itself from the West Bank by seizing its legal and 
administrative connections with it, but the separation policy did not apply to the holy 
places in Jerusalem. In 1994, this guardianship was re-emphasised via a Jordanian 
proclamation that underlined the kingdom’s historic position in Jerusalem’s holy places 
as well as the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel, where Israel acknowledged 
Jordan’s special position in Jerusalem.  
(ii) Jordanian identity linked to defending Jerusalem 
The Jordanian authorities and the Palestinian government legitimised the 
documentation as necessitated by the need to combine their efforts to resist Israeli 
efforts to ‘Judaize Jerusalem’.367 The Palestinian Authority’s Minister of Islamic 
Affairs, Mahmoud al Habash maintained that the document was purely spiritual and 
that there were no ulterior motives, saying it was put together to establish a reality that 
had existed for many decades and that it put forward a legal foundation for partnership 
between the two parties in safeguarding Jerusalem. The former Jordanian minister of 
communications and information, Sami al Ma’ayta, similarly remarked that the 
documentation was earmarked to limit the Judaization of Jerusalem.368  
The weekly newspaper in Jordan, al Bayader al Seyasi, which is sympathetic to the 
PLO, commented:  
‘Jordan has the power, capability and influence in the international and 
Arab arenas to halt any attack on the al Aqsa mosque, while 
thePalestinian authority is powerless to defend Jerusalem and its holy 
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places.’369 
The above analysis of recent developments with respect to the Jordanian role regarding 
the Jerusalem holy sites has demonstrated that despite Jordan disengaging from the 
West bank in 1988, it still sees itself as being intimately linked with its maintaining and 
overseeing the Palestinian holy sites. This demonstrates that despite Jordan wanting to 
separate itself from the West Bank and the Jordanian identity being distinct from 
Palestinians, the monarchy still wishes to emphasise its religious legitimacy by 
maintaining some hold over the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. It is very important for 
King Abdullah to show to the Arab world and the wider Muslim community that his 
position as a direct descendent of the prophet, highlighting the Hashemite progeny with 
guardianship over Muslim East Jerusalem and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, ties 
the Jordanian monarchy to a religious past, emphasising his employment of religious 
identity in Jordan’s foreign policy. What the preceding analysis has shown is that the 
Jordanian monarchy is very conscious of the religious nature of its regional identity. 
Given the artificiality of the Jordanian state and its lack of historical longevity, it is seen 
as important by the Jordanian monarchy that the religious nature of the Hashemite 
family is continually emphasised, demonstrating the importance of religion in 
discussions of modern Jordanian identity. The Jordanian regime consciously employs 
religious terminology to win legitimacy in the Arab and Muslim world. 
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Conclusion 
The Jordanian government’s efforts since the early 1950s to formulate a hybrid 
Jordanian national identity incorporating both Jordanians and Palestinians have been 
resisted by each community in its own way. At the same time, however, there is strong 
evidence to suggest that the regime itself did not hesitate when it served its interest to 
stir up or exploit tensions between the Jordanians and Palestinians in the country.370 
Complicating an already difficult situation is the effect of Jordanian-Palestinian 
relations within the ongoing processes of economic and political liberalisation measures 
that have re-ignited tensions between the two communities. 
Each of these processes has led to the formulation of policies that affect the economic 
and political balance between the Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan. These changes 
in the internal communal sharing of power have a specific meaning insofar as this 
balance has gone someway in the past to forming each group’s identity, with Jordanians 
seeing themselves as being tied to the government and the Palestinians seeing 
themselves as outside the government. 
The accumulated effect of economic restructuring and political openings appears to 
have led the two communities in different directions: sensing a threat to their historical 
power position, Jordanians have delineated more clearly a narrative that has been 
referred to as one espousing ‘trans-Jordanian nationalism’. Many Palestinians in Jordan, 
on the other hand, witnessing an opening up of the political and economic system after 
disengagement and being more understanding of the king after the Gulf crises, have 
begun to feel that they have to take part in the Jordanian system. 
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The Jordanian kingdom has responded to the recent Arab spring protests with tentative 
monarchical reflexes, bringing the politics of identity and institutions of the government 
back into the public domain. Therefore, the public demonstrations have disclosed the 
fundamental issue: ‘The identity politics of who is Jordanian, and whom the state is 
therefore meant to serve’.371 Within this outline, the divergent preferences of Jordanians 
and Palestinian Jordanians have created two different elements of identity formation: on 
the one hand, Palestinian national identity is rooted in the struggle with Israel; on the 
other, the most important component of national identity construction is closely related 
to the state formation, the Hashemite kingdom for Jordanians.372 Unlike the protests 
organised to resist the peace treaty with Israel in 1994 and 1997, in the current 
demonstrations, it is this very basic notion of Jordanian national identity and 
preferences that has emphasised the role of native Jordanians in leading the public 
rallies today.373 
Whatever the outcome of the continuing tensions between Jordanian and Palestinian 
anxieties, the two groups are certainly going to continue talking and debating and will 
feature prominently in domestic politics as this current stage in the redefining of 
Jordanian national identity after 1988 continues to unfold. 
King Hussein was concerned about the possible impact of the emerging Palestinian 
entity on the relationship between Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan. On many 
occasions, the king warned that anyone tampering with Jordanian national unity would 
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be his ‘enemy until doomsday’. The king added that the Palestinians in Jordan enjoyed 
all rights of citizenship and would continue to do so unless they freely elected to leave 
for Palestine.374  
The king assured the PLO that Jordan’s own self-interest dictated support for the PLO. 
Jordan’s involvement with the Palestine issue was regarded as a twin-track approach – 
the political, historical and social bonds between the East and West Banks would make 
strategic ties essential to both nations once the Palestinians fully achieved their national 
aspirations. After 46 years in power, King Hussein died on February 7, 1999. 
Jordan’s involvement with the Palestine question has always been, and still remains, 
one of the most crucial aspects of its national identity narrative. Jordan was born out of 
the Palestinian struggle and has been tied to its fortunes and misfortunes from the 
beginning of the Arab-Israeli struggle for the Holy Land. Indeed, as the analysis in the 
chapter has demonstrated, the geographical factor has been conducive to the 
development of strong, social, commercial and administrative ties between Jordan and 
the West Bank.375 
In keeping with the discussion of Jordan and Palestine, and as this chapter has 
demonstrated, Black September and its aftermath had a very significant impact on the 
relationship between the two countries, ultimately leading to Jordan disengaging with 
Palestine in 1988. Within its frontiers, Jordan faced a conflict. Jordanian nationalism, 
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built, as it was, on Transjordanian identity, developed into a distinct identity as a 
reaction to Palestinian nationalism. In terms of their identity, this left Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin in a very precarious situation. The removal of the Palestinian 
liberation organisation was a necessity to ensure the longevity of Jordan; however, the 
subsequent Jordanisation of the government apparatus served to alienate Jordanians of 
Palestinian descent from the emerging Jordanian identity.376 
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Chapter Four: Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty and its effects on 
Jordanian identity 
 
Introduction 
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Jordan continued its traditional policy of 
maintaining discreet but tolerant relations with Israel, although the potential for 
increased problems was always present. Many Jordanians became particularly worried 
as some of Israel’s conservative politicians became increasingly enamoured with the 
slogan ‘Jordan is Palestine’. This slogan and the approach it represented suggested that 
Jordan could serve as an alternative Palestinian homeland, and that there was 
correspondingly no need for a Palestinian state created out of the Palestinian territories 
captured in 1967. An early advocate of the alternative homeland theory was Israeli 
General Ariel Sharon, who favoured allowing the PLO to overthrow throw King 
Hussein in 1970.377 Almost no other Israeli leader supported this idea at that time, but 
some later suggested that Jordan was the proper homeland for the Palestinians even if 
the Hashemites remained in power. The Jordanian leadership would have nothing to do 
with such ideas, which they viewed as designed to enable Israel to annex the West Bank 
while claiming that they were not depriving the Palestinians of a national existence. In 
practical terms, many Jordanians feared that the alternative homeland approach could 
lead to an Israeli effort to encourage Palestinian mass emigration to Jordan. In Jordan’s 
worst-case scenario, Israel could annex the West Bank and then expel huge numbers of 
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Palestinians into the kingdom, overwhelming Jordanian economic infrastructure and 
radically altering the kingdom’s demographic balance. This scenario did not occur, but 
the Jordanians remained worried. 
In July 1994, King Hussein and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin announced the 
Washington Declaration, whereby the leaders of the two countries declared an end to 
the formal state of war between their countries at a White H ouse ceremony in the 
presence of President Clinton. This declaration laid the groundwork for a peace treaty 
between the two countries, which was expected to be forthcoming in a matter of 
months. 	  
Jordanian and Israeli leaders signed a formal peace treaty on October 26 1994 at a 
ceremony in the Arava Valley, south of the Dead Sea, in an area which had formerly 
been a minefield. The treaty helped resolved a number of important, long-standing 
differences over key issues, including borders, water and the security of both nations. 
The Israelis returned 380 square kilometres of Jordanian territory that had been taken as 
Israeli farmland following the 1967 war. The Israelis also agreed to provide Jordan with 
water resources to compensate for water drilling in Jordanian land. The treaty further 
recognised that Jordan held a special and privileged position in protecting the Muslim 
holy sites in Jerusalem and that the border between the countries was explicitly defined. 
The Jordanians saw a number of advantages of making such an agreement beyond the 
specific details of the treaty on the functional issues noted here.378 
One key reason for seeking the treaty with Israel was to gain as much security as 
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possible in the face of any future right wing Israeli government unsympathetic to 
Jordanian interests. In 1994, Amman continued to be alarmed by the rhetoric of the 
various hard-line leaders that Jordan was an alternative homeland for the Palestinians. 
Israel political leader and later prime minister Ariel Sharon had continued to show 
interest in the ‘Jordan is Palestine’ concept and presumably had not fully given up on 
his belief that the Hashemite government needed to be overthrown to allow indigenous 
Palestinian institutions to develop a new Palestinian homeland. The establishment of a 
treaty with Israel created obligations on the part of both countries to respect the other’s 
sovereignty and institutions. Sharon for his part did not openly oppose the treaty in the 
Israeli Knesset, although he did abstain in the vote to ratify it. The final Knesset vote 
for the ratification of the treaty was 105 in favour, 6 against and 6 abstentions. King 
Hussein was particularly pleased with the result, which indicated peace with Jordan was 
broadly accepted by the Israeli leadership and not simply an agreement between Jordan 
and Israel’s Likud party under Prime Minister Rabin. 
The Jordanian leadership was also aware that the peace treaty received this sweeping 
Knesset endorsement at a period of deep political polarisation in Israel over the nature 
of Palestinian peace, when especially fierce invective was used in the debate between 
the Israeli hawks and doves over other issues. Even in this environment, the Jordanian 
peace treaty did not become politically divisive in Israel. The advantages of the peace 
treaty did not prevent it from becoming controversial within Jordan. Organised 
Islamists, including the Islamic Action Front, were particularly opposed to the treaty 
and the less well-organised leftists also found it objectionable. The oppositionists failed 
to block the treaty’s ratification in parliament due to intensive lobbying by the Palace. 
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The treaty correspondingly passed by a vote of 55 to 23 in the lower house in a vote by 
elected delegates.379  
The 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty is appreciated better when compared to the 
background of the existing Jordanian-Israeli treaty. The history of these interactions 
provides a useful perspective for understanding the course adopted in the recent 
Jordanian-Israeli peace-making process. In many critical respects, this is precisely what 
occurred with the Jordanian-Israeli treaty, which effectively broke with earlier patterns 
of unsuccessful Arab-Israeli negotiations. However, reverting to previous negative 
responses, such as doubting the motives of the other party, and differences in 
perceptions between the leaders has so far prevented the full expression of the rewards 
promised by the treaty’s architects.380 
Israel became the most important political actor in the Middle East, and it has always 
been Israeli policy to try to normalise Arab-Israeli relations through bilateral peace 
accords with its neighbours. Since the mandate period, Israeli leaders had fantasised 
about the economic potential of an open Middle East market.381 With regard to Jordan, 
Israeli economists had more recently speculated about the potential financial rewards of 
jointly developing commercial and tourist facilities at the Dead Sea, and at the twin 
cities of Eilat and Aqaba. A formal accord with Jordan was a necessary stepping stone 
along the path of mutual fiscal gain; however, beyond the economic advantages of 
peace, security-conscious Israel clearly appreciated that peace with Jordan would 
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constitute significant closure along its long eastern front. 
A formal agreement with King Hussein was acceptable policy across Israel’s highly 
fractionalised political spectrum, because peace with Jordan was a long-cherished goal, 
dating from the interrupted agreement with King Hussein’s grandfather, Abdullah 
(d.1951). After capturing the West Bank from Jordan in the 1967 War, many Israelis 
promoted the Jordanian option as a way to trade that territory for a separate peace, 
without the trauma of having to deal with the Palestinians or the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO). 
The popularity of the peace according to King Hussein reflected the traditional Israeli 
preference for dealing with non-Palestinian Arab state leaders and the long-standing 
predominance of Jordanian nationalists over Palestinian nationalists within the Israeli 
foreign-policy establishment. This was true despite the 1993 breakthrough of directing 
Israeli-PLO dealings embodied in the Oslo Accords, and even more so in light of 
subsequent crises in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Enthusiasm for the treaty with Jordan 
was also an expression of relief at having found a counterweight to, or insurance policy 
against, Yasser Arafat’s and the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s unproven ability 
to deliver the goods382. 
The king shared many of Israel’s motivations in finally concluding a formal peace, and 
his thinking had similarly evolved to the point where the question was not whether 
peace was possible, but when and on what specific terms. Concerned that a successful 
Israeli-PLO agreement would leave him sidelined, King Hussein was anxious to 
maintain Jordanian influence in the West Bank. His own declaration on 31 July 1988 
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had reduced Jordanian responsibility for West Bank Palestinian affairs. Any new PLO-
Israeli security or economic measures established would obviously have a huge impact 
on Jordan; however, King Hussein wanted to position Jordan to better shape 
developments to its advantage.383 
After Madrid, Israeli-Jordanian negotiations benefited from sustained, symmetrical, 
high-level interaction between the two sides, such as between Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin after making peace at Camp 
David in 1978. This compared with precedents set at the turn of the century, when both 
King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin commanded sufficient popularity and power at 
home to be able to make good on their promises. Rabin enjoyed a particularly strong 
position domestically. Even the right-wing opponents of his dealings with the PLO 
endorsed peace with Jordan, which was described by one observer as a ‘risk-free’ 
policy.384 
King Hussein’s peace agreement faced opposition from both Islamists and leftists, 
which were not insignificant elements within the Jordanian parliament, but the 1993 
electoral defeat of the Islamic Action Front by Hussein loyalists suggested that the king 
was correct in his estimation that he could expect parliamentary support for his treaty 
with Israel.385 In gauging the likelihood of support from the Jordanian population, 
Adnan Abu-Odeh distinguishes between Transjordanians (Jordanian nationals of 
Tranjordanian origin) and Palestinian-Jordanians (Palestinians who became Jordanian 
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nationals after the unity of the West and East Banks in 1950).386 
The triangular interaction between Jordan, Israel and the PLO contributed to the 
resurgence of Transjordanian nationalism in the 1970s. In the beginning, ascendant 
Transjordanian policies were represented as a reaction to the Palestinian threat to 
Transjordanian identity, and to the seemingly permanent occupation of Israel of the 
West Bank, ‘with its implications of more Palestinian emigration to the East Bank, 
more pressure on Jordan’s meagre resources, more demographic imbalance, and 
eventually the establishment in Jordan of a substitute Palestinian homeland’.387 
The Jordanian state, after signing the peace treaty with Israel, began to back the 
Tranjordanian national discourse, mainly for domestic political reasons. In 1997, 
Nahedh Hattar, an editor and journalist, and also one of the important influences of the 
modern Jordanian national movement explained the convictions, principles and goals of 
his movement:  
‘The Trans-Jordanian national identity is in opposition to the Zionist 
entity, since the former is an extension of the surrounding Arab entity that 
is in opposition to Israel … The continuing existence of the Zionist entity 
necessitates the negation of the Trans-Jordanian entity, because Israel is 
willing to expel Palestinians who will find a Jordan al -watan- al badil 
(the substitute Palestinian homeland) … Therefore the movement 
supports strongly the establishment of a Palestinian state with east 
Jerusalem as its capital’388 
It is apparent from this interview that Abu-Odeh is arguing that Transjordanian 
nationalists should maintain their exclusionary attitude by asserting that their chief 
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motivation is to preserve their Palestinian identity as the antithesis to Zionism, even 
though the official discourse continuously underlines Palestinians being a burden in 
Jordanian politics.389 However, Abu-Odeh suggested that the argument that the creation 
of a Palestinian state would constitute a security risk to both Israel and Jordan was 
misguided, and argued for the creation of a Palestinian state for the stabilisation of 
relations between Jordanians, Palestinians and Israelis.390 The most constructive prime 
minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin (d.1995), first recognised the Palestinians as a peace 
partner, but paid with his life to establish peace between Jordanians, Palestinians and 
Israelis, and bring Israeli politics into balance in favour of reconciliatory politics with 
the Palestinians.391 
Former Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’s role in the 1993-1994 agreements with 
Jordan, who acted with Prime Minister Rabin’s full authority, stands in sharp contrast to 
his abortive negotiations with the king around the London document of 1997 that was 
vetoed by the Prime Minister Shamir (d.2012) at that time. Despite a bitter decade of 
prolonged rivalry between them, Rabin and Shimon Peres joined forces after 1993 to 
present King Hussein of Jordan as a solid political partner, as he presented himself to 
them. 
The 1993-1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty benefited from direct and well-focused 
attention given by strong leaders in control of their governments, who were well served 
by their loyal aides. Success was also facilitated by the fact that the high-level officials 
entrusted with the ongoing negotiations between the periodic meetings by their political 
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bosses developed smooth and pleasant interpersonal relations. 
These findings have revealed that Israeli-Jordanian relations had been fraught for many 
years because Jordanian popular opinion was deeply suspicious of Israeli activity in the 
West Bank and particularly with regard to Palestinian harassment; however, there came 
a point when the political leadership in both states realised the mutual benefit of a peace 
agreement. Part of the Israeli agenda was to reclaim the West Bank as part of Eretz 
Israel, which would remove any recognition of Palestinian national identity and force 
Jordan to recognise that there would be no third state between it and Israel. The Israeli 
political establishment wanted Jordanian nationalism to encompass and subsume any 
vestige of Palestinian identity. The rationale here was that if Jordan was forced to 
accept the Palestinian inhabitants of historic Palestine, Israel would absolve itself of any 
new responsibility towards the Palestinians and forestall the establishment of any 
Palestinian state of the future. 
As far as Jordanian national identity was concerned, the insistence by Israel that it 
would take responsibility for all Palestinians there gave Israel a free hand, and was, in 
the long term, not acceptable. Although there was a period up to the disengagement of 
1988 when certain sectors of the Jordanian political class favoured the incorporation of 
the West Bank within Trans-Jordan, and thereby extend the borders of the state across 
the River Jordan and share a boundary with Israel, this plan did not have long-term 
feasibility.  
The opening section of this chapter demonstrated that Jordanian national identity from 
1950 to 1988 tried to co-opt Palestinians citizens within a Jordanian identity. During the 
1980s, Jordan was forced to recognise that there had to be a separate Palestinian 
existence. Following the intifada and the emergence of a more assertive younger 
generation that was disconnected from the PLO and more sympathetic to Palestinian 
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Islamism (Hamas and Islamic Jihad), King Hussein had to concede that not all 
Palestinians were part of the Jordanian national project. Therefore, although Jordanian 
national identity had attempted to incorporate Palestinian national expression, by 1988 
and the time of disengagement, Jordan had to accept that Palestinian nationalism was 
distinct from Jordanian nationalism. Since 1988 and the forestalled peace process, a 
number of Jordanians have called for the Jordan First option to be pursued at all costs, 
even if Palestinian interests had to be sacrificed. This chapter will continue to analyse 
the development of Jordanian nationalism after disengagement in 1988. 
 
I. Terms of agreement 
As both parties moved through the successive stages of the peace process, the terms of 
agreement expanded in both breadth and depth. The culmination of a four-part process 
that evolved over 24 months, the Jordanian-Israeli treaty ended the state of war between 
the two countries, and established a full and formal peace. It went on to outline quite 
specific and concrete steps in many areas. The treaty’s 30 articles and five annexes 
covered an extensive array of co-operative measures in various fields, such as border 
demarcations and crossings, water sharing, cultural and scientific exchanges, tourism, 
transportation, crime, economics and trade, aviation, environment, post and 
telecommunications, energy, health and agriculture.392 In addition, a peace treaty was 
signed between Israel and Jordan that promised to respect the territorial sovereignty of 
the two countries; for example, Israel was obliged to concede that Jordanian national 
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identity and nationalism were part of a transformed Middle East in which Israel was 
now secure in the knowledge that peace on its southern and eastern flanks with 
neighbours Egypt and Jordan was partially guaranteed.  
The peace treaty also implicitly recognised the existence of a Jordanian national state in 
the heart of the Middle East that came with recognition of its national identity, and, as 
the peace treaty was signed six years after disengagement, there was recognition on the 
Israeli establishment side that peace with Jordan did not mean peace with the 
Palestinians. However, contained within the terms of the treaty was also implicit 
recognition that Jordan no longer claimed the West Bank for itself, and that on West 
Bank land and that of the Gaza Strip, an independent Palestinian state would be forged. 
Therefore, the treaty recognised the existence of Jordanian nationalism along with 
Israeli nationalism, and since Jordan had relinquished control of the West Bank in 1988, 
it also indirectly recognised the existence of a third party between the two states. Just as 
Egypt secured its national interests with the Camp David Accord of 1979, so, around 20 
years later, did Jordan secure its national interests, considered by some to have been at 
the expense of the Palestinians, with its formal treaty with Israel in 1994. 
 
II. Identity in Jordan and the peace process 
Identity represented a crucial dimension in the treaty outcome. Among all the 
justifications for the treaty, the most significant achievement was seen as the guarantee 
of the existence of Jordan as an entity. The treaty defined Israel’s eastern border for the 
first time in history, and ended the discursive struggle in the international public sphere: 
Jordan is not Palestine. To explain further, the treaty offered a formal Israeli 
endorsement of the identity consensus secured between both the Jordanians and the 
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Palestinians after severing the ties that Jordan achieved with the West Bank in 1988 
with disengagement. The various responses to the term ‘Jordan is not Palestine’ are 
central to the re-conceptualisation of Jordanian identity.  
The Israeli threat served as the justification for the need to emphasise and develop 
Jordanian identity. A validation of state identity was formed based upon the perspective 
of Arab norms. From this perspective, the consolidation of the Jordanian identity helped 
the Palestinian cause by confirming a distinctive Palestinian identity, thereby forcing 
Israel to come to terms with the Palestinians, rather than continue to hope for a 
Jordanian intermediary. Prior to the Oslo Agreement, this ability to justify the public 
assertion of Jordanian identity in terms of Palestinian rather than Jordanian interests 
was significantly important. After the Oslo agreement, the justification of Jordanian 
identity in terms of Jordanian interests assumed an increasingly prominent place. In 
addition, Jordanian identity became an acceptable end in itself, and not merely a means 
towards advancing the Palestinian cause. The sentiment was: ‘Jordan has nothing to 
apologise for as a nation or as a nationalism’.393 
The change in conceptions of Jordan’s state identity and the implications for its 
preferences in the peace negotiations represent a significant dimension that is not 
identified by rationalist bargaining theory. The removal of the refugee issue from the 
Jordanian preferences depended upon the reconstruction of Jordanian identity. Firstly, 
Jordan’s identity changed with the severing of ties with the West Bank after 
disengagement in 1988. Secondly, Jordan’s preferences changed with the refugee issue 
being dropped, which made the final status outcome possible. Thirdly, this change in 
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preferences over outcomes in the West Bank defined Jordanian strategies in the 
bargaining, and made Jordan a different actor in many respects from the Jordan that 
discussed possible settlements with Israel in the 1970s and 1980s. Fourthly, Israel’s 
negotiations with the PLO, combined with the growing recognition that Jordan’s 
preference and identity had changed, led it to abandon the Jordan option as a viable 
final settlement. The recognition that Jordan is Jordan represented the achievement of a 
powerful and critically important acceptance in the international public sphere of this 
reality. This acceptance of Jordan’s identity allowed its interests to be legitimised and 
to be publically accepted. Finally, the centring of a Jordanian identity within a 
Jordanian public sphere made the articulation and justification of specific Jordanian 
interests more normatively defensible.394  
This analysis has demonstrated that in the years since the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty 
of 1994, Jordanian national identity has been streamlined to disengage the Palestinian 
element in  the recognition of Israel, allowing Jordan to be reinstated as a key player in 
the wider Middle East peace process, receive endorsement from the international 
community and be seen as a separate state within the Middle East state system, and 
finally to demonstrate to Jordanians that Jordan as a state was just as powerful as any 
other state promoting its national identity in the region. Since the peace treaty with 
Israel in 1994, Jordanian national identity has become more clearly demarcated, is more 
clearly expressive of Jordanian national interests and has evolved on a trajectory that is 
specifically Transjordanian, without reference to the Palestinian dimension of pre-1988 
Jordan. 
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III. Debates in Jordan over the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty 
As early as 1994, the government of Jordan began a media campaign to influence 
public opinion to support the impending agreement. The regime knew that it would be 
difficult to gain public support for ending nearly 50 years of hostility with Israel, 
especially in the absence of a comprehensive accord for Middle East peace. For this 
reason, King Hussein personally took the lead in promoting the treaty, and in contrast to 
most Jordanian government campaigns when the prime minister appeared as the main 
policy actor, King Hussein made it clear that the treaty was his personal ambition. Thus, 
any opposition to the treaty would be interpreted by the regime as opposition to the 
monarchy itself, and with the relevant consequences.395  
The campaign attempted to persuade Jordanians to support the peace treaty with two 
major arguments: the first one was that the regime and those who supported it presented 
the treaty as a strategic option for Jordan, where the country had little choice. The 
government argued that Jordan needed to join the peace camp, and King Hussein 
explained that in the past, many opportunities for peace with Israel had been missed. 
Government supporters in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Deputies 
recommended the treaty should be endorsed, as this was the ‘best’ accord the regime 
could have reached given what was ‘possible’ and ‘realistic’.396 
The second argument identified in the peace treaty was that Jordan, as an independent 
state, got all that it claimed back from Israel. In a statement to the lower house of 
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parliament, a government spokesman said that the treaty should quickly be ratified in 
order to ‘regain Jordanian rights in land and water, to protect the country from threats 
and conspiracy and to ascertain the Kingdom’s borders’.397 
The openness of the Jordanian public sphere became a public issue second only to the 
peace treaty itself. King Hussein and his government at the time regularly asserted the 
existence of a Jordanian national consensus for peace. The public sphere had not 
produced such a consensus, and the perceived need to maintain the appearance of one 
drove the repression of the public sphere. A major achievement of the democratic era 
had been to bind the public to a Jordanian identity through participation in an open 
Jordanian public sphere.  
‘Loyalty’ replaced ‘participation’ as the mechanism of proving belonging (intima) to 
the Jordanian identity. In sharp contrast to the principle of public sphere participation, 
the regime attempted to re-establish a norm of the inviolability of royal decisions: 
‘Because the king enjoys the confidence of his people, he doesn’t have to defend his 
right move to them … it is the right of the leader to act without needing to justify or 
interpret.’398 
During the peace negotiations with Israel, there was considerable public debate over its 
meaning for Jordanian identity and interests. King Hussein often emphasised that the 
opposition represented only a small minority of Jordanians, and that the vast majority of 
Jordanians supported his moves towards making peace with Israel. King Hussein 
floated the idea of a national referendum over any peace treaty in July 1994, but the 
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idea quietly faded away as the negotiations drew to a close, and the outcome of such a 
referendum seemed less certain than a vote in parliament, where an absolute pro-
government majority existed. Later, the opposition called again for a referendum on the 
peace treaty, but their calls were ignored. 
King Hussein and Prime Minister Majali each explained that because ‘the vast majority 
of Jordanians support the peace … there is no need for a referendum.’399  
The opposition framed its objections in terms of both interests and identity, and in terms 
of level of interests, the opposition made specific arguments about the text of the treaty 
and its implication for Jordanian security, water rights, economic development and 
sovereignty. At the level of identity, the opposition argued that the treaty with Israel 
would cause Jordan to lose its Arab and Islamic identity. Meanwhile, the government 
emphasised the Jordanian state interests achieved in the treaty, although the opposition 
denied the priority of these interests in relation to wider Arab interests and identity.  
The regime responded that the Jordanian negotiators had secured all of Jordan’s rights 
and interests. Firstly, it argued that the treaty had returned every centimetre of 
Jordanian occupied territories and some of its rights to water, while decisively ending 
the threat of Israeli expansion eastward. Secondly, the government of Jordan at that 
time emphasised the economic benefits of peace in order to deflect attention from the 
political concessions in the treaty, and relied heavily on the premise that the economic 
interest would supersede political ideology or concerns over identity.400  
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Focusing on the opposition criticism of the treaty specifically with reference to the loss 
of Jordanian standing in the wider Arab and Islamic worlds, the regime had to respond 
in a suitably robust and straightforward fashion. With reference to the loss of credibility 
in the Arab and Islamic setting, this had the potential to damage Jordanian national 
identity in regional and international spheres. In certain quarters of the Arab world, and 
particularly in Arab streets, any talk of peace with Israel given its mistreatment of 
Palestinians under its occupation was a recipe for disaster. Criticism of Jordan was 
primarily driven towards the assertion that Jordan left the Arab camp to serve the 
interest of the enemy occupying state. Arab solidarity had been compromised, and just 
as Sadat had been accused of being a traitor, so King Hussein now found himself in this 
dangerous firing line. For an Arab state to recognise and make a peace treaty with Israel 
without securing a written guarantee of Palestinian statehood was seen by many Arabs 
as a ‘stab in the back’. Jordanian national identity would now be highly compromised in 
the eyes of many Arabs, from Morocco to Iraq.  
With reference to the wider Islamic world from Africa to Asia, Jordan’s recognition of 
the existence of Israel was similarly seen as a breaking of the ranks of the Islamic 
brotherhood, for example, the Ummah. Jerusalem being the third holiest city in the 
Muslim world and Israel being in occupation of east Jerusalem since 1967 was a 
damaging blow to Jordanian national identity, although this criticism has been 
somewhat muted recently with the securing of Jordanian rights of maintenance and 
refurbishment of the haram al sharrif. Concurrent with this criticism of Jordan was the 
one directed at the state by the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the surrounding 
states. This criticism of Jordanian national identity was specifically made at King 
Hussein, who was of the noble Hashemite lineage and therefore a descendent of the 
prophet. This criticism levelled against Jordan from both the Arab and Islamic quarters 
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had potential to do real damage to the national identity of the country. The fact that 
Jordan had weathered this storm since 1994 and King Abdullah II had managed to steer 
the fortunes of the Hashemite kingdom in a sensible direction with tacit endorsement 
from the said quarters bodes well for Jordan’s continuing endeavour to chart a 
recognisable and respected national identity in the 21st century. 
 
IV. National identity and the peace process after the death of King Hussein 
In the aftermath of King Hussein’s death, the new king chose not to visit Israel for 
around 14 months while he adapted to his position as leader of the country. This initial 
reluctance to make a state visit was annoying to the Israelis, but King Abdullah might 
have been concerned about the danger of making a public and media worthy mistake so 
early in his administration. 
King Abdullah came to power in 1999 and continued King Hussein’s policy with regard 
to Israel and the peace process. The new, western educated and western oriented king 
said that his first priority was Jordan, and that he wanted to see a less corrupt, and more 
prosperous country. King Hussein’s attachment to Jerusalem soon disappeared from 
Jordanian priorities, and did not seem to be missed by Jordanians.401  
In September 2000, the Al Aqsa intifada broke out, and like the Arab and the Muslim 
worlds, the Jordanian public envisaged a fight against an Israeli attempt to destroy the 
logic of the Oslo peace process, which they understood as leading inexorably to a 
Palestinian state in all of the West Bank, with Jerusalem as its capital. If King Hussein 
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was alive to make some contribution to the disposition of the Haram al Sheriff, the 
intifada could have been avoided. Nevertheless, Jordan and King Abdullah were not 
consulted at the Camp David negotiations; nor were they involved in the outbreak of 
the second intifada.402 However, all Jordanians publicly adopted the cause of the 
Palestinians, and attitudes towards Israel that were already cool became icy. Israeli 
diplomats were attacked on the streets of Amman, which led to the withdrawal of 
diplomats’ families, and after the Jordanian Ambassador to Israel resigned, no 
successor was sent. Israel warned its citizens to avoid travelling to Jordan. 
Jordanian attitudes seemed to have reached the point that prescient observers feared 
even during the days of 1994-1996. The anti-normalisers had routed the normalisers 
from the field, although their leftist and Islamist baggage did not represent the views of 
most Jordanians. For them, working with Israel and consorting with Israelis was now 
seen as an anti-Islamic and anti-Arab act. The blacklist of those who were deemed to be 
collaborators and therefore traitors to the Palestinian cause, which had been in the 
process of compilation for years, was released and was made generally available. Many 
of those who appeared on it were solid and well-known Jordanian citizens. These were 
types of people typically opposed by the Islamists and leftists, and were western 
oriented. They were mostly from the Christian community in Jordan, and often strong 
supporters of the Jordanian monarchy.403 
In retrospect, the only way an Israeli-Jordanian peace could have succeeded was if an 
Israeli-Palestinian peace had also been signed. This was obvious to the Jordanians, but 
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much less so to the Israeli government. The East Bank Jordanian leadership, and 
especially the more nationalistic among the East Bank elite, also had hopes that 
Jordan’s specific national interest could make the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty work. 
The fight over normalisation in Jordan is in some respects a conflict that goes beyond 
the merits of dealing with Israel. On the side of the anti-normalizers are the Islamists 
who are seeking for a Jordanian and even a pan-Islamic state governed by Islamic law 
(sharia’a) plus assorted leftists and pan-Arabists. The other side is more complex, as 
much of the educated, westernised elite, especially of east Jordanian background, would 
prefer to have good economic, political and even cultural relations with Israel, but know 
that this is impossible without resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.  
 
The question now is whether the popular feeling against Israel will become so strong 
that the government in Jordan will have to acquiesce with overt support to break 
relations with Israel, and this is what most people in Jordan are asking for at the present 
time. Even then, security cooperation could very possibly continue, because the fact 
that the two governments share important geostrategic interests is unavoidable. If there 
is a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, there is little reason to believe that 
Jordan’s popular perception of Israel will not improve to some degree, and especially if 
Israel’s policy includes economic measures that are supportive of the weak Jordanian 
economy. This is what Jordan has been looking for since the 1994 peace treaty signing, 
and whether these measures can or will be undertaken by Israel remains to be seen. 
This analysis has demonstrated how the ongoing tense relations with Israel impact upon 
the future national trajectory of Jordan and its citizens. During times of tension, the 
peace agreement that Jordan signed in 1994 comes under greater scrutiny, and in some 
quarters, there are even calls for its revocation. It is in the long-term interests of Jordan 
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that concerted and steady progress is made towards a just and durable peace settlement. 
With the establishment of a Palestinian state, the political elite of Jordan could rest 
assured that Jordan would have a separate identity that is distinct from the Palestinian 
national identity. For Jordan to develop a cohesive, open and confident national identity 
in the future, it is imperative that the peace with Israel brings real dividends. There 
needs to be both economic prosperity and more liberalisation of the Jordanian political 
apparatus, especially in the wake of the tumultuous developments of the ‘Arab Spring’.  
The evolution of Jordanian national identity has always been tied in with the Palestinian 
question, resolution of which is partly dependent upon amicable relations with Israel, 
the regional ‘strong man’. Jordan cannot develop a clear and confident national identity 
until the Palestinian tragedy is resolved. Given the murky history of the relations of 
both Israel and Jordan, which one scholar has termed collusion across the Jordan, and 
given that up until 1988, Jordan insisted upon retaining control of the West Bank, this 
will not easily be erased from the Palestinian psyche. 
 
V. Peace with Israel and the future of Jordanian identity 
The purpose of this chapter was not to outline the contours of the peace agreement with 
Israel, but to analyse the key points that need to be discussed in order to secure a warm 
relationship. This section of the chapter will look at the prerequisites for a just and 
workable peace agreement and improving Jordanian-Israeli relations. 
There is agreement among top-level leadership figures in Jordan as to what needs to 
happen in order to find a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The establishment 
of a Palestinian country and a just resolution of the refugee problem are important 
requirements, without which attempts at normalisation will lack popular agreement and 
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involvement. What this means is that Jordanian leaders are of the belief that a warm 
peace with Israel is really dependent upon the latter’s actions, and no durable peace is 
possible unless Israel permits the establishment of a Palestinian state and a solution to 
the refugee crisis. 
There was agreement in the literature and research work undertaken that Jordanian 
economic requirements had to be met, and promises given in this regard had to be 
sustained and delivered. Before 1994, Jordan was led to believe that as a result of the 
peace agreement, Israel would help the people of Jordan to make the desert bloom as 
part of the peace agreement, and the US helped abolish Jordan’s foreign debt, which 
enhanced Jordan’s willingness to make the peace agreement with Israel. As the research 
has demonstrated, people in Jordan must see a positive impact on their living standards, 
and this positive impact has to be traceable to the peace agreement. 
Another point that became evident during the research was that the United States has to 
be more involved and more determined to have all parties sign up to obligations and to 
work in concert to tackle violence. In September 2003, the third year of the second 
intifada was celebrated, with demonstrations taking place across the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. However, the research shows that scholars and commentators believed the 
intifada to be weak and perhaps a lost cause. Recent research for this project has shown 
that the second intifada did not yield any real results apart from strong Israeli 
retribution.404 
The economic situation in the occupying territories is continually deteriorating because 
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of closures and curfews that restrict the people to their houses for many days at a time. 
The important point here is that while there is little support for more violence, there is 
equally very little support to see the violence subside overnight, and this is an opinion 
shared by the inhabitants of the refugee camps in Jordan. The mood of the people in 
Jordan and the occupied territories is that there is no viable alternative to confrontation 
because the end of violence would mark the end of any serious pressure on Israel to 
come to the negotiating table.405 
The findings of this research suggest that for Jordan to build a cohesive national 
identity, it is important for the Middle East peace process to stay on track, undeterred 
by violence, with strong international support, particularly in the area of monitoring 
peace, as well as strong economic support to give peace a monetary dimension. 
Members of the Jordanian political elite do believe that peace with Israel is possible; 
however, this is contingent upon a just resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. The 
research found that many Jordanians in middle level leadership positions, particularly 
those in universities and colleges in Jordan, maintained that it would be very difficult to 
make young Jordanians believe Israel could be a friend. Many of the younger 
generation in Jordan believe that Israel is the eternal enemy, and so would not become a 
partner in peace in the short term.     
The political middle level leadership in Jordan was found to be divided into an 
ideology-based opposition. This is the normalisation movement composed of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the socialists in Jordan. The other movement in Jordan is the 
nationalists. The members of the Muslim Brotherhood are not necessarily opposed to 
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peace and normalisation with Israel, but had one condition: that the state be for all its 
citizens and not be a specifically Jewish state. To many members of the Islamic 
opposition, any negotiations or deals over the Palestinian state are not justified, as the 
area between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean should be referred to as historical 
Palestine. As for the Jordanian nationalists, they are more pragmatic in their approach, 
since they see no harm in making peace with Israel and accepting its existence; 
however, they too believe there should be a Palestinian state for the refugees. As far as 
the title of this thesis is concerned, emotional ties to a pan-Arabic identification are at 
variance with those currents working towards a specifically Jordanian identity. 
 
VI. The evolution of identity in Jordan and relations with Israel 
The state of Jordan in the Middle East is a unique development. This is in relation to the 
formation of the country and the development of its specific identity, particularly in 
relation to where it is situated in the map of the region. As my research has 
demonstrated in the early chapters, Jordan was a somewhat artificial creation in the 
immediate post World War I period. This difficult territorial and population history 
gave rise to a very interesting social and political development: in place of a slow 
evolution of one overarching national identity, a number of collective identities came 
into being, sometimes building on one another, and sometimes developing in tandem.406 
Jordanian-Israeli relations present a harder case of state behaviour under conditions of 
high security and political pressures. It has been widely assumed that Jordan and Israel 
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share important strategic interests, which serve as the foundation of interstate 
cooperation. On the other hand, Israel has been the constitutive ‘other’ in Arabist 
discourse, and the long-standing covert but widely known Jordanian-Israeli relations 
comprised its avowed identity. The sharp contradiction between the demands of the 
identity (Israel as an enemy) and interest (Israel as necessary partner) has long been of 
central concern.407 Avi Shlaim advances a very interesting thesis in his book that there 
was secret collusion between the Zionist entity and the Hashemite monarchy across the 
river Jordan. The book, when published in 1988, created a controversy, both in the Arab 
world and among Israeli intellectuals. The thesis of the book has interesting 
implications for my identity study, namely that there may be a very intimate and close 
connection, a mutual interest you might say, between Israeli state formation and 
Jordanian identity formation.408 The peace treaty signed in 1994 forced direct 
engagement with these contradictions. While opposition to the treaty did refer to 
interests, a surprising amount of its public argumentations focused on Jordan’s Arab 
identity. Opponents argued that the formal treaty with Israel would cause Jordan to lose 
its Arab and Islamic identity. Whilst the Jordanian government explained the state 
interests achieved in the treaty, the opposition denied the priority of these interests in 
relation to wider Arab interests and identity. Israeli arguments that the Israeli deterrent 
would protect Jordan against threats from its Arab neighbours might have reflected 
private discussions with officials from the Jordanian army, but could not be usefully 
advanced in the Jordanian public sphere; the substitution of Israeli for Arab friends 
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could not be reconciled with the existing Jordanian identity discourse. 
The regime responded with a comprehensive frame linking Jordan’s interests to 
regional transformation, which would forestall a direct confrontation between the two 
incompatible identities. King Hussein tapped into a discourse of peace in which forces 
among both the Arab and extremists who challenged those on the Israeli side who 
wanted peace were challenged by more radical elements. The regime demonstrated the 
link between identity and interests by justifying the peace treaty with Israel on the basis 
of specifically Jordanian interests without reference to Arab or Palestinian interests.  
The government emphasised the return of Jordanian occupied territories and some of its 
rights to water, along with potential for economic gains through joint investments and 
trade. Overall, the official discourse held up the decisive response to the Israeli ‘Jordan 
is Palestine’ claim as the single most important achievement. As Fahd al Fanek, a 
Jordanian columnist, mentioned during an interview with Al Rai newspaper: ‘the 
fundamental benefit to peace is to confirm the Jordanian Identity.’409 The only interests 
invoked were Jordanian interests, defined to exclude all conceptions of Jordan included 
in either Palestinian or Arab identity. 
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VII. The future prospects for Jordanian-Israel relations and identity 
formation 
The leaders of both Jordan and Israel highlighted their intentions for a long peace 
between the countries when they signed the peace treaty in 1994. Both Tel Aviv and 
Amman hoped that normalisation of relations would bring a new peace to the Middle 
East. In Jordan, the monarchy tried to change people’s attitudes toward Israel. One 
could find in the mid and late 1990s indications that normalisation was beginning to 
win approval in the minds of many Jordanians. The peace treaty with Israel also 
involved the re-configuration of Jordanian identity, with a stress on Jordanian interests 
and a downplaying of the Arab identity.	  
The study has demonstrated that three factors were responsible for the failure for 
normalization. I) Israel acted to undermine the belief of the Jordanians in the possibility 
of a regional peace; II) The monarchy reversed the political liberalisation project to deal 
with the anti-normalisation opposition movement; III) The expected benefits of peace 
did not materialise.410 Ultimately, King Abdullah II inherited a situation where he was 
compelled to re-orientate the alliance with Israel towards a focus on better ties with the 
American government. Jordan’s identity when making the peace with Israel highlighted 
regional relations and its own state interests at the expense of pan-Arabism; however, 
with the loss of confidence in the treaty, Jordan’s identity resurrected its transnational 
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relations with the United States, with a greater dependency on the sole superpower 
emerging.411	  
The territorial and demographic tests of the Hashemite kingdom since its beginning in 
1921 as a lose framework have shaped the nature of the various collective Jordanian 
identities that have emerged. The most important factor the study has highlighted 
appears to be geographical rather than people related. The Jordanian idea of wataniya 
has prevailed as the dominant national ideology, even though the majority of the 
population are of Palestinian descent. For the foreseeable future, it is likely to remain 
this way, with acceptance amongst Palestinians of the political dominance of the 
Jordanians and Jordanians’ realisation that they must recognise the Palestinian majority 
and share with them mot only power but also the historical national identity of Jordan. 
In sum, my work is highlighting that efforts to ‘Jordanise’ Palestinians or ‘ Palestinise’ 
Jordanians have not succeeded. Since disengagement, the concept of a Jordanian 
national identity as a joint project of Transjordanian and Palestinian elements has won 
greater acceptance.	  
There has been a foreword amongst Jordanians and Palestinians in the country towards 
a positive identification with Jordanian national identity. As one noted scholar has 
highlighted, the answers to the questions of ‘who is a Jordanian?’ and ‘who is a 
Palestinian?’ may be different today from what they would have been before 
disengagement.412	  
Ironically, the failure of the peace treaty with Israel has brought the Palestinian and 
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Jordanian people together to chart a future in a more clearly defined Jordanian national 
identity that gives hope to both peoples and contributes to the delineation of a more 
inclusive and tolerant Jordanian future identity. The Israeli dimension in this discussion 
is key to recognising that a Jordanian identity cannot be divorced wholly from the 
Jewish state across the River Jordan.413 As this chapter has demonstrated, Jordan’s 
relationship with Israel is tortuous and dependent on a combination of factors: Jordan 
will have to work with Israel for its future stability, and it will also have to incorporate 
its Palestinian population more fully for it to chart a delicate and progressive future that 
outlines a strong and more deeply rooted Jordanian national identity.	  
 
Conclusion 
The chapter of the thesis has suggested a constructivist link between change, identity 
and the conducting of foreign policy. One is in a position to question the idea that 
identity is a product of ethnic, religious, cultural or state interests. In place of these 
traditional understandings, the experience of Jordan post disengagement demonstrates 
that struggles over identity in the national and international settings give birth to 
pockets of interests that key elements within the country then try to realise at all costs. 
Since 1988, Jordan’s identity has changed, particularly since it has concluded a difficult 
peace with Israel in 1994. All of these elements have led to very different 
understandings of Jordan’s identity and interests. The more vocal interpretations of the 
Arab dimension of Jordan’s identity constrained the ability of the monarchy to publicly 
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side with Israel. Even those Jordanians who would have benefited from peace publicly 
at least tried to demonstrate adherence to Jordan’s Arab identity. 	  
This chapter has also analysed Jordan’s relations with Israel from the beginning of its 
existence to the present day. It has shown how the relationship between the two states 
has demonstrated both cordiality and deep mistrust. The chapter focused on the peace 
agreement between the two countries in 1994 and has shown how despite promising a 
great deal, the treaty failed to deliver on peace and security. Jordanian national identity 
has had to evolve very carefully, while making subtle reference to its neighbour to the 
west. Jordan both defines itself with respect to  
Israel as being Arab, Islamic, native to the region, monarchical and tribal in a positive 
sense. It also looks to make similarities with Israel by styling itself as progressive, 
modern, advanced, democratic and liberal in its governance.  
In this context of struggle between the government and the opposition to establish a 
dominant public frame, popular opposition to the treaty was not foreordained or 
inherent in Palestinian communal identity, Islamic beliefs or Arab culture. Identity does 
not produce interests but rather forms the articulation of interests in public political 
struggles. Improved relations with Israel involved both strategic interests in state-to-
state co-operation and also fundamental challenges to the Arab dimension of Jordanian-
Arab identity. To conclude this paragraph, Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank 
in 1988 offers a very powerful argument for the very real relationship between 
Jordanian identity and geostrategic interests.	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Chapter Five: The Arab Spring and National Identity in Jordan 
 
This chapter will analyse the unfolding events of the Arab Spring and how it has 
impacted on Jordan. Particular attention will be paid to the crises unfolding in 
neighbouring Syria. With the region in turmoil and the Syrian refugee problem in 
Jordan, there has been a greater discussion of national identity in Jordan and, in some 
aspects, a greater emphasis on an exclusive Jordanian national identity. 
 
Introduction to the Arab Spring protest	  
In the spring of 2011, the Arab world witnessed the beginning of popular political 
upheaval. Starting in Tunisia, the protest movement in the Arab world spread region 
wide, with democratic movements subsequently gaining momentum in Egypt, followed 
by popular protests in Bahrain, Libya, Yemen and Syria. At its core, the Arab Spring is 
a popular rejection of the uncivil Arab state that represents the historically 
discontinuous and colonially imposed oppressive state apparatus in the Arab world. 
414This oppressive and externally imposed apparatus, initially constructed by the former 
colonial regimes, was subsequently inherited and refined by the post-colonial 
indigenous rulers, whether in the form of military rulers or traditional monarchies. By 
the 21st  century, the mass rejection of the uncivil state represented not only a struggle 
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for democracy, but also an attempt to construct an indigenous, authentic new politics 
that represent the popular will of the Middle Eastern people.415	  
The protestors forced the ousting of the most powerful and ruthless rulers of the region. 
Tunisian ruler Zain al Abedeen ben Ali was forced to leave his country and head into 
exile in Saudi Arabia in January 2011. The Egyptian president was also forced out of 
power by the Egyptian people with the help of the army in February 2012 and was 
sentenced to life in prison.416 Meanwhile, a rebellion against Libya’s ruler, Muammar al 
Gaddafi, accelerated into an armed conflict, eventually drawing in an intervention by 
Western forces, which were brought in to support the Libyan opposition on the 
purported basis of an international responsibility to protect innocent civilians.417 
Finally, Syria was locked into a brutal civil war in March 2011 between Bashar al 
Assad’s forces and the free Syrian army, where the spectre of sectarianism and regional 
proxy wars has taken hold.418	  
Aided by modern technologies, the Arab Spring movement subverted the tired 
repressive technologies of the ancient regimes of the Middle East. An area of the world 
that was previously a byword for political stagnation and autocratic rule was 
transformed in 2011-2012 into an intense battle for the future of the Middle East, 
bringing in participants representing liberals and leftists, Islamists and nationalists, 
                                                
415 Jacqueline S. Ismael and Shereen T. Ismael, The Arab Spring and the uncivil state, Arab Studies 
Quarterly, Vol 25, No 3, special issue: Perspectives on the Arab Uprising, summer 2013, p.229. 
416 Hamza Hendawi, Egypt’s Mubarak sentenced to life in prison, Associated Press, June 2nd, 
http://news.yahoo.com/egypts-mubarak-sentenced-life-prison-100619336.html Accessed on 15/11/2014. 
417 David Rieff, R2P RIP. NewYork Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html 
Accessed on 17/11/2014. 
418 Yasir Ghazi and Tim Arrango, Iraqi militants pour into Syria turning civil war into sectarian war. 
Minneapolis Star tribune, October 27 2012 edition, http://www.startribune.com/world/17611591.html, 
Accessed on 20/11/2014 
253 
 
along with elements of the contested regimes.419	  
As the above has explained the larger context of the Arab spring must not be forgotten 
when analysing the Jordanian case. The unfolding of the tumultuous events in countries 
surrounding Jordan accelerated demands for change in the country. Although the 
protests in Jordan were not as violent like those in Syria and Egypt, nevertheless, the 
monarchy was mindful of the potential for the protests to spiral out of control. King 
Abdullah had a difficult balancing act to follow, and in order to safeguard the monarchy 
and his interests, he emphasised Jordanian national identity and the future of a stable 
and prosperous Jordan dependant on grass roots support, with change coming from the 
bottom up, not violent and oppositional politics.	  
 
Section A: The Arab Spring	  
(i) An overview of the Arab Spring in Middle East politics 
The powers and belief systems that propelled the modern political narrative of the 
Middle East from 19th century changes in government and through much of the 20th 
century were largely irreligious and nation-state orientated.420 Religious politics was 
always there, but only in part, and often subservient, to the wider governmental subject 
area. It was divided into conservatives trying to maintain male-dominated and 
institutional freedoms, like many of the conservative religious scholars, and a more 
recent populist civil society, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Conflicting parties and 
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varied belief systems were nationalist orientated but of different colours, manifested at 
times as Westminster constitutionalism, as in the Wafd party and other movements in 
dynastic Egypt, or as nationalism and socialism in Nazi Germany-inspired parties 
during the interwar period in Iraq.421  
Palestine and Egypt, then, forcefully introduced communist, statist concepts in the pan-
Arab nationalisms of Nasser, the Ba’ath and the Algerian FLN, propelled by and allied 
to the Russians from the 1950s. These conceptual politics, especially Nasser’s Egypt, 
had very permanent populist social bases and sympathies throughout the near east and 
in connection to the ever-present Arab-Israeli conflict. The importance of Islam in 
politics came much later, from the 1970s onwards, partly following the failure and 
corruption of the populist military governments, the success of the 1979 Islamic 
revolution in Iran, the dismemberment of the USSR and the communist world, which 
had been part of the conceptual and military-inspired scenario. Within this political 
analysis, the secular dimension of contemporary social movements is not a revelation, 
but their distance from racist nationalism and state-oriented communism, in favour of 
common liberties, is a new departure. The next question that arises is what this entails 
for the immediate future of the Middle East.422 
It is significant that ‘democracy’ delineated in terms of elections, however transparent, 
contributes to the justification of this scenario. Elections move forward nativist and 
religious sectarian social bases and justify the sharing of political power and resources 
between corrupt politicians sitting over ministries which become resource centres for 
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groups and different networks of people. This is the effect of elections without civil 
society frameworks and legal mechanisms to check accountability and strengthen social 
and majoritarian party rule.423 
Iraq, of course, is a very particular and special case, owing its liberation to the 
‘American invasion’. The countries that are now experiencing the changes of the Arab 
Spring are different, as is the process of political change. The political arena and the 
opposition TV and radio stations in Egypt were never completely destroyed by the 
Mubarak government, and they have come to fruition after the revolution. The various 
parties that lead the call for change raised the words of liberty, freedom, reform, 
change, and social accountability, with very little or no reference to the concerns of the 
ethnic and Islamic politics that gave rise to previous opposition parties.424 
Yet the social bases and the institutional organisation for such participatory politics are 
basically not present, having been destroyed during the many years of authoritarian 
rule. It is important to note that the removal of Mubarak and his colleagues has not 
really transformed the government of Egypt, and the present military rulers, who have 
deep ties to the old ruler, are not about to hand over power to the elected representatives 
of the people. The religious parties and the city-wide bosses can mobilise votes and 
support, and a very early friendship is emerging between them and the military against 
the revolutionary forces that propelled the changes.  
The Muslim Brotherhood and the more fundamentalist Salafist movement gained a 
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majority victory in the January 2012 parliamentary elections. It is important to note that 
in the last round of the presidential elections in June 2012, the vote was equally split 
amongst many contenders: Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammad Shafeeq 
representing the old regime and the ‘deep state’. On the positive side, the more liberal 
and socialist candidates did rather well in the first round.425 
Syria is an even more difficult case in this respect: it is very difficult to see a scenario 
for political change if the government should fall. The movement for freedom in Syria 
started in the poor and marginal areas, most notably Dara’a, from a population that had 
reached the limits of disaffection from poverty and state suppression, enraged by a 
barbaric act of state violence and feeling weak and humiliated by the regional Assad 
government. This was soon taken up by the literate middle classes and the socially 
connected younger generation, with talk of liberty and social accountability, just like 
their compatriots in Egypt and elsewhere in the region.426 
The above-mentioned revolutionary changes in Iraq and Syria show that Jordan cannot 
remain unaffected by these changes for long; the problem for the regime is to second-
guess where these changes are to impact Jordan. For King Abdullah II and his 
government, given the changes that are happening in the neighbouring countries, the 
identity of Jordan needs to be both dynamic and cognisant of Arab Spring vocabulary, 
and, at the same time, pay heed to state conceptions of Jordan as a pillar of longevity in 
an otherwise tumultuous region.427 
The prerequisite for identity formation in Jordan is to second guess what happens in the 
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neighbouring countries: King Abdullah must concede to the opposition some legitimate 
demands, and yet he must also not encourage too much revolutionary change in case 
this backfires and initiates a movement that he subsequently cannot control.428 
(ii) A preliminary analysis of the Arab spring protests 
The Syrian conflict has incrementally entered into Jordanian political life to play a 
significant part in shaping opposition alliances and regime policies towards the popular 
opposition movement. Towards the end of 2010, Jordanian public sentiment was very 
feverish, and demonstrations against corruption and the cost of commodities, in 
particular petrol prices and basic staples such as imported flour, sugar and meat, were 
common. In addition to these issues that angered the public, the difficulties associated 
with efforts by Jordanian governments to open the Jordanian market indiscriminately to 
foreign and private investments were very apparent on the national stage, whereas 
before they had been more likely to be handled locally via the negotiations of family, 
tribal, social and political organisations.429 
As the above analysis has demonstrated, political disenfranchisement was not the only 
grievance for the protesters on the streets of the capital; there were socioeconomic 
factors at play also, chief amongst them being the rise of the cost of living and the 
hardship many middle and low middle class families faced. In this state of anxiety and 
flux, the regime was careful to defend itself by evoking ideas of national solidarity and 
the promotion of a strong national identity that would safeguard Jordanian interests at 
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home and abroad.  
iii) The Arab Spring opposition movement in Jordan 
The prevailing narratives are all in agreement that Jordan’s state and society can be 
characterised as being essentially tribal and divided between Palestinians and East 
Jordanians. Insider and outsider political viewpoints have been analysed based on this 
division. This analytical viewpoint of Jordan was formed in the early 1970s after the 
terrible events of black September. This approach does not provide any information 
about important differences regarding city, nomad or peasant loyalties, as it groups all 
these aspects under the aspect of tribalism. The current scholarly discourse that 
segments Jordanian society between its Palestinian part and its Jordanian part is itself 
employed by the Jordanian government to emphasise its right to rule and its ability to 
safeguard societal and regional peace. This is also a narrative used by some opposition 
voices in Eastern Jordan, either against the Hashemites as the ruling family, at the 
expense of other groups in the East Jordanian community, or against the monarchy as a 
political entity, at the expense of other political structures, such as a republic.430 
However, the protests that swelled up with the eruption of the Arab Spring indicated 
that there are parts of Jordanian society that are different from the prevailing discourse. 
My analysis has shown that there is a need to distinguish, on the one hand, the protests 
that originated in popular discontent at the Jordanian government’s record in 
safeguarding public affairs, in particular, corruption, high living costs and 
unemployment, and, on the other hand, official opposition groups that exploited the 
                                                
430 Hana Jaber, ‘Jordan: Protests, Opposition Politics and the Syrian Crisis’, The Arab Reform Initiative, 
July 2014, p.3. http://www.arab-reform.net/sites/default/files/20140725%20%20Jaber%20-
%20Jordan%20and%20the%20Syria%20crisis.pdf. Accessed on 17 September 2014. 
259 
 
ongoing discontent to push themselves forward onto the political stage. 
The Islamists were heading up the official opposition, represented by the Jordanian 
Muslim Brotherhood, which indirectly started from the Palestinian resistance 
movement. Despite martial law forbidding the formation of political parties for nearly 
40 years, the Muslim Brotherhood movement survived through this difficult time by 
changing itself into a charitable organisation, thus becoming an important player in the 
building of the Jordanian monarchical government. The appearance of the Islamic 
Action Front as an opposition movement in the post-disengagement period was no more 
than the open and public expression of this role and its manifold contradictions. 
There were also pan-Arab nationalist and socialist trends, or those with Nasserist, 
leftist, or populist leanings. The most important socialist parties are the Communist 
Party, the Jordanian Democratic People’s Party and the Democratic Popular Unity 
Party. Arab nationalist parties include the Socialist Ba’ath Party, the Arab Progressive 
Ba’ath Party and the Direct Democratic Nationalistic Movement. 
As my thesis has demonstrated, the number of registered parties increased so much 
between 2010 and 2014 that it became very difficult to monitor them with certainty, due 
partly to the parties’ disappearances, merges and name changes that have accompanied 
the changing public narrative in the country. My analysis shows that a rise in the 
number of parties provides a very clear indication for researchers that Jordan already 
enjoys a party democratic pluralism, unlike countries like Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and 
Syria, where the monopolisation of political power by authoritarian regimes is apparent. 
My examination of the rise in the number of political parties since 2010, and, in 
particular, since the start of the Arab Spring, leads to a number of observations. First 
and most importantly, there is an absence of a clearly defined political, social or even 
people-oriented agenda in most of the parties’ manifestos. Second, I found in my 
260 
 
fieldwork that there are very limited data that allow researchers to analyse the quantity 
and the quality of the members of these parties. 
The current opposition narrative of the Jordanian political scene before the start of the 
Arab Spring intrinsically connected domestic and regional goals, especially with regard 
to the Palestinian issue analysed in Chapter Three. This delayed both the political and 
economic plans for change in Jordan until after the goal of self-determination of the 
Palestinians could be realised. 
My analyses and conclusion to this section confirm that the Arab Spring has compelled 
the different Jordanian political opposition groups to work together within the purely 
Jordanian social and political reality, as distinct from the Palestinian issue. I think it 
was therefore a surprise that the Syrian civil war, as it became more complicated and 
had growing repercussions for neighbouring states, especially Jordan, would eventually 
lead to a polarisation that would halt Jordan’s internal reform movement, which had 
been praised despite the fact that the protests were entering their third year. All this has 
demonstrated that identity formation in Jordan continues to be in flux, and the civil 
wars raging in Syria and Iraq mean that Jordanians are increasingly apprehensive about 
events on the horizon and do not intend to alter their status quo radically. Identity in this 
respect has largely coalesced around the figure of King Abdullah II and the royal armed 
forces. People around the country are apprehensive and reluctant about a sudden and 
dramatic change in the future of the country. For the time being at least, Jordanian 
identity is secure and open, but cautiously guarded, and it has in recent years focused 
most evidently on its historical anchor of religion, king and nation. 
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iv) The effects of the Arab Spring in Jordan 
The Arab Spring, which began in January 2011, swept through Tunisia, Syria and 
Egypt, but did not affect Jordan. The system of government in Jordan was affected by 
the demands of the protestors, and the monarchy had to introduce some changes, albeit 
superficial, to appease the demands of the reformers. There is the very real danger that 
those sectors of Jordanian society that have depended on the monarchy may switch 
sides, feeling that siding with the monarchy will ultimately prove life-threatening.  
 The regime is dependent upon its traditional base of support on the East Bank of 
Jordan and cannot rely wholly on the basic support of the upwardly mobile Palestinian 
strata. The King can feel relatively ensconced with a sound base of support within the 
public sector; besides, the division of the electoral constituencies in Jordan has 
historically favoured support for the monarchy. On the other hand, the Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin suffer from marginalisation and exclusion from key positions in the 
state. And so they are sometimes treated unfairly. The memory of Black September 
dominates their view of the central authorities, which increases their sense of 
marginalisation. The issue of identity has been paramount for Jordan in the 21st century 
as the country moves forward to chart a new future under the young king. Key issues 
that concern the young generation in Jordan include how to reconcile the Jordanian 
identity with the pan-Arab identity. Jordan must look forward and construct an identity 
that is rooted in the tribal tradition, the monarchical position and, finally, in the 
Palestinian dimension. National identity is key to the security of Jordan. The people of 
Jordan must feel that their hopes and aspirations are catered for and an identity is 
carved that is not at odds with the region-wide demand for democratic liberalisation. 
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However, the traditional source of influence for middle-class Jordanians, represented by 
their relationship with the state, suffered damage due to the wave of privatisation and 
rampant corruption, as well as the concentration of resources in the hands of a new elite 
in the private sector enjoying special privileges and easy access to the royal palace. As 
a result, it was concluded by many East Bankers that the solution was the addressing of 
economic grievances that require political reforms, including constitutional and 
electoral reforms. This coincided with the Islamic movement itself making more 
realistic demands.  
The Islamic movement in Jordan, although led by the Muslim Brotherhood, has always 
chosen to operate within the system and not against it. The Brotherhood in Jordan is an 
organisation that works for incremental slow change, and it must not be confused with 
the more extreme expressions of political Islam associated with Syria and Iraq. Islam is 
a basic aspect of national identity in Jordan, and the country cannot disassociate itself 
from its Islamic moorings. The King and the governing apparatus cannot afford to 
sideline the expressions of political Islam making headline news. In order to diffuse the 
momentum of the Islamic opposition, the King must co-opt the moderate elements in 
the Brotherhood.431 
While it was relatively easy in the past to take advantage of the monarchy divisions 
separating East Bankers from Palestinian Jordanians, it has become difficult for the 
system to contain the protests by dividing the protesters, as it gave rise to alliances of 
transient groups around specific demands for political reform, which challenges the 
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dominance of practices based on identity politics. Although most of the East Bankers 
and Jordanian Palestinians are not united in their anger, the renewed anger of both sides 
could mark the beginning of what is the greatest threat to monarchical stability in 
Jordan. The Palestinians of Jordanian descent have historically demanded a more open 
and freer governance. They have been less inclined to a monarchical system of 
governance and more demanding of change in the government style. In contrast, the 
East Bank population has favoured more stable and lasting relations with the monarchy, 
which has historically been the bedrock of Jordanian political stability. The regime has 
been dependent upon the population of the East Bank, and the identity formation has 
therefore been closely representative of East Jordanian interests.432 
Up until recently, the way in which the system responded was always historically 
receptive to the demands of its key support base, and the King has overseen 
amendments and changes in the law in this respect. The ministerial committee, which 
has been mandated to explore potential reforms, is charged with a critical mission at a 
time when the authorities are seeking to exacerbate the hostility between the two 
communities of the Palestinians and the East Bankers. It can be argued that this 
combination of tactics has been successful so far, as the protests have failed to reach the 
stage of critical mass demonstrations along the lines of some of the other revolutions of 
the Arab Spring, as they are merely modest alternatives to address the causes of anger. 
The king is trying his best in a very difficult situation to appease opposition elements 
that are overly critical of the regime. He is walking a tightrope, where he has to appease 
                                                
432 Lamis al Muhtaseb, ‘Jordan’s East Banker-Palestinian Schism, Norwegian Peace Building Resource 
Centre Journal, pp.1-4, 
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/746892aacedd3e8fcb1ff7370a7
7fb67.pdf Accessed on 15/1/2015. 
264 
 
overly critical opposition; the King also has to be mindful of the Arab Spring raging 
around his country. The coming years are set to be very critical for the regime: it must 
espouse and formulate a key policy initiative that is based on the identity formation and 
the incorporation of competing demands. Jordan needs an identity that is rooted in its 
indigenous traditions but that is also accepting of a changing Middle East and 
acknowledges tensions and struggles as emergent democracies fight to take root. 
It would be wise to postpone the elections, especially amid mounting pressure to 
dissolve parliament after the hearing on the issue of the casino and the recently started 
process of privatisation of the phosphate mines persuaded many that the current 
parliament is not serious in eradicating corruption. The recent arrest of activists and 
peaceful advocates of reform shows that the government still considers the protest 
movement primarily as a security threat. This, as well as the lack of accountability of 
those responsible for a series of attacks against demonstrators since the beginning of 
2011, shows that Jordan still has a long way to go to safeguard political and civil 
liberties, which are indispensable in any genuine political reform process.433 
A long-term plan for Jordan requires a serious addressing of issues that various 
members of the Jordanian population are unhappy about. But patience is key, and the 
government must respond at a measured pace and implement real reforms. The 
government must make credible reforms in the electoral system and provide a more 
equitable representation of the urban centres, as well as pay more attention to the 
particular needs of the social and economic development of rural areas.  
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There are also other steps that will make a difference, such as limiting the powers of the 
State Security Court, ensuring accountability for corruption and human rights 
violations, giving real powers to the parliament, establishing an elected Council of 
Elders, and abolishing or at least reducing the role of unelected bodies. These demands 
are being put forward by a younger electorate that wants to see a more open, liberal and 
democratic future for Jordan that facilitates the formation of a healthy, robust and 
dynamic new identity for the country. These are the issues that concern the younger 
educated strata of Jordanian society, who are upwardly mobile, more world-conscious 
and linked through social media. The king should modify his rhetoric and style of 
leadership to accommodate this new dynamic identity for Jordan. Young Jordanians are 
witnessing the Arab Spring and want the benefits of the Arab Spring without the 
drawbacks: this means they want political liberalisation, economic reform, freedom of 
the press and more social equity; however, they do not want the internecine social 
discord and civil unrest that has marred Syria, Egypt and Libya. 
The king still retains some of the trump cards in his hand: the fear of destabilising the 
popular image of the monarchy, the political and material support Jordan receives from 
the United States and the Gulf states and the permanent divisions within the opposition. 
However, it is foolhardy to believe that there is no danger or that the prospect of radical 
change and strikes that lurks in the background will not sooner or later affect Jordan. 
The system will have to learn from the lessons of others or face a similar fate.  
The preceding section has demonstrated the importance of incremental change, and of 
the king opening up the country to more progressive ideas. Jordan is in a critical 
situation: it has thus far weathered the storm of the Arab Spring; however, it cannot 
remain immune to the demands of younger protestors impatient for change. Identity 
formation is key to Jordan’s stability in the 21st century. The monarchy must play a 
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positive role in helping to form an open identity for Jordan in this century. Jordanian 
identity has undergone critical checks and balances: the role of the monarchy, the role 
of the tribes and the role of the Palestinian population are all key to positive identity 
formation. Jordan will be tested severely if the war in Syria continues to rage, and there 
is no end in sight. The king’s balancing act means he needs to maintain stability with 
the help of the United States and the Gulf states, and he must appease the demands of 
those asking for greater reform.434  
(v) The context of the Arab Spring protests in Jordan 
Jordan sits at the centre of a volatile regional environment, and over the years it has had 
to face the grave consequences of unending regional instability as well as the influx of 
Palestinian refugees into the Hashemite kingdom. These challenges remain the hallmark 
of political life in Jordan today, and have a profound impact on the evolving identity of 
the people of the country. To survive these challenges, the monarch has had to balance 
carefully domestic and foreign policy goals. Over the decades, the regime in Jordan has 
shrewdly exploited the country’s geo-strategic location to secure an influx of foreign 
aid that has helped to create a kind of semi-rentier system similar to the one in 
operation in the Gulf region.435 
For years this has helped Jordan to compensate for the lack of a strong indigenous 
economy. It has also shaped state-society relations in a way that allowed the monarch to 
overcome economic as well as political challenges by emasculating ‘institutionalised 
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opposition to its rule and relying on the distribution of benefits and privileges to create 
a cohesive support base and a security establishment loyal to the existing political 
order’.436 These developments have confounded identity formation in Jordan, with 
some people supporting the status quo and the monarchy, and others seeing in the 
recent changes in the Arab world an opportunity to re-orientate Jordan in a politically 
more progressive direction. 
When Jordanians took to the streets of several cities in the spring of 1989 to protest 
against the government decision to raise the prices of several commodities, the late 
King Hussein responded to the mini-uprising by opening up the political system and 
allowing the fairest parliamentary election in the modern history of Jordan to take 
place. Opposition and international observers alike hailed the milestone elections of 
November 1989. These elections, however, would be an isolated episode in Jordan’s 
quest for democracy.437 
Despite the optimism surrounding the elections of 1989, Jordan has failed to develop a 
democratic system based on the rotation of power. These developments have reignited 
heated debates on Jordan’s future and, as a corollary, what it means to be Jordanian in 
the 21st century: whether it entails being more in tune with the native tribal traditions 
and having sympathy for the monarchy and the ruling dynasty, or whether a more 
progressive identity is constructed by a younger population that is inclusive of 
Jordanian and Palestinian differences. 
The state-society harmony during that period could not have been more striking. All 
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internal political indicators suggested that Jordan was on the right track. The political 
reform process continued and brought some positive progress. Above and beyond all 
expectations, King Hussein reached a historic reconciliation with those who wanted his 
regime to fail. The national charter of 1991 outlined a new framework for political 
participation in the Hashemite kingdom, giving the King a legitimacy that he never had 
before. He suspended the martial law that had been in place since 1957, thus permitting 
the opposition to take part in political life. For the first time in decades, the Islamic 
opposition in Jordan agreed to take part in the government.438 This was a significant 
step, partly because it demonstrated to the Islamist opposition that there was room for a 
religion-based understanding in national identity and a co-option of the Brotherhood in 
the national political discourse. 
The number one priority for King Hussein at that time was to break from the 
disheartening cycle of regional and international isolation. The opportunity arose in the 
1991 Madrid Peace Conference, and the peace process was key to his survival. He 
entered into the process forcefully despite some domestic opposition. When it looked as 
if Jordan was about to reach an agreement with Israel, the King re-orchestrated the 
domestic political scene to obtain the support he needed to reach an agreement with 
Israel in 1993. The agreement with Israel as analysed in Chapter Four was key to 
Jordan securing peace on its western border and aligning it on internal matters to 
address domestic grievances. This took the public’s attention away from Israel, 
concentrating it on internal identity issues. Jordan was no longer identified with an anti-
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Israeli narrative. This development opened up new scenarios as to what being Jordanian 
meant in a positive role, as opposed to a negative definition. 
The government changed the electoral law and restructured electoral districts to deprive 
the opposition of a strong voting block that could limit the king’s room for manoeuvre 
in dealing with Israel. The king later dissolved parliament and called for early elections. 
Therefore, the government of Jordan turned its back on reform and resorted to a new 
electoral law that would guarantee a parliament that would approve whatever deal the 
king would strike with Israel. Reform was put on the back burner, and as of that 
moment power was centralised in the hands of a few.439   
Centralisation and the silencing of the opposition, particularly with regard to matters 
concerning the Palestinian cause, always arouse strong emotions. The king, wary of 
criticism of the peace treaty, sold it to the Jordanian people by emphasising that it 
would bring manifold dividends to Jordan and would allow the monarchy to devote its 
energies to the building and advancement of the country. The ultimate goal in this 
scenario was to sell to the Jordanian people the idea of a country that would be less 
worried about the idea of conflict and more concerned about building prosperity and 
creating a new Jordan for the coming generations. This tied in with the monarchy’s 
effort to sell the policy of ‘Jordan first’ and to delineate a sharp sense of Jordanian 
identity where the interest of the country was the priority. 
Upon his accession to the throne, King Abdullah promoted an image of himself as a 
reformer. He introduced a number of initiatives such as Jordan First and the national 
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agenda and a sweeping vision of socioeconomic transformation. However, the first 
phase  of the 21st century was the worst in terms of reforms. Parliament was suspended 
for no reason for more than two years, between 2001 and 2003. Implicit in the action 
was a condescending attitude on the part of the ruling elite towards the ability of people 
to elect representatives who could live up to the vision of the King. There was a naive 
assumption on the part of some political analysts that Jordan needed a quick pace of 
reform, and parliament was only impeding this process. They argued for reform from 
above, to use the parlance of political scientists.440 Political reform from above was 
seen to be more direct and sure to pass the test of time, as opposed to reform from 
below. Throughout the modern history of Jordan, all reform programmes have been 
initiated by the monarchy in response to changing circumstances on the ground. 
National identity projects have also invariably been led by the monarchy and central 
government, the intention being to create a cohesive and clear Jordanian identity despite 
the presence of centrifugal factors. 
It was at this juncture that power was centralised in the hands of a few politicians – 
many of whom were accused of being corrupt – who initiated privatisation in a very 
irresponsible way. Without effective monitoring bodies, corruption reached a new high 
in the history of Jordan: it seems as if the state was incapable of reversing this 
deteriorating trend. Against this backdrop, people felt they had no option but to resort to 
the street and express their dissatisfaction and bitterness about the economic and 
political situations.441 Street protests led directly to the Arab Spring phenomenon and 
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the corresponding call for change and reform, as well as the charting of a national 
identity that was seen to be more progressive, liberal and democratic. 
It is certain that Jordan faces severe political and economic difficulties that mirror the 
grievances that motivated mass uprisings elsewhere in the region. However, the chances 
of regime change in Jordan are slim. While ensuring long-term stability requires Jordan 
to find solutions to its difficult political and economic problems, the country’s 
underlying political and social configuration is likely to remain unchanged for the 
foreseeable future. Therefore, identity formation will continue to be a key concern of 
the rulers and the ruled alike. Jordan will have to be cognisant of the changes in the 
neighbouring Arab countries. National identity in Jordan is a thorny subject because the 
country is in a volatile region and the leaders will want it to remain immune from the 
revolutionary changes surrounding it. Jordan will need to construct a very robust and 
clear identity that distinguishes it from the Palestinian and Syrian narratives. 
 
Section B: The protests in Jordan	  
(i) Arab Spring protests in Jordan	  
Following the events throughout the Middle East, Jordanians took to the streets in 2011 
to protest against the rise in the cost of living in Jordan, that is, the rise of the cost of 
food, fuel and other commodities. The moderately small size of the protests 
contradicted their importance, in that this period they were dominated by segments of 
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the regime’s historical support base, East Bank Jordanians.442 Over time, these protests 
evolved to include a wide spectrum of the population, including citizens of Palestinian 
origin, Islamists and unaffiliated youths. 
While each of these communities expressed specific criticisms and demands, the protest 
movements’ overall ambition set around the call to end political and economic 
corruption. At its core, the discontent expressed a lack of public confidence in politics 
and governance more than a decade after King Abdullah II’s 1999 accession to the 
throne. Despite continuous talk of political reform sustained by successive public-
relations campaigns, decision-making continues to lack both transparency and 
accountability, remaining concentrated in the royal palace. The prospects for ordinary 
citizens, whether of East Banker or Palestinian origin, to participate in politics, remain 
scarce; their elected representatives in parliament have little influence. Accordingly, 
protesters stressed the need for greater balance of power, increased political 
participation and effective government accountability. The tone and main objective of 
Jordan’s Arab Spring protests so far have been to reform, not overthrow, the regime. In 
other words the protests were aimed at the government not the Jordanian monarch, to 
whom they were loyal.443	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The common concerns uniting the demonstrators masked fundamental differences 
among them. The principal fault line separates East Bankers from Palestinian-
Jordanians. These two communities’ historically fraught relationship and often 
disconnected realities have stymied the protest movement and stand in the way of 
establishing a more coherent opposition. Unsurprisingly, reform-adverse elements 
within the regime have sought to exploit these differences.  
While East Bankers form the historical pillar of the Hashemite monarchy, Palestinians 
began arriving en masse to the country only two years after the kingdom was 
established in 1946.444 The political integration of these refugees, most of whom were 
granted citizenship after Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950, was reversed after the 
1970-1971 ‘Black September’ civil war that pitted the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) against the monarchy. Over time, Palestinian refugee camps 
increasingly fell under the sway of the Muslim Brotherhood, which the authorities 
supported at the time even as they simultaneously repressed nationalist Palestinian 
groups, such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian 
Communist Party and Fatah.445 
Palestinian-Jordanians have been locked out from both the public sector and security 
apparatus since Black September; they also have suffered at the hands of an electoral 
law based on gerrymandered districts that privilege rural East Banker areas at the 
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expense of Palestinian-dominated urban centres.446 
In reaction, the Palestinian-Jordanian elite has invested heavily in the private sector, in 
which it eventually came to play a leading role. Most refugees moved out of the camps 
and into the Amman-Zarqa-Irbid municipality that attracted most infrastructure and 
industrial development.447 In contrast, rural East Banker strongholds suffered from the 
near collapse of the agricultural sector and the curtailing of public spending from the 
1990s onwards.448  
Socioeconomic differences between the two communities fuelled a ‘nationalist’ East 
Banker discourse in which Palestinian-Jordanians figured alternatively as greedy 
capitalists or treacherous Islamists, disloyal and unpatriotic. This has undermined the 
protest movement and provided opportunities for the regime to exacerbate communal 
tensions. While the effort has met with some success, not all East Bankers subscribe to 
such negative views of Palestinian-Jordanians; some pro-reform activists believe that 
the communities have suffered equally from mounting corruption and political 
stagnation and are seeking to bridge communal divides by offering detailed proposals 
for political reform that include a new electoral law benefitting East Bankers and 
Jordanians of Palestinian descent alike.449 
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Quite evidently the strange relations between East Bankers and Jordanians of 
Palestinian descent was a dynamic in the opposition movement in the monarchy. These 
strains and tensions were exploited by the government to lessen the impact of the 
opposition movement. However, these disagreements could also be counterproductive 
for the future stability of Jordan, and in order to forestall any such outcome, the 
monarchy was careful to emphasise national unity and national identity as a precursory 
defensive measure. Therefore, national identity served multiple purposes: it was utilised 
by the opposition to demand change in the interest of the Jordanian people and it was 
also harnessed by the government to show that national identity and national self-
preservation was the primary objective of King Abdullah II and his government.	  
One of the most obvious problems that upset the status quo and led to widespread 
discontent was the issue of the nomads. When the regime took control of large areas of 
farmland from the al-Hajayah tribes in the south of the country east of the Hijaz border, 
they registered the lands in the name of the royal family as a token gesture. The lands 
were then distributed to overseas companies to turn into phosphate mines, from which 
the shares that they took out would reach tremendously high prices. 
This matter led to a changed political dialogue from deep inside Jordanian society, 
including those who are familiar with the losses and gains from dealing with the royal 
court publicity demanding a share in political decision-making.450 
ii) The protest movement in contemporary Jordan: The case of the Hirak  
The Hirak movement received little of the media coverage that was saturated by the 
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larger protests in Amman during 2011-2012. In the spirit of the Arab uprisings, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamic Action front (IAF) party, secular leftist parties, 
professional syndicates and youth groups held weekly demonstrations calling for 
democratic reforms, some drawing thousands of marchers. Significantly, these protests 
brought new coalitions of reformists that overcame long-standing divisions, such as the 
Islamic/secular division.451 The vanguard of these rallies, the Brotherhood and 
professional syndicates, had dominated the opposition landscape since the early 1990s, 
when the end of martial law under King Hussein facilitated a renaissance in the civil 
service.452  
Though they drew the attention of western analysts looking for revolutionary drama, 
this groundswell of urban protests did not pose a credible threat to the regime. For one, 
security officials understood well how to undermine mass mobilisation in Amman 
through non-violent means, such as using bureaucratic restrictions and associational 
laws to limit the size of demonstrations.453 Furthermore, these demonstrations were 
more stage-managed exercises than spontaneous revolts, complete with fixed marching 
routes, pre-distributed slogans, frequent utterances of loyalties to the throne and cordial 
relations with the police, many of whom infamously provided water bottles to thirsty 
protestors. These scripted rituals had long characterised the protest culture of Amman, 
and in that sense did not break new ground.454 
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The protest movement in Jordan can be subdivided into three categories. The first 
category is made up of small groups of autonomous activists not connected to the old 
political parties, and frequently highlighted by a socialist leaning political direction. 
The second category is made up of numerous socialist and nationalist political groups, 
while the last and the most numerous are the Islamic revivalist connected with the 
Muslim brotherhood movement in Jordan, as mentioned above. 
The role of the independent political actors both in the working class protests and in 
protests groups demanding democratic change are fascinating. This significantly is the 
case given Jordan’s historical context, where, for many years, any political action was 
very severely curtailed and outlawed by military rule. As a consequence, being 
politically motivated often resulted in participating in underground activities and was 
very dangerous for the youth groups. In addition to this, those involved in legal politics 
were beholden to traditional master-servant relation patterns, necessitating money and 
resources to keep on track.455 
(iii) Jordan’s segmented and appeased opposition 
At present, the factionalised nature of Jordan’s political opposition is unlikely to 
threaten the regime’s supremacy. The challenges of the 2012-2014 period have come 
from disparate groups that generally share similar grievances but are nonetheless 
distinct in their identities, bases of support and aims. This has made it difficult to give 
the reform movement coherence or a common leadership456. In terms of national 
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identity, it has meant that the opposition has not been able to capitalise on this unsteady 
and precarious position because the opposition parties have not been successful in the 
political realm, and they have been largely unable to lead the debate on national 
identity. Instead, the prime mover and most forceful exponents of Jordanian national 
identity have been the government and the monarchy, which has always sought to 
monopolise the construction of national identity in the country. 
For example, support for the Islamist movement – led largely by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) – comes principally 
from Palestinians in the urban centres of Amman and Irbid. Islamist demands have 
focused on political reform. These include a new electoral system that provides greater 
representation for urban areas, an elected government, including parliamentary 
selection of the prime minister, a strengthening of ties with the Palestinian territories, 
and a reduction of the internal security forces’ political influence. The Islamist 
opposition, being heavily represented in the Palestinian urban areas, has sought to 
articulate a national identity that is more inclusive of Islamist and Palestinian 
discourses. What this has meant in real terms is that, given the growth of the Palestinian 
population over the preceding decades and the rise of political Islam in the Arab world 
since the 1970s, the formulation of national identity in the post-disengagement period 
has had to make greater reference to the concepts of ‘Palestinian-ness’ and ‘Islamism’. 
The Hirak (a youth movement that includes members of the November 14 opposition 
party), by contrast, is a highly decentralised movement spread across Jordanian towns 
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and villages. Its origins lie in the dissatisfaction among East Bank Jordanians with 
predominantly socioeconomic issues, though it has broadened somewhat beyond these 
concerns over time. Hirak supporters are particularly frustrated by the lack of 
development efforts outside of Amman, and the neoliberal economic policies under 
King Abdullah that undermine the traditional patronage system of resource distribution. 
Hirak supporters want a rebalancing of the Jordanian socioeconomic system and greater 
attention paid to the needs of the East Bank youth and development projects outside of 
the urban centres. The Hirak group would like national identity to be less centralised, 
more inclusive of tribal and East Bank traditions and more mindful of the historic 
socioeconomic patronage system than the present neoliberal stance of the monarchy is. 
The local committees of the Hirak movement are diverse in membership and 
orientation. What unites this group, however, is its tribal, Transjordanian roots and that 
those involved come from what has long been the monarchy’s traditional base of 
support. They lament the perceived disregard for the kingdom’s tribal foundations, and 
the more nationalist elements of the Hirak are at sharp variance with the Islamists and 
leftist groups on Jordan’s relationship with Palestine by advocating various levels of 
disengagement. They are similarly wary of what they consider to be the growing 
economic influence of Jordan’s Palestinian population and would hesitate to advocate 
drastic political reform that might grant that group greater political power. The recent 
dissatisfaction of the Hirak youth has meant the monarchy and the authorities have had 
to rebalance and recalibrate the national identity narrative. More heed now needs to be 
paid to the aspirations and desires of those from the East Bank who wish to build on 
disengagement, pronounce a more nationalist agenda and limit the rising influence of 
the Palestinian middle class. If the East Bankers had their way, Jordanian national 
identity would be firmly rooted in the monarchical and tribalist traditions of the 
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country, and it would therefore be less accepting of Palestinian and socialist agendas. 
Trade unions, professional associations and leftist groups similarly contribute to the 
demand for reform. For example, journalists from newspapers, broadcast media and 
online media have mobilised in opposition to state interference of the press. Topping 
their list of grievances is a new press and publications law that extends restrictions and 
registration requirements for Jordan-based online news sites. Public teachers have 
likewise been emboldened, ultimately unionising, mobilising for higher wages, and 
striking temporarily against increases in fuel prices in November 2012. All of  this 
activity means matters in Jordan are in flux presently; the future seems uncertain, and 
the hopes and expectations resting on King Abdullah II sadly have not materialised 
despite the king’s best endeavours. The monarchy is much more in tune with the desires 
and aspirations of a growing population that is politically astute. The situation in Jordan 
will need to satisfy multiple demands as demonstrated above: there is a socially mobile, 
literate, petty bourgeoisie that is tired of political disfranchisement and wants a greater 
say in the national fortunes of the country. As for national identity, this is in a constant 
state of flux, and the younger generation wants to chart a future and an identity that is 
seen to be progressive and respectful of Jordan. 
While this framework paints only a basic picture of the complex political field in 
Jordan, the challenges facing a sustained campaign of mass mobilisation are clear. The 
differences in the opposition groups’ identities and political goals are divisions that 
reinforce one another. Without a unifying call to topple the monarchy, it is more 
appropriate to think of multiple oppositions instead of a single, unified movement 
against the regime. 
Furthermore, the monarchy has taken advantage of these divisions in its long-employed 
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divide-and-rule strategy. Increasing public sector wages, permitting teachers to unionise 
and promising development funds for areas outside of the capital are some of the ways 
the regime has for now pacified key segments of the opposition. 
The Islamic Action Front and constituencies that make up the Hirak have willingly 
participated in this pacification historically. The Islamic Action Front has thus far 
played the role of loyal opposition, which Jordanian politics experts, rather than replace 
the regime; moreover, the Hirak movement in the south has merely sought to remind 
those in power of the need to be responsive to their traditional base of support. 
Tempered by these relations, as well as by the grim reminders from Syria and Egypt 
that wholesale regime change can be an uncertain and dangerous undertaking, there is 
little impetus for a full-scale revolutionary effort.457 
(iv) Hirak opposition in Jordan 
After the Jordanian spring commenced with peaceful protests in January 2011, many 
observers rejected the idea of the breakdown of the Jordanian regime. Existing 
opposition forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood, old leftist parties and other civil 
society organisations did mobilise thousands of demonstrators in Amman weekly. 
However, such protests were elite orientated in that they were driven by organisational 
leaders rather than ordinary citizens. Further to that they were not spontaneous. 
Islamists obeyed implicit rules of protest by announcing precise marching routes, 
keeping crowds nonviolent and dispersing peacefully. They did not personally target 
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King Abdullah or call for the regime’s downfall. As it had been accustomed to self-
contained protests, the regime tolerated these events with virtually no repression.458 
These assessments were only half correct. The Brotherhood and other conventional 
opposition indeed were no mutinous vanguard intent on storming the palace, but they 
are also no longer the most accurate bellwethers of public opinion. Two newer 
opposition trends emerging in 2011 embodied popular and more unpredictable vectors 
of political change grass roots movements, the Hirak movement in tribal communities 
outside the capital and the explosion in youth mobilisation elsewhere. 
(v) The youth group Hirak in Jordan 
The Hirak trend touches on a second and broader dynamic of change within Jordanian 
society: new political activism resulting from generational change. Among the two-
thirds of Jordan’s population who are aged 30 or less, political mobilisation rose 
sharply during the Arab Spring for several reasons. The first is the declining prospect 
for youth employment. The economy does not generate jobs for 60,000 new entrants to 
the national labour force annually, and real employment is double the official rate of 14 
percent. The majority of Jordanians in their 20s are jobless, trapped between a weak 
private sector that prefers cheaper foreign workers like Egyptians and Syrians and a 
bloated public sector that has too few openings for bureaucracies already suffering from 
redundant operations. The growth of tertiary education too has played a role. Even in 
rural areas, spreading access to university education since 1990 has gradually 
liberalised youth attitudes. 459 
                                                
458 Jordan Reform Watch, al islah fiil ulrdun Amman, Jordan 2012: Identity Center, 2013. 
459 Naseem Tarawneh, ‘the kids are not alright’, Jordan Business, June 2013, pp.13-16. 
283 
 
The youth trend has eroded the oldest and most contentious social cleavage, the 
Palestinian-East Bank divide. For decades, the Jordanian government exploited social 
tensions between the Palestinian majority and most tribal East Bank minorities to 
prevent a unified national opposition. For example, the electoral system disenfranchised 
the former through biased voting and distracting laws, while a prejudiced nationalism 
that celebrated the latter as traditional Jordanians permeated the education system, 
political system, political discourse and hiring practices.460 For example, since the 1988 
disengagement from the West Bank, the interior ministry has arbitrarily revoked 
Jordanian citizenship from thousands of Palestinian-origin residents, most of whom 
have resided in the kingdom for years. This was a strategy designed to deter new 
demands for political voice amongst the Palestinian majority in the kingdom.461 
However, many new activists who emerged during 2011-2012 believed that common 
needs for politics could overcome the demographic divide. Palestinian and East Bank 
youths worked in unison in urban movements and ensconced their politics in broad 
principles of dignity rather than the localised language of identity politics.462 
Such a false sense of security propelled the popular argument that the Arab Spring 
bypassed Jordan. The lack of revolutionary turmoil, however should not obscure 
irreversible shift within state-society relations. Hirak protest groups and urban youth 
movements claimed a unique space within the area of opposition politics; they could 
neither be tainted by accusations of Islamic radicalism nor divided by the politics of 
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social identity. This new generation came of age by fighting for constitutional 
monarchy and demanding the king’s abdication, representing a growing fragmentation 
within a social force often assumed to be monolithically supportive of state imperatives. 
Such politics do not fit within the existing patterns of opposition and protest activity 
considered by Jordanian experts as moderate and predictable, and hence posing no 
threat to the stability of the Hashemite kingdom.463 
(vi) The government’s response to the protests in Jordan 
In this section of the chapter, the thesis will analyse the government response to the 
protests in Jordan. The purpose of this section is to delineate the regime’s strategy in 
order to check the more revolutionary aspects of the Arab Spring. King Abdullah II, 
mindful of what had unfolded in neighbouring Syria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, 
did not want a repetition of these developments in the streets of Amman. The monarchy 
wanted to chart a national identity that was rooted in the cause of Arab solidarity, 
Palestinian statehood and the more progressive elements of the Arab Spring. 
In response to the Arab Spring protests that took place in neighbouring Arab countries, 
the king, having been briefed, moved on and dismissed his prime minister, Rifai, on 
February 1, 2011. Changing governments and moving cabinets is a very old, established 
way used by both King Abdullah II and the late King Hussein to appease the Jordanian 
public demand. In this way, Jordanian politics can be re-directed while the king remains 
immune from criticism. The king has chosen a new prime minster four times since the 
beginning of the demonstrations at the start of 2011. Furthermore, King Abdullah very 
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speedily reiterated his promise of change by appointing committees with reform 
agendas.464 
The prime minster Samir Rifai was very unpopular and was himself implicated in the 
economic complaints that were at the heart of the demonstrations. He had previously 
presided over a number of neo-liberal reforms, putting a very heavy emphasis on the 
privatisation of many government programmes to deal with the country’s increasing 
deficit. Being of Palestinian descent, he was also labelled by tribal chiefs in Jordan as 
looking after Palestinian businessmen at the cost of developing tribal regions, which 
have historically being more reliant on public sector investment and efforts.465 
King Abdullah appointed Ma’arouf al Bakhiet to speed up the reform agenda as a result 
of the calls for change from the Arab street. Al Bakhiet is from a very strong tribe in 
Jordan, having appeared on the surface to be a sympathiser of the poor who were 
protesting against low salaries and high food prices. He began by examining the salary 
scales in the public sector, promising better conditions, as well as fulfilling the King’s 
demand for a national dialogue committee to discuss changes in election law and the 
law governing political parties.466 
Prime Minister al Bakhiet was not popular with Jordanians of Palestinian background; 
he had served before as the prime minister, having been assigned to safeguard the 
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Jordanian interest after the hotel bombing in Amman, which happened in November 
2005. He had started a security-orientated policy, leading to confrontation with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. His re-appointment as prime minister in 2011 led to the first 
division in the protest movement. The tribal groups saw this as an appropriate time to 
give the new regime an opportunity, while the Muslim Brotherhood and some of the 
socialist parties wanted to continue the Friday demonstrations.467 
During al Bakhiet’s time in office, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to put an emphasis 
on the protest movement, which disturbed the government. The experience from the 24 
March 2011 protest and the demonstrators’ change of focus towards resentment in tribal 
areas further diminished al Bakhiet’s ability to manoeuvre. While he got mired in 
corruption charges and increasingly was seen to be opposed to the demands of the 
protestors, his government came to an end.468 
October 2011 saw a new government change, in which Awwn al Khasawneh replaced 
Prime Minister al Bakhiet. In an effort to show that he was very committed to his 
reforms, the king this time did not appoint a ‘returnee’ or what the demonstrators called 
the ‘revolving door of the prime minister industry’. Prime ministers have usually been 
chosen from a select few families, some of them returning and others following in the 
footsteps of their fathers. This time a high profile judge, well regarded for his integrity 
and above suspicion of wrong doing was called back from his post as a judge in the 
International Court of Justice in the Hague, where he had served since 1999. The 
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appointment was understood to be a nod to the Muslim Brotherhood. This was very 
soon confirmed when the new prime minister very quickly proclaimed his wish to hold 
a conversation with all groups in the country, including the opposition parties and the 
protest movements. The Muslim Brotherhood turned out to be the focal point of these 
discussions. 
Media experts on the other hand declared that the reshuffle of the government was a 
response to the former prime minister’s proposed election law that was opposed by the 
different opposition groups. Tribal members of the parliament felt that this favoured the 
Islamists while the Islamists felt angered because the suggested party list scheme in 
effect limited the number of parliamentary seats the opposing parties could muster all 
together under the revised election rules. The Muslim Brotherhood also refused to 
consider a suggested ban on political parties established on religious grounds, claiming 
that both measures were aimed at restricting religious influence that they maintained 
otherwise to rapidly increase under open and fair elections.469 
Fayez al-Tarawneh, who was also prime minister in the late 1990s, was appointed 
prime minister after Khasawneh. The reaction to the news of his appointment would 
suggest it was not seen as an important change. Conservatives from the political state 
dominated the new government. The king asked al Tarawneh to form a new 
government for ‘a limited transitional period to introduce reforms needed to hold 
elections before the end of the year 2012’.470 In addition to Jordan’s increasing 
economic difficulties, al Tarawneh also had to deal with the same problems as his 
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predecessors, namely, changing elections and political party rules, preparing for 
parliamentary and postponed regional elections and drafting liberal rules for the media 
establishment.471  When he failed to end the protests against economic regression and 
the lack of political reforms, King Abdullah surprised the Jordanian public by once 
again appointing a new prime minister after dissolving the parliament in preparation for 
new parliamentary elections. 
The current prime minister, Abdullah Ensour, is a former minister and a strong 
advocate of democratic change. Ensour is an independent member of parliament and 
recognised for his many associates both in circles around the royal Hashemite court and 
with the Islamic Action Front, other opposition groups and trade unions. His main task 
was to convince the Muslim Brotherhood to forgo the announced boycott of the coming 
elections, a rather difficult and complex job with an election law book which clearly 
favoured tribal politicians known to be more supportive of the king.472 This was a task 
in the end that did not materialise as the Islamic Action Front kept with its boycott 
decision. 
As the preceding discussion has highlighted, Jordan seems to have weathered the storm 
of the Arab Spring. The king has been shrewd and calculating in appeasing the demands 
of the protesters. By appointing a series of new prime ministers, he was able to dampen 
the more revolutionary aspects of the protests. King Abdullah and his advisers wish to 
articulate a national identity for Jordan, which takes into account stability, a benevolent 
monarch, democratic aspirations and a neo-liberal economic policy. National identity in 
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Jordan in the opening decades of the 21st century is very confident, stable and 
monarchical based, and seeks to accommodate the demands of a younger, more 
politically conscious generation. 
 (vii) Political opposition and reforms in Jordan 
The year 2011 began with street protests – but not yet calls for regime change – in 
Amman and other cities across Jordan, partly inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions and slogans for reform  in the kingdom. The dissatisfaction and feeling of 
powerlessness that led to these protests were evident and had been rising for a 
substantial amount of time. 
These protests reminded Jordanians of the popular unrest and social demonstrations of 
April 1989. These earlier protests turned very quickly into street riots, instigated in 
large part by deficit-reducing measures introduced as part of an international monetary 
fund maintenance programme.  
The protests of 1989, like the ones that took place in 2011, grew very quickly to include 
demonstrations not only against severe economic measures, but also state corruption, 
while calling for greater and more open liberalisation. What alarmed the Hashemite 
monarchy in both cases was the very large visible presence and even domination of the 
ethnic East Jordanian or Transjordanian subjects.473 
To explain it in more detail, the protestors themselves could not be characterised as the 
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usual suspects in oppositional socialist and religious parties or Palestinian agitators. 
Rather, the protestors ranged across the political spectrum within Jordan and even 
crossed the ethnic divide between Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians. 
With sudden regime change taking place in other Arab states, Jordan’s opposition 
movement has expanded and is now more coordinated in its endeavours to put the 
regime on the back foot with respect to the reform process, calling for greater 
democracy and the restricting of the King’s more arbitrary powers (this has been 
highlighted by the king in an official discussion paper in the royal Hashemite court 
website),474 in order to make Jordan a more representative and constitutional 
Kingdom.475 
The preceding analysis has shown that the monarchy is acutely aware that in order to 
avoid revolutionary demands for regime change, some gradual and incremental reform 
is necessary. The goal that King Abdullah has set himself is ambitious and 
commendable, as he wishes to bring into being in Jordan a constitutional monarchy, not 
altogether different from the role of the head of state in the United Kingdom. In terms 
of identity formation, Jordan aspires to be democratic, yet monarchical. Jordanians 
aspire to be progressive while avoiding the more revolutionary tendencies of regime 
change.  
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(viii) The reform question in Jordan 
Jordan began its liberalisation process in response not to the Arab uprising of 2011, but 
to widespread popular unrest in April 1989. Even though the motivations were 
defensive on the part of the regime, it initiated a political and liberalisation process that 
included the revival of elections and parliamentary life.476 At the time, Jordan’s 
liberalisation looked to be the most promising and the most extensive in the entire Arab 
world. Over time, the process expanded to include the lifting of martial law, the 
legalisation of political parties, the loosening of restrictions on the media and six rounds 
of national parliamentary elections (in 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2007 and 2010).477 
Economically, Jordan moved steadily towards a neo-liberal model of development, with 
emphasis on privatising state-owned industries, lowering barriers to trade and 
encouraging extensive foreign investment.  
Yet, while economic liberalisation has proceeded apace since 1989, political reform has 
since faltered, stalled and at times regressed. Over the past two decades, Jordan has 
experienced both liberalisation and de-liberalisation in its political life, as the state has 
at times retreated from earlier reforms. This was clear in the aftermath of Jordan’s 
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peace treaty with Israel in 1994.478 
In an analysis of stalled reform in Jordan, the International Crisis Group in 2003 
suggested the deficit of democratic representation might become the spark for real 
conflict in the kingdom, even going so far as to compare Jordan to Algeria. But the 
same report also remarked upon the weakness of Jordan’s political opposition, arguing 
that too often opposition parties and civil society have contented themselves with 
vacuous slogans and unrealistic proposals that do not resonate with the people and 
further undermine the credibility of political action.479 
Analysing rising tensions and unrest in Jordan, the International Crisis Group noted that 
government reform efforts seemed to focus mainly on procedural democracy, that is the 
act of elections, without providing meaningful channels for genuine participation, 
transparency and accountability.480 
Investigating the unrest that led to six deaths in recurrent violence in the southern town 
of Ma’an in November 2003, the ICG argued that: 
 
Nevertheless, the regime’s Achilles heel is the feeble bond of trust 
between most citizens and the state. Meaningful relationships are based 
on family or tribal loyalties, with religion also an important social glue. 
The state, however, is largely absent from these relations being broadly 
perceived as non-transparent, unresponsive and unaccountable.481 
The report also cited King Abdullah himself, who is quoted the same year in an 
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American newspaper stating that: 
the leadership of the Middle East don’t understand that 50 percent of the 
population is under eighteen, and if they don’t get going to create some 
means for real participation for these young people, they are going to 
have serious problems.482 
In an attempt to achieve political reform, King Abdullah appointed the kingdom’s 
former foreign minister and prominent reformer Marwan Muasher to the post of deputy 
prime minister of reform. In that capacity, Muasher was tasked to lead a broad-based 
committee of Jordanians in what was called ‘the national agenda’ for reform. 
The effort resulted in calls for broader political reforms within the Kingdom, including 
the rights of women, and a deepening of Jordan’s nascent civil society specifically. As 
Muasher noted at that time, even the concept of civil society has sometimes been 
reduced to include only charitable NGOs and not political parties, professional 
associations or trade unions, effectively de-politicising the concept.  
Consequently, he called for a broader conceptualisation of civil society, to include all 
these types of organisation, independent of the state itself, with goals ranging from 
social to economical. In this way, he surmised political liberalisation in Jordan and 
elsewhere can move forward, but only with a strengthened civil society as its base.483  
As the proceeding paragraphs have demonstrated, Jordan is on its way to becoming a 
constitutional participatory monarchy. The king recognises the need for reform and has 
appointed ministers to steer this process along, all of which bodes well for a new and 
strong Jordan that is ready to face the challenges of 21st century politics with gusto and 
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a forward-looking, modernising agenda. 
(ix) Protests gaining little traction in Jordan  
A number of events over the period 2011-2013 might support the idea that the survival 
of Jordan’s monarchy has been jeopardised. For example, the kingdom has witnessed 
many protests since early 2011, with demonstrators demanding substantive economic 
and political reforms. In November 2011, the government’s decision to lift fuel 
subsidies angered many Jordanians, as it raised the cost of fuel and gas, resulting in 
widespread demonstrations that many believed the government would be unable to 
contain.484 Moreover, King Abdullah’s frequent cabinet reshuffling – Jordan has had 
five different prime ministers in the period 2011-2013 – might be considered a sign of 
desperation from a monarch who has no real vision for reform. This stigmatisation and 
characterisation of King Abdullah as slow on the reform front has meant that Jordan’s 
national identity has become stymied and non-responsive to the changing situation 
engulfing the country. The king will need to deliver on his reform promises if his vision 
of a participatory and inclusive Jordan is to bear fruit. Jordan’s national identity and 
King Abdullah’s forthcoming measures, or a lack thereof, will prove very telling for the 
future. 
Most recently, the country’s new electoral law generated widespread dissent among 
citizens demanding fair political representation. The law fell far short of Jordanians’ 
democratic aspirations, and consequently many wondered if the parliamentary elections 
held under that law in April 2012 would finally motivate citizens to demand a regime 
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change. Demand for more open political representation feeds directly into the 
delineation of a national identity that is accepting of all identities in Jordan, whether 
one is Palestinian or from the East Bank.485 
In each of these cases, however, popular dissatisfaction has failed to develop into the 
kind of widespread unrest that has prompted regime change elsewhere in the region. 
Jordan’s protests have generally been scheduled events, hardly uncontrollable mass 
demonstrations. They have lacked the sustained occupation of public spaces seen 
elsewhere, and are remarkable more for their organised nature than for their 
revolutionary feel. 486 
Even the protests and riots that followed the government’s decision to remove fuel 
subsidies fizzled out after a week or two. This subdued nature of the protests and the 
lack of revolutionary fervour have meant that national identity creation in Jordan 
proceeds at an incremental pace, where the questioning of the monarchy and the 
country’s tribal traditions have been kept to a minimum. This cautionary approach to 
political change, gradualist evolutionary change even, has meant Jordan has weathered 
the storm of the Arab spring relatively well and emerged unscathed. In terms of national 
identity, this has meant that the espousal of revolutionary causes has never been a 
marked feature of Jordanian political life; the country has always been represented by a 
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national identity that has been relatively stable, slow to change and rooted in the 
country’s nativist traditions 
(x) The issue of identity in Jordanian politics today 
There is no question that ethnic identity tensions within Jordan have dramatically 
increased over the decade. This is due in part to the severe economic hardships, but also 
to the kingdom’s extreme vulnerability to regional tensions, which range from Israeli 
discussions of Jordan as an alternative homeland for Palestinians, to war in Iraq and the 
massive Iraqi refugee flows into Jordan after the 2003 Iraq war, and 
now fears of complete civil war and even the collapse of Syria to the north. These 
identity dynamics have been most clear in the strong nativist trend that has emerged to 
protect Jordan for real Jordanians. This has led to unprecedented levels of criticism of 
the regime and of the monarchy for allegedly selling Jordan to a Palestinian economic 
class and now an increasingly governmental elite. Tensions have abounded in the East 
Jordanian southern cities and towns, and within and among Jordanian tribes. These 
traumatic events that Jordan is currently experiencing open up two different scenarios 
for the country: 1) Jordan could be convulsed by the bloody changes taking place on its 
borders; recent events in Syria show that the brutal war there has now spilled into 
neighbouring Iraq and potentially harmed tribal and ethnic divisions in the north of 
Iraq. 2) The second option for Jordan is a measured response to the demands for 
change, greater acceptance of political reform, listening to legitimate dissent in the 
country and appeasing the nativist discourse of the East Bankers. The king has shown 
himself to be skilful at handling criticism and calls for change. He has able and 
experienced advisers to guide him and forewarn him of any potential danger on the 
horizon. 
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High-profile criticism of the monarchy has emerged from tribal leaders and retired 
military officers, and the latter have now also formed their own political party. Recent 
alarmist accounts of Jordanian politics have indeed picked up on these tensions. But 
they too often mistake the more polarised views of specific Palestinian and East 
Jordanian political figures for the views of most Jordanians. 
Jordan is actually a diverse country and should not be confused with the ethnic 
caricatures that both Palestinian and East Jordanian chauvinists use for each other. It is 
not, in short, a country of tribal bigots and disloyal rich Palestinians. Rather, it is 
predominantly an Arab state with a significant Circassian minority, and predominantly 
a Muslim country with a large Christian minority. Some have tribal backgrounds, but 
many do not, and regardless of the exclusivist nativist trend supported by some in 
Jordanian politics today, all Jordanians actually have ties across one or more of the 
kingdom’s borders. This more nuanced and more discerning analysis shows the picture 
to be less black and white and more grey. Those who characterise Jordan as a country 
of disloyal rich Palestinians and disgruntled poor tribes hide more than they reveal in 
their analyses. Jordan is in reality a more complex, socially integrated and cohesive 
country than many political commentators would admit. The analysis that they present 
counters the narrative of the more alarmist commentators who believe the country to be 
on the brink of disaster. There is no such scenario for Jordan: identity politics in Jordan 
is in flux but the longer-term picture is far more encouraging and positive. Matters 
should therefore be treated with more caution without running headlines based on 
unconfirmed facts and subjective opinions. 
While political tensions in Jordan frequently manifest themselves in ethnic, tribal, or 
identity terms, they are more often than not about class divisions between rich and poor, 
and between haves and have-nots. And these cut across ethnic lines. Nevertheless, the 
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violence in Syria has exacerbated these tensions. Even as the regime remains deeply 
concerned about the implications of the Syrian imbroglio for Jordan’s own security and 
stability, the kingdom’s broad-based reform movement has splintered in its responses.  
Some of the latter parties, originally allied with the Islamists as part of a broad reform 
coalition in Jordan, now fear that the Arab uprisings have led only to Islamist 
empowerment, and even charge that there is a new ‘Islamist-American-Zionist’ 
conspiracy to that effect. Yet, despite the various ethnic and ideological fault lines in 
Jordanian politics, pro-reform and pro-democracy demonstrators from the leftist, 
nationalist and Islamist parties, and also from non-partisan youth movements across the 
country, have marched and protested against corruption and for reform almost every 
Friday for more than a year. The Arab uprisings have certainly helped inspire the 
reform movement and have also spurred the regime to push through revisions in the 
constitution and soon in the electoral laws as well.487  
 
Section C: The Syrian Crisis 
(i) Inside alliances against the backdrop of the Syrian civil war 
The protests originated from deep inside different strata of Jordanian society. Part of the 
momentum that started before the Arab uprising originated in opposition movements, 
from both inside and outside the registered professional groups. The Arab Spring then 
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led to larger demands for constitutional change and political enfranchisement. The 
earlier protests did not originate from the official opposition parties in Jordan. A 
number of different of political organisations and alliances outside the political 
establishment formed very quickly calling for change. These included Bedouin 
coalitions and coalitions around certain figures with a presence in political affairs, 
whether within the regime or outside it, including the national front for reform, the 
popular association of reform, the national initiative and the national Zamzam 
initiative.488 
The national initiative, which includes nationalist and socialist parties, hesitated to enter 
the debate on institutional reform, especially on the electoral law. It is certain that the 
issue in Jordan is mainly structural, so laying the groundwork for ownership over the 
kingdom’s resources is the most important priority. But the two other coalitions had 
different interpretations. While the national front for reform was demanding the return 
of the 1952 constitution, the popular association for reform demanded that parliament 
should be given the authority to appoint the government, and that the regime should be 
turned into a constitutional monarchy.489 
By the end of 2012, the Jordanian government began to handle popular discontent and 
the demands of the opposition more harshly. This harshness in approach coincided with 
a number of factors: Jordan received assurance of international and local support, 
especially from Saudi Arabia. The government of Bashar al-Assad was reinstated in 
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power, which it was on the edge of losing, giving confidence to the Jordanian friends of 
Damascus. It agreed to take part in the parliamentary election, which took place in 
December 2013, having asked all the opposition parties to abandon the elections and 
refrain from taking part in them.  
It is clear that the Jordanian government is using the Syrian war to strengthen its base, 
which has been rocked by social pressure and poor management, and to highlight the 
importance of its regional rule. Practically, the Jordanian government explains its stance 
on Syria, as the Syrian situation unfolds, as a difficult position that allows for somewhat 
contradictory and inconsistent views. The statements made by King Abdullah II have 
changed from favouring radical reforms in Syria as a solution to stating that, by 
stepping down from power, President Assad would place Syria on the path to pluralism 
and democracy.490 
(ii) Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan 
The current estimates of the number of refugees are approximately 641,915. Those 
estimates are based on a calculations made by the United Nations humanitarian agency 
which is based in Amman and also is providing assistance to those thousands of 
refugees who are fleeing the Syrian war.491 What is certain is that the situation is 
changing rapidly and appears to be getting worse. For months, Syrians have been 
fleeing to Jordan in relatively small numbers. The feeling among many of the people 
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already working to help refugees in Jordan was that the situation, though it bore 
watching, was within the capability of local institutions to manage. Today, that feeling 
is rapidly dissolving. But so far, the Jordanian government has not put forth much of a 
strategy for dealing with this crisis, which could evolve in many different ways. In 
addition to the above, a chart has been added below to show the number of Syrian 
refugees in Jordan and which areas have the largest numbers of refugees.492 
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Handling the current uncertainty requires learning the lessons of past forced migrations, 
and in particular of the Iraqi refugee crisis of 2006-2010, which evolved under 
somewhat similar circumstances. Jordan’s last refugee crisis came about, at least in 
part, because the Jordanian government and the international community had prepared 
themselves for the wrong disaster. When the bombs started falling on Baghdad in 2003, 
everyone expected Jordan’s borders to be swamped by tens to hundreds of thousands of 
Iraqis demanding sanctuary. When that situation did not materialise, it was assumed 
that the danger was over.493 
No one seemed to predict what came next: the slow continuous build-up of a displaced 
population. The border between Iraq and Jordan had long been heavily trafficked, and 
by 2006 many more Iraqis were entering Jordan than were leaving. Some came on 
business or vacation and decided to stay until their home became safer. Some who 
already lived in Jordan decided to bring their families. Others fled often after a 
kidnapping or threats of violence against a family member. Many started off able to 
care for themselves, but months or years in exile when they were unable to work ate 
away at their savings and left them in desperate need.  
Today, in a strange sort of déjà vu situation, the discussion of Syrian displacement 
appears to centre around the same assumption that a ‘crisis’ will mean millions of 
families trying to cross the border all at once. The first response of the Jordanian 
government to this worry was to build a camp on the Syrian border. The partially state-
owned Jordan Times recently ran a photo of a vast paved lot surrounded by water tanks, 
                                                
493 Nicholas Seeley,Jordan open door policy for Syrian refuges, foreign policy journal march 2012 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/01/jordans-open-door-policy-for-syrian-refugees/ Accessed on 
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and unnamed officials told the paper two more camps are being planned and are now 
being built to house the incoming refugees fleeing from Syria. 
But both the government and the Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization, which was 
put in charge of preparing the camps, have declined to talk about how the camps will be 
managed, or by whom, or even who is supposed to live in them. The first camp opened 
in mid-February 2012, but there is no news of anyone actually using it. Displaced 
Syrians, like the Iraqis before them, are taking up residence in Jordan’s cities. It is 
possible that President Bashar al-Assad’s next bombing campaign will indeed trigger an 
epic mass migration, with tens of thousands crowding Jordan’s borders, a situation that 
might call for camps to house the large numbers of displaced.  
Though cagey about its plans, the government has been open to acknowledging the 
presence of displaced Syrians, and even accepting that some may be refugees, a word 
that carries problematic connotations in this context. The government has also been 
proactive in making it clear that Syrian children would have full access to Jordanian 
schools, though it remains unclear how long that commitment will last. So far, the 
public response to displaced Syrians appears positive. The state media apparatus has 
sided, to the degree it can, with the Syrian people. Government newspapers faithfully 
cover both reports of violence over the border and anti-Assad protests at home.  
If economic conditions worsen, or if violence in Syria increases and starts to affect 
Jordanian citizens, attitudes towards Syrians may quickly sour. Already there are 
tensions within the government, which could cut either way in terms of public 
perception. That the refugee issue is at the moment manageable is all the more reason 
for governments and aid organisations to work together to plan, in a transparent 
manner, for the most likely eventualities. They should work to ensure that assistance is 
delivered to those who need it, and that Jordan is able to maintain its open-door policy 
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without being made to suffer economic or social consequences in exchange for its 
generosity.494 
 
(iii) The refugee crisis and its impact on identity in Jordan 
With no end to the Syrian civil war in sight, the Syrian refugee crises continue to 
escalate amid international concerns over how to respond to this humanitarian 
emergency. The international community commended Jordan for welcoming the Syrian 
refugees who fled their country during the civil war, which is still ongoing. But as the 
number of refugees entering Jordan continues to rise, so does the strain on Jordan’s 
political and economic balance, in particular, in a country which has struggled to create 
a unified national identity since independence.495 
Over the years the sheer number of refugees living in Jordan has created a series of 
issues for political life in Jordan. First of all, refugees have been seen as a challenge to 
the integrity and legitimacy of the Jordanian regime. The fact that Palestinians make up 
the majority of the population feeds into the notion that Jordan is Palestine that came 
out from Israel, which claims that the Palestinian right to self-determination could be 
satisfied by the establishment of a Palestinian state in Jordan. In addition to the above 
statement, King Abdullah II of Jordan reiterated that Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is 
Palestine. This is an obvious threat to the regime’s power and to Jordan’s viability as a 
                                                
494 Nicholas Seely, ‘Jordan’s Open Door Policy for Syrian Refugees’, Middle East Foreign Policy 
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495 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21179835 Accessed on 27/12/2014 
306 
 
nation state. 
The refugee situation also poses a challenge to the key constituencies, which have 
traditionally kept the Hashemites in power. The Hashemite monarch has long based his 
support on the loyalty of the East Bank Jordanian tribes. The East Bankers have 
enjoyed a privileged relationship with the monarchy, which has given them access to 
free education and public sector jobs, and they fill the ranks of the army and the state 
intelligence services. But the growing refugee demographic threatens their privileged 
positions, and has begun to provoke a backlash in recent years. 
Faced with these challenges, King Abdullah II has undertaken several measures since 
he acceded to the throne with a view to fostering a sense of Jordanian patriotism that 
could be channelled towards supporting the Hashemite rule. His Jordan First campaign 
could be described as an attempt to construct a national identity defined in territorial 
rather than pan-Arab terms and foster loyalty to Jordanian interests above all others. 
The Jordan First campaign, however, has been met with unease by many who distrust 
its political motives. The brand of Jordanian nationalism encouraged by the campaign 
implicitly excludes and delegitimises the Palestinian identity and can be regarded as 
one element in the monarchy’s deliberate policy to reserve high-level governmental 
positions and discriminate against Palestinians despite the king’s wife being of 
Palestinian descent.496 
With the new wave of refugees, which is creating mounting pressure on Jordan’s 
economy, there is a worrying possibility that attitudes towards refugees could continue 
                                                
496  Jeffery Goldberg The modern King in the Arab spring, The Atlantic magazine April 2013. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270/Accessed on 
27/12/2014 
307 
 
to sour. The Syrian refugee population is causing a strain on Jordan’s scarce water 
supply as well as its schools and hospitals. Jordanians fear that the influx of Syrians  
desperate to earn a living will push wages down and heighten the competition for scarce 
jobs. At the same time, the government in Jordan has suspended subsidies on 
electricity, water, fuel and bread, which has led to higher prices for everyone. The 
presence of refugees in the country is a significant strain on the limited resources the 
country is able to offer. 497 
The Jordanian government needs to balance competing interests; it must look at the 
current distribution of power in the country amongst the various national groups in a 
very open and frank way. There is the danger that the influx of more refugees may 
threaten the balance of power in Jordan, as there is only so much privilege that the 
monarchy can dispense. The regime needs to take into account these identity pull-and-
push factors when delineating a new identity for Jordan, since identity formation in 
Jordan today is a very complex and multifaceted affair. The country will need to 
embrace multiple narrative strands: the Palestinian narrative, the tribal narrative and the 
young pan-Arab, Arab Spring-inspired democratic narrative.498 
Historically the Hashemite monarchy has had to balance a number of different elements 
in its desire to enunciate a clear Jordanian national identity. These different elements 
have included East Bank Jordanian tribes, West Bank Palestinians, Islamists of the 
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Muslim brotherhood and Arab Nationalists. The present Syrian refugee influx has 
affected this delegate balance and complicated more the sense of a clear Jordanian 
national identity today. 
Historically, tribal support for the Hashemite monarchy had been a critical feature of 
the Jordanian state’s political legitimacy. During the early years of the establishment of 
Jordan as a state, the Hashemite family built the identity of the Jordanian nation around 
the Bedouin tribes. Beyond representing important characteristics of Jordanian identity, 
East Bank tribes have played an important role in Jordan’s armed forces and security 
services, from which the Jordanian government derives its traditional power base. The 
thesis has therefore demonstrated that exclusivity around Jordanian identity originates 
from attempts by East Bank Jordanians to safeguard their political status and privileges. 
Jordan has historically built its political legitimacy around East Jordanian national 
identity. From the early years since the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom, the 
idea that Jordan might become an alternative homeland for Palestinians loomed large in 
the nation’s political mindset and psychology. Palestinians were excluded from 
government positions, although they formed a large percentage of the Jordanian 
economic elite. The perceived threat of Palestinians to East Bank political hegemony 
and Jordanian national identity plays itself out in Jordan’s Syria refugee policy as the 
country puts limitations on the arrival of Palestinian and Syrian refugees. 
The protracted nature of the Syrian refugee crises has future political implications for 
Jordanian national identity. A generation or two from today that translates to 20 or 30 
years on, Syrians who have made a life in Jordan will add to the population of non-
Jordanian individuals who live with fewer rights and not as fully equally citizens within 
the kingdom’s frontiers. This changing demographic threatens to highlight future 
political questions about who deserves full citizenship and will provoke a more 
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challenging discussion of who actually is Jordanian, what does Jordan First mean and 
how is national identity in Jordan to unfold in the coming years.499 
 
 
 
Conclusion: Jordan since the Arab uprising: between change and stability 
The Islamist movement, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, has begun to be seen as 
one of the main beneficiaries of the uprisings in the post-2011 Middle East. The 
Islamist group’s support for public rallies (especially in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria) 
epitomises a new era of challenge for the incumbent Arab regimes. Although it is too 
early to speak of structural change or a revolutionary era in the region, the events of the 
Arab Spring have highlighted the profound effect the Muslim Brotherhood Society is 
having in most Middle Eastern countries. 
Despite the fact that the uprisings sparked changes to certain political rules in the 
region, the main players within the systems themselves have, to a large degree, 
remained in place. Rather than wiping the slate clean, the Arab Spring has encouraged 
former political players in the region to switch positions and activities inside the 
prevailing system. One of the clearest examples of this is the Muslim Brotherhood and 
                                                
499 Alexandra Francis, Jordan refugee crises, Carnegie Endowment for International peace September 
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its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, in Jordan.500 
For Jordan, the Islamic Action Front’s change in stance is only one outcome of the 
protests. Jordan’s democratisation process has also been influenced by another by-
product of the recent uprisings, a resurgence of East Bank engagement, witnessed for 
the first time since the socioeconomic riots in Maan in 2002. Although not triggered by 
identity issues within the kingdom, the recent public rallies have led to the re-
emergence of historical divisions and called into question the notion of loyalty between 
Jordanians and the citizens of Jordan with Palestinian origins. 
For the Arab Middle East in general, the uprisings can be best explained as a legitimacy 
crisis in which incumbent regimes have lost the support of the masses. Economic and 
social pressures have provoked widespread demands for political and economic reform. 
In Jordan, before the Arab uprisings, political liberalisation efforts were primarily 
sparked by domestic economic grievances and had little impact when compared to the 
other countries in the region. This thesis argues that with the onset of the public rallies 
and Islamist activist insurgence in the Arab world, Jordan came to represent the 
epitome of new change. Steps taken by the government to uphold its own process of 
political reform from 2011 onwards resonated in other countries. Due to the permeable 
nature of the Arab world’s borders, Jordan’s regime-led style of democratisation has 
spread, and Islamist activism, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front, in 
particular, have been prompted to redefine and reconstruct themselves. 
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Until the onset of the Arab Spring, the trend towards democratisation in Jordan was 
generally influenced by socioeconomic problems, to which the monarchy responded 
with an agenda of political openness. This changed with the Arab Spring, when East 
Banker domestic activism combined with repercussions from the Arab subsystem to 
stimulate the political reform process. 
Currently, in the Hashemite kingdom, the Islamist movement has emerged as one of the 
main actors in the mobilisation of public debate on political reform. As one of the most 
stable regimes in the Middle East, Jordan is a clear example of the Brotherhood and 
Islamic Action Front acting both as ‘loyal opposition’ and as an impetus for political 
liberalisation. Nevertheless, the latest social uprisings have led to growing tensions 
between the kingdom and the Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front, despite the 
latter’s position as the key political party and opposition within post-1992 Jordanian 
politics.501 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion.	  
 
In conclusion, a reflection on each chapter of the dissertation and how they combine as 
a whole is appropriate. Chapter One demonstrated that this research must take into 
consideration the argument that Gellner’s Eurocentric perspective, which limits his 
utility when considering non-European cases, taints his overall analysis. However, for 
one to presume that his theory is utterly irrelevant is to misconceive the valuable and 
material methodology that he provides in painting a picture of how nationalism is 
derived. Gellner’s theory is still applicable to states outside Europe, as can be seen in 
the nationalisms that have taken hold in many Middle Eastern and Arabic countries 
such as Jordan. 
As this chapter shows, the argument can also be endorsed by Gellner’s own writings 
regarding the relationship between nationalism and religion in the Middle East. Thus, it 
is legitimate to call Gellner’s theory relevant to a case study on Jordanian nationalism, 
and the arguments in this project will be developed in favour of, and in contrast to, 
Gellner’s modernist approach so as to provide a comprehensive answer to the main 
question regarding the development of Jordanian nationalism in the period since 
disengagement in 1988. 
In fact, despite the ethnic and political discrepancies between Western and Eastern 
societies, modernism, rather than primordialism or ethno-symbolism, is the most valid 
theory for the examination of nation formation in the Middle East. This is because, 
unlike the other theories, modernism defines nationalism in countries such as Jordan as 
a result of colonialism, political struggle, and social and bureaucratic transformation, 
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and thereby manages to capture the dynamics underlying the generation of new national 
identity. Most of these criteria are equally significant for the history of nationalism in 
the Western world. However, this does not mean that other theories, especially ethno-
symbolism, are completely irrelevant. Indeed, ethno-symbolism may prove very useful 
in approaching aspects of Jordanian nationalism, such as the ethnic past of the 
Palestinians and other minorities, including Bedouins, who live in Jordan.  
Chapter One explored theories applicable to the development of nationalism in the 
Middle East and highlighted key developments in Jordanian national identity in the 
period after disengagement. 
The second chapter discussed the development of the concept of Jordan First in depth 
by clarifying the meaning of state power and the regime’s survival strategies. It 
presumes that a new meaning of the concept of Jordan First as a national slogan is 
considered to be one of the main factors that has weakened traditional powers, and is a 
new beginning for the political liberalisation process. The underlying assumption is that 
individuals will begin to define themselves according to their personal achievements. 
Therefore, Jordan First as the regime’s national slogan is an instrument of 
modernisation that heightens popular demand for the principle of personal achievement. 
To summarise Chapter Two, the analysis demonstrated over four sections that the 
development of national identity with respect to the Hashemite discourse has 
engendered a clearly defined and coherent understanding of Jordanian national identity. 
First, with respect to the tribes of Jordan, the analysis demonstrated how tribal and 
Bedouin identity are integral to any modern concept of Jordanianess. Although 
increasingly less relevant, the tribal makeup of Jordan for the foreseeable future will 
remain an important undercurrent of national identity. In relation to the armed forces, 
the analysis has demonstrated that from the conception of the state of Jordan through to 
314 
 
its present history, the martial qualities represented by the armed forces are an integral 
and important component of modern Jordanian identity.  
The Palestinian analysis in this chapter has shown that this important population of the 
country is a cohesive and a counter force when it comes to national identity formation. 
In short, where the segments are not well integrated in Jordan, in socioeconomic terms, 
there is a greater likelihood that they will espouse a more pronounced Palestinian 
identity. With respect to Jordan First, this was a response by the monarchy to counter 
opposing views, but it is too early to determine whether the regime has been wholly 
successful in inculcating a strong sense of Jordanian identity in view of the effects on 
the country by the current Syrian situation, which is a scenario that is still unfolding.     
Chapter Three analysed the Jordanian government’s efforts since the early 1950s to 
formulate a hybrid Jordanian national identity incorporating how both Jordanians and 
each community in its own way has resisted Palestinians. At the same time, however, 
there is strong evidence to suggest that the regime itself did not hesitate when it served 
its interest to stir up or exploit tensions between the Jordanians and Palestinians in the 
country. Complicating an already difficult situation is the effect of the Jordanian-
Palestinian relations within the ongoing processes of economic and political 
liberalisation measures that have re-ignited tensions between the two communities. 
Each of these processes has led to the formulation of policies that affect the economic 
and political balance between the Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan. These changes 
in the internal communal sharing of power have a specific meaning insofar as this 
balance has gone someway in the past to forming each group’s identity, with Jordanians 
seeing themselves as being tied to the government and the Palestinians seeing 
themselves outside the government. 
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The accumulated effect of economic restructuring and political openings appears to 
have led the two communities in different directions: sensing a threat to their historic 
power position, Jordanians have delineated more clearly a narrative that has been 
referred to as one espousing ‘trans-Jordanian nationalism’. Many Palestinians in Jordan, 
on the other hand, witnessing an opening up of the political and economic system after 
disengagement and being more understanding of the king after the Gulf crises have 
begun to feel that they have to take part in the Jordanian system. 
Whatever the outcome of the continuing tensions between Jordanian and Palestinian 
anxieties, the two groups are certainly going to continue talking and debating and will 
feature prominently in domestic politics as this current stage in the redefining of the 
Jordanian national identity after 1988 continues to unfold. 
King Hussein was concerned about the possible impact of the emerging Palestinian 
entity on the relationship between Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan. On many 
occasions, the king warned that anyone tampering with Jordanian national unity would 
be his ‘enemy until doomsday’. The king added that the Palestinians in Jordan enjoyed 
all rights of citizenship and would continue to do so unless they freely elected to leave 
for Palestine.502 
The king assured the PLO that Jordan’s own self-interest dictated support for the PLO. 
Jordan’s involvement with the Palestine issue was regarded as a twin-track approach – 
the political, historical and social bonds between the east and west banks would make 
strategic ties essential to both nations once the Palestinians fully achieved their national 
aspirations. After 46 years in power, King Hussein died on February 7, 1999. 
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Jordan’s involvement with the Palestine question has always been, and still remains, 
one of the most crucial aspects of its national identity narrative. Jordan was born out of 
the Palestinian struggle and has been tied to its fortunes and misfortunes from the 
beginning of the Arab-Israeli struggle for the Holy Land. Indeed, as the analysis in the 
chapter has demonstrated, the geographical factor has been conducive to the 
development of strong, social, commercial and administrative ties between Jordan and 
the West Bank. 
Chapter Four of the thesis suggested a constructivist link between change, identity and 
foreign policy conduct. One is in a position to question the idea that identity is a 
product of ethnic, religious, cultural or state interests. In place of these traditional 
understandings, the experience of Jordan post disengagement demonstrates that 
struggles over identity in the national and international settings gave birth to pockets of 
interests that key elements within the country then try to realise at all cost. Since 1988, 
Jordan’s identity has changed, particularly since it has concluded a difficult peace with 
Israel in 1994. All of these elements have led to very different understandings of 
Jordan’s identity and interests. The more vocal interpretations of the Arab dimension of 
Jordan’s identity constrained the ability of the monarchy to publicly side with Israel. 
Even those Jordanians who would have benefited from peace publicly at least tried to 
demonstrate adherence to Jordan’s Arab identity. 	  
Chapter Four also analysed Jordan’s relations with Israel from the beginning of its 
existence to the present day. It has shown how the relationship between the two states 
has demonstrated both cordiality and deep mistrust. The chapter focused on the peace 
agreement between the two countries in 1994 and has shown how despite promising a 
great deal, the treaty failed to deliver on peace and security. Jordanian national identity 
has had to evolve very carefully, while making subtle reference to its neighbour to the 
317 
 
west. Jordan both defines itself with respect to Israel as being Arab, Islamic, native to 
the region, monarchical and tribal in a positive sense. It also looks to make similarities 
with Israel by styling itself as progressive, modern, advanced, democratic and liberal in 
its governance.  
In this context of struggle between the government and the opposition to establish a 
dominant public frame, popular opposition to the treaty was not foreordained, or 
inherent in Palestinian communal identity, Islamic beliefs or Arab culture. Identity does 
not produce interests but rather forms the articulation of interests in public political 
struggles. Improved relations with Israel involved both strategic interest in state-to-state 
co-operation and also fundamental challenges to the Arab dimension of Jordan Arab 
identity.	  
Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank in 1988 thus offers a very powerful 
argument for the very real relationship between Jordanian identity and geostrategic 
interests. 
The final chapter of the thesis demonstrated the importance of recent events in Jordan 
for the stability and long-term security of the country. Jordan in this critical period of 
the 21st century faces many multi-faceted challenges: it has to understand the changing 
dynamics of the region, it has to listen to new voices requesting change, and the country 
needs to stabilise its borders and work with international actors wanting to ensure long-
term stability and prosperity. 
This thesis has demonstrated that the narratives that shaped the national identity of 
Jordanians were produced by the state educational system. As demonstrated, the state 
production of historical narratives is supported by the use of specialists in the discipline 
who present their reading of history as ‘ objective and analytical’. By doing this, they 
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set the rules for what is true and what is considered untrue. The specialists’ power 
under the supervision of the state is presented as a neutral act. Such a work plan 
obscures the real influence of the authors who construct identity in Jordan and make 
their research seem neutral and unconnected to the state apparatus. 
The second part of my conclusion relates to  the study question and the discussion of 
national identity in Jordan. The main argument advanced in this thesis is supported in 
the empirical findings. The thesis proposed, first, that identity is socially constructed. 
Second, this identity develops via difference, and it is in relation to others that a sense 
of self develops. The Jordanian national narrative was formed in opposition to the other, 
the other in this instance being Palestinians, Israelis and other Arab nationalities. The 
first argument is in line with the constructionist view on how identities develop. This 
view is in contrast to the essentialist approach, which posits the idea that an identity 
stems from a core essence. As my analysis in the thesis shows, Jordanian national 
identity, as a social identity, is partly socially constructed by the media, state 
propaganda and school and college textbooks.503 
National discourse in Jordan organised the national narrative by selecting events that 
came to symbolise the success and defeat of Arab and Jordanian heroes, like the Late 
King Hussein, and their enemies such as the Israeli state. Another important aspect of 
the role of power in this difficult process of identity formation in relation to people who 
are not Jordanian is that it results in an indirect or direct disagreement between the 
Jordanian self and the non-Jordanian other. Therefore as the thesis has demonstrated, 
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any criteria used to draw a line between self and other is an actual fact, a manifestation 
of power relations which prepare the ground for a healthy rivalry between the included 
Jordanian and the excluded non-Jordanian, that is Palestine. As Derrida has argued, any 
effort by the Jordanian elite to establish the framework of its own identity involves the 
exclusion or silencing of the voices of others who are perceived to be not authentic 
Jordanian or traditional Jordanians. As a result, the process of identity formation in 
Jordan involves acts of highly symbolic violence against the person understood to be 
non-traditional Jordanian or the opposite. As the case study of Jordanian identity since 
1988 has demonstrated, this exclusion of the other is supported by this conclusion.504 
Identity formation and politics since disengagement in 1988 have been key elements in 
the Jordanian national discourse. Jordan needs to embrace an identity that is fluid, 
caters for the different voices in the country and embraces the challenges of modernity. 
This chapter has also shown that the Arab Spring has had a significant impact on 
national identity in Jordan, and it continues to alter the national identity dynamics of a 
country situated in a volatile region. It remains to be seen what the coming months and 
years have in store for Jordan, as the country struggles to keep a lid on the swelling 
opposition movement and the lack of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. 
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